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Abstract 
Container supply chains are vulnerable to many risks. Vulnerability can be defined as 
an exposure to serious disturbances arising from the risks within the supply chain as 
well as the risks external to the supply chain. Vulnerability can also be defined as 
exposure to serious disturbances arising from a hazard or a threat. Containers are one of 
the major sources of security concerns and have been used, for example, to smuggle 
illegal immigrants, weapons, and drugs. The consequences of the use of a weapon of 
mass destruction or discovery of such a device in a container are serious. Estimates 
suggest that a weapon of mass destruction explosion and the resulting port closure could 
cost billions of dollars. The annual cost of container losses as consequences of serious 
disturbances arising from hazards is estimated as $500 million per year. The literature 
review, historical failure data, and statistical analysis in the context of containerships' 
accidents from a safety point of view clearly indicate that the container cargo damage, 
machinery failure, collision, grounding, fire/explosion, and contact are the most 
significant accident categories with high percentages of occurrences. Another important 
finding from the literature review is that the most significant basic event contributing to 
the supply chains' vulnerability is human error. Therefore, firstly, this research makes 
full use of the Evidential Reasoning (ER) advantages and further develops and extends 
the Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning (FER) by exploiting a conceptual and sound 
methodology for the assessment of a seafarer's reliability. Accordingly, control options 
to enhance seafarers' reliability are suggested. The proposed methodology enables and 
facilitates the decision makers to measure the reliability of a seafarer before his/her 
designation to any activities and during his/her seafaring period. Secondly, this research 
makes full use of the Bayesian Networks (BNs) advantages and further develops and 
extends the Fuzzy Bayesian Networks (FBNs) and a "symmetric method" by exploiting 
a conceptual and sound methodology for the assessment of human reliability. 
Furthermore a FBN model (i. e. dependency network), which is capable of illustrating 
the dependency among the variables, is constructed. By exploiting the proposed FBN 
model, a general equation for the reduction of human reliability attributable to a 
person's continuous hours of wakefulness, acute sleep loss and cumulative sleep debt is 
formulated and tested. 
i 
A container supply chain includes dozens of stakeholders who can physically come into 
contact with containers and their contents and are potentially related with the container 
trade and transportation. Security-based disruptions can occur at various points along 
the supply chain. Experience has shown that a limited percentage of inspection, coupled 
with a targeted approach based on risk analysis, can provide an acceptable security level. 
Thus, in order not to hamper the logistics process in an intolerable manner, the number 
of physical checks should be chosen cautiously. Thirdly, a conceptual and sound 
methodology (i. e. FBN model) for evaluating a container's security score, based on the 
importer security filling, shipping documents, ocean or sea carriers' reliability, and the 
security scores of various commercial operators and premises, is developed. 
Accordingly, control options to avoid unnecessary delays and security scanning are 
suggested. Finally, a decision making model for assessing the security level of a port 
associated with ship/port interface and based on the security score of the ship's cargo 
containers, is developed. It is further suggested that regardless of scanning all import 
cargo containers, one realistic way to secure the supply chain, due to lack of information 
and number of variables, is to enhance the ocean or sea carriers' reliability through 
enhancing their ship staff's reliability. Accordingly a decision making model to analyse 
the cost and benefit (i. e. CBA) is developed. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Summary 
This chapter first introduces the key definition used in this research. The research aim 
and objectives are then defined, followed by the background. The objectives and 
hypotheses of this thesis will serve to set out a logical structure of this thesis which is 
aimed at addressing the inherent problems outlined. The main research methodology is 
briefly discussed as well as the scope and structure of the thesis. 
1.1. Definition for Typical Terms Used in This Research 
In the process of constructing a risk model for the safety and security of container line 
supply chains, definitions of the following terms are useful: 
An unintended event involving fatality, injury, property loss or damage, and/or 
environmental damage is called an Accident. 
ice that extends Container supply chains can be defined as one logistics distribution serv 
liner shipping services (which are provided on a regularly scheduled basis to pre- 
determined ports) to inland transport services, to complete efficient flow and storage of 
container cargoes, information and related value added service from point of 
consumption for the purpose of conforming to consumers' requirement (Yang et al., 
2005a). 
The process of sufficiently reducing uncertainty and doubt about alternatives to allow a 
reasonable choice to be made among them is called Decision Making (Harris, 1998). 
The time between the first identification of abnormalities and actual failure time will 
vary depending on the deterioration rate of the component; this period is called the 
Delay lime or opportunity window to carry out the maintenance or an inspection 
(Pillary and Wang, 2003). The time to failure for any component cannot be predicted 
accurately. The failure can only be characterized by the stochastic properties of the 
population as a whole. The times to failure can be used to form a probability distribution 
which gives the likelihood that the component will have failed prior to sometime "t" 
(Andrews and Moss, 2002). 
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Formal Safety Assessment (FSA): FSA is based on the principles of identifying hazards, 
evaluating risks and cost benefit analysis (CBA), and has as its objective the 
development of a framework of safety requirements for shipping in which risks are 
addressed in a comprehensive and cost effective manner (MSA, 1993; MCA, 1996). 
The FSA methodology comprises five inter-related steps and is listed as follows (MSA, 
1993; Pillary and Wang, 2003): 
" The identification of hazards. 
" The assessment of risks associated with those hazards. 
" Ways of managing the risk identified. 
" Cost benefits assessment of the options. 
" Decision on which options to select. 
A physical situation with a potential for human injury, damage to property, damage to 
the environment or some combination of these is called a Hazard (Kumamoto and 
Henley, 1992). 
An unforeseen or unexpected event, which may have the potential to become an 
accident but in which injury to personnel and or damage to the ship or to the 
environment does not materialised or remains minor is called an Incident (Wang and 
Trbojevic, 2007). 
In the context of risk assessment, Judgment is not simply the final decision but is an 
integral part of the whole risk assessment progress with the essential nature as the 
ability to make a critical assessment of evidence (Chicken and Posner, 1998). 
Knowledge encodes judgments about the general tendency of things to happen, evidence 
summarizes the impact of that which actually happened, whereas belie combines the 
two, it consists of assertions about a specific situation inferred by applying generic 
knowledge to a set of evidence sentences (Aleliunas, 198). 
The characteristic of an item expressed by the probability that it will perform a required 
function under stated conditions for a stated period is called a Probability distribution 
(Henley and Kumamoto, 1992). 
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Reliability can be defined either as the probability that a system or a component 
performs its specified function as intended within a given time horizon and the 
environment or as the probability of the absence of failure affecting the performance of 
the system over a given time interval and under given environmental conditions. 
Reliability is therefore a measure of the probability of the successful performance of the 
system over a period of time (Andrews and Moss, 2002). Lusser (a German 
mathematician) queried the original assumption that the reliability of a chain of 
components was determined by the strength of its weakest link (Andrews and Moss, 
2002). 
A Reliability Network is a representation of the reliability dependencies between the 
components of a system. Dependencies are used in such a way as to represent the means 
by which the system will function. A system where component failure cannot be 
tolerated (a non-redundant system) is called a Series Network (Andrews and Moss, 
2002). 
A combination of probability of occurrence of an undesired event and the degree of its 
possible consequences is called Risk (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). 
A comprehensive estimation of the probability and the degree of the possible 
consequences in a hazardous situation in order to select appropriate safety measures is 
called Risk Assessment (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). 
Robustness can be defined as the extent to which a system is able to perform its 
intended function relatively well in the presence of failures of components or 
subsystems (Santa-Fe institute, 2001). 
Freedom from unacceptable risk or personal harm is called Sae (Wang and Trbojevic, 
2007). 
Reliability and safety analyses are different concepts that have a certain amount of 
overlap between them. Reliability analysis of an item involves studying its 
characteristics expressed by the probability that it will perform a required function 
under stated condition for a stated period. If such an analysis is extended to involve the 
study of the consequences of the failure in terms of possible damage to property and the 
environment or injury /deaths of the people, the study is referred to as safe , analysis 
(Pillary and Wang, 2003). 
3 
An action or a potential action likely to cause damage, harm or loss is called a Threat 
(Burns et al., 2003). 
Securi is defined as freedom from vulnerability, and supply chain vulnerability can be 
defined as `an exposure to serious disturbances, arising from risks within the supply 
chain as well as risks external to the supply chain (Chapman et al., 2002). 
A situation in which a person does not have the appropriate quantitative and qualitative 
information to describe, prescribe or predict deterministically and numerically a system, 
its behaviour or other characteristics is called Uncertainty (Zimmermann, 2000). 
1.2. Background 
Prior to the development of the shipping container in 1960, maritime cargo was 
transported in two ways: "bulk cargo" and "break bulk cargo". Mixed cargo was placed 
on pallets and loaded and discharged from ships' cargo holds by crane. The break bulk 
method had many disadvantages. It was often extremely lengthy, labour intensive, 
highly susceptible to pilferage, breakage and weather factors, and involved a highly 
inefficient system for getting cargo from ports to their ultimate destination. However, 
with the introduction of the shipping container, a single container could be discharged 
from a containership directly to a truck chassis and could be out of a port facility in a 
matter of minutes. Containers loaded with cargo at a manufacturing site could now be 
delivered directly to a wholesaler, retailer or distributor without the container ever 
having been opened (Kelly, 2007). "The maritime transportation system is an industry 
that typifies the notion that time is money" (Kelly, 2007). The reasons for rapid 
development of container transport are as follows (Kelly, 2007): 
" It helps to improve the cargo handling efficiency and speed up the turnover of ships. 
" It helps to improve the transport quality and reduces the cargo damage and shortage. 
" It helps to save different items of fee and reduces the transport cost. 
" It helps to simplify the transport procedure and make the transport more convenient. 
" It changes the traditional unitary transport into coherent unitised transport enhancing 
the development of international multimodal transport. 
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The container supply chain system integrates the service of shipping lines, ports and 
inland transport, and consequently extends "port to port" to "door to door" services. 
One of the most obvious properties of this evolution is that port and inland transport 
services are effectively integrated (rather than simply physically combined with the 
shipping lines) by many value added services and exchange of information. This 
integration provides the ability of a "one stop shop" service for the chains (Yang et al., 
2005b). The paradigm (i. e. one stop shop) has allowed the container supply chains to 
contribute to economic prosperity, but renders them uniquely vulnerable to many risks, 
ranging from the possibility of physical breaches in the integrity of shipping to 
interruption of communication (Yang et al., 2005b). 
Supply chain security has emerged as an area of vital importance for both the users and 
providers of the freight transportation system. This importance is in large part due to the 
economic importance of global international trade. Recent events have created a 
fundamental shift in thinking regarding the types of threats that may affect supply chain 
systems. Supply chain and freight transportation security now typically refers to a state 
of protection against various terrorist threats, most notably as the freight transport 
vehicle for the weapons of mass destruction (i. e. containership, aircraft, train, and 
truck). 
Smuggling of terrorists and terrorist weapons using freight containers is another major 
threat. It is obvious that security against terrorist threats, similar to security against 
narcotics smuggling or security against hazardous materials spills, is a public good in 
the parlance of economics. Since risk probabilities are perceived to be very small and 
potential consequences are difficult to measure, firms are unlikely to bear protection 
costs, and market forces alone may not provide motivation for them to protect 
themselves against supply chain terrorism threats. However, the potential societal 
impact of terrorist attacks to supply chains and/or the transportation infrastructure 
supporting supply chains is high, and therefore societies have begun to employ 
regulation to ensure some degree of supply chain security (Savelsberg et al., 2004). 
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The international trading system is composed of manufacturers, port authorities, 
terminal operators, transportation companies (both local and international), security 
companies (together with local and national governments), participating agencies (e. g., 
customs and immigration), and consumers. The cost of any security system will be 
allocated among these various actors. If the net security system cost is small (a few 
percent of shipping costs, or a few tenths of a percent of the value of the goods 
shipped), it may, in many cases, be possible to pass those costs on to the consumer 
without noticeable effect. However, as the net costs of security increase relative to 
shipping costs this option may become exhausted, and the political and economic 
dilemmas of deciding where in the system those costs will be absorbed will become 
more difficult to resolve (CIS, 2002). For instance, the economic impact on U. S. supply 
chains due to higher shipping costs, increased travel times, increased inventories, border 
delays, and other changes as a direct result of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks is 
estimated to be $150 billion per year (Bernasek, 2002). 
1.3. Statement of Problem 
Container supply chains are vulnerable to many risks. In a supply chain context, 
logistics internal and external risks together endanger the continuity and reliability of 
the chains. Yang et al. (2005a) discussed the risks in container line supply chains from 
four aspects (i. e. process, person, organization and environment). The work by 
Christopher and Lee (2004) hinted that the risks could be classified to be expected and 
non-expected. Furthermore, the complexity of supply chains' risks arises when it 
interacts with the other two risk characteristics (i. e. uncertainty and dependence). The 
complexity of container line supply chains' risk immediately leads to the lack of 
visibility to monitor the safety performance of supply chains. It is often the case that 
one member of a supply chain has no detailed knowledge of what goes on in other parts 
of the chain (e. g. not adequate risk mitigation or control measures for keeping the 
reliability and continuity of the chain). Because there is no visibility of upstream and 
downstream flows and stocks, confidence declines and decisions are made to apply 
safety and security control measures to the individual sections/sub-chains of the supply 
chain for preventing/mitigating risks. Obviously, uncertainty makes it extremely 
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difficult to clearly identify the vulnerability of supply chains and assess their risks. 
Interactive dependence significantly discounts the effectiveness of risk control. 
Container supply chain systems suffer from high levels of dependence between their 
risk factors or components. In order to stay competitive, maintain cost-effectiveness, 
and achieve reasonable safety and reliability, the systems have to take into account such 
risk dependence. 
Based on Savelsbergh et al. (2004)'s research, the challenges of conducting the research 
are listed as follows: 
1. What are suitable metrics for measuring supply chain infrastructure risk? 
2. What are appropriate systems for measuring and quantifying the indirect societal 
risk posed by supply chains and supporting supply chain infrastructure? 
3. How should the transportation infrastructure component of risks be estimated? 
4. How should vulnerability of infrastructure components be measured? 
5. Are there appropriate metrics for understanding the importance of certain 
infrastructure components to supply chain performance, so that appropriate 
protection prioritization can be made? 
6. How can supply chain risk be categorized and quantified? 
7. What are appropriate methods for measuring the likelihood or probability of highly 
disruptive events? 
8. How can the likelihood of rare events with limited historical precedents be 
estimated? 
9. How can a supply chain's vulnerability to disruption be measured? 
10. How can a supply chain's ability to react and recover from highly disruptive events 
be measured? 
This research is primarily concerned with the uncertainties regarding the measurement 
parameters of container supply chains' risks and their factor relationships. This is 
because they are concerned with the types of uncertainties that can be expressed in 
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probabilistic or/and possibilistic terms, and only probability and possibility are 
appropriate mediums to the effective risk assessment of supply chains. In many typical 
risk analysis approaches, risk measurement parameters are represented by empirical 
quantities. To be empirical, these quantities must be measurable, at least in principle. In 
other words, they must have a correct value, as opposed to an appropriate or good value 
(Morgan and Henrion, 1990). This is, however, not straightforward, and frequentists 
recognise that empirical quantities may be random and incomplete in some conditions 
and thus, require disparate data sources to be incorporated. The randomness depends on 
the variations between observations and the number of observations, and is usually 
expressed in terms of a sample variance or confidence intervals around the sample 
mean. The incompleteness indicates the unavailability of historical data. Consequently, 
subjective interpretations are incorporated using linguistic assessments. However, such 
linguistic descriptions define risk measurement parameters to a discrete extent so that 
fuzziness can at times be produced. 
1.4. Research Objectives and Their Hypothesis 
The primary aim of this research is to generate a novel quantitative risk assessment 
methodology for the operation of container line supply chains under high uncertainty. 
Providing such a methodology will enable the companies involved in container line 
supply chains to identify, manage and control the vulnerability of the chains and to 
support the safety and security planning for both mitigating and continuity actions. In 
order to achieve this aim, some contributory objectives need to be carefully addressed. 
They are listed as follows: 
" To identify uncertainties in modelling both hazards and threads in container line 
supply chain operations. 
" Producing sufficient conceptual and actual scenarios, to deal with lack of data. 
9 To develop a novel mathematical model using the fuzzy logic and evidential 
reasoning algorithm, for assessment of reliabilities. 
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" To develop a Fuzzy Bayesian Network (FBN) methodology to deal with 
dependencies between criteria using fuzzy logic and the expected utility to assist in 
appropriate distribution of prior probability. 
" To produce an advance dynamic security assessment technique using Fuzzy 
Bayesian Network (FBN) to deal with dependencies between security factors. 
9 To conduct case studies to show how the proposed network, models and methods 
can be used to improve marine operations. 
The hypothesis that the objectives depend on is that the most widely used uncertainty 
treatment theories such as fuzzy logic, Bayesian probability and Dempster-Shafer (D-S) 
can be the foundation of and have significant contribution in developing novel and 
advance risk assessment and decision making models in the context of container line 
supply chains. 
1.5. Research Methodology and Scopes of Thesis 
At an early stage in the work, the research was broken down into four key themes and it 
was these that directed the structural design of the research methodology, the 
acquisition of the data itself and its subsequent analysis. The four key themes were 
identified as being: 
1. Identification of research problems and challenges. 
2. Critical review of the supply chains' operation, accidents and literature related to the 
challenges identified in Step 1. 
3. Using probability and possibility theories such as Bayesian network, fuzzy set 
method, and evidential reasoning to assess and aggregate the reliability of different 
variables from dissimilar universes, and to calculate the effect of their reliability on 
the vulnerability of supply chain systems. 
4. The validation of the hypothesis by comparing and analysing the modelling 
produced in Step 3. 
9 
The supply chain flow can be segregated into two groups, which are described as links 
and nodes. The links are trucks, trains, containerships, information transmission 
facilities and their infrastructures, roads, rails, inland waterways, liner shipping lanes 
and cables/satellites. The nodes are warehouses, LCL premises, rail termini/stations and 
ports. No links or nodes will function without the people who understand how to 
operate and maintain them. Therefore, any activity deviation coming from such persons 
may lead to a severe disruption in the chains. The primary scope of this thesis is to 
develop a methodology for evaluating the human reliability. Furthermore, the container 
supply chain can be assumed as a series network and for a series network the reliability 
of a system can be calculated through the reliability of its components (i. e. importers, 
exporters, manufacturers, manufacturing sites, inland carriers, warehouses, ports, 
containerships, container consolidation and deconsolidation facilities, etc. ). The 
secondary scope of this thesis is, firstly, to develop methodologies for assessing and 
aggregating the reliability of different commercial operators and premises; secondly, to 
determine the strength of the supply chain's weakest link via the components' 
reliability; thirdly to suggest the control options for increasing the reliability of the 
supply chain from the safety and security point of view; and finally, to develop decision 
making models based on analysing the cost and benefit. 
1.6. Structure of Thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters, excluding this introduction. Chapter 2 reviews 
the important literature influencing the current study. It includes the demonstration of 
the operation processes of container supply chain systems, container security, 
technology overview, rules and regulations, the analysis of historical failure data, the 
review of risk assessment methodology (i. e. fault tree analysis) related to containerships 
and prior studies of using uncertainty treatment methods to risk assessment and decision 
making. This will serve to draw attention to the possible inadequacy and limitation of 
the current status, thus demonstrating the need and justification of this research thesis. 
Chapter 3 gives a detailed and exhaustive review of root causes for human error. Based 
on the review, firstly, a generic model with a hierarchical structure for evaluating the 
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seafarers' reliability is constructed. Secondly, a conceptual methodology for evaluating 
the seafarers' reliability based on Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning (FER) is generated. 
Thirdly, the methodology developed has been applied to a case study in order to 
demonstrate the process involved. Finally, control options to enhance seafarers' 
reliability are suggested. The proposed methodology enables and facilitates the decision 
makers to measure the reliability of a seafarer before his/her designation to any 
activities and during his/her seafaring period. 
The seafarers' reliability depends upon many variables and alteration of a criterion 
value will ultimately alter their reliability. For instance, if the grade of a ship's design 
and habitability is very bad and the grade of the sea condition is very rough, then due to 
noise and vibration, a seafarer will not be able to sleep appropriately. Therefore, his/her 
rest hour's grade will descend from a good grade to an average grade. Consequently, 
his/her stress levels and the condition of his/her health will alter. Graphs have proven to 
be a very intuitive language for representing such dependence and independence 
statements, and thus provide an excellent language for communication and discussing 
dependence and independence relations among problem-domain variables. Chapter 4 
makes full use of the BNs' advantages and further develops and extends Fuzzy 
Bayesian Networks (FBNs) and a "symmetric method" by exploiting a conceptual and 
sound methodology for the assessment of human reliability. The methodology 
developed has been applied to a case study in order to demonstrate the process involved. 
Furthermore a FBN model (dependency network), which is capable of illustrating the 
dependency among the variables, is constructed. By exploiting the proposed FBN 
model, a general equation for the reduction of human reliability attributable to a 
person's continuous hours of wakefulness, acute sleep loss and cumulative sleep debt is 
formulated and tested. Based on the developed equation and a person's sleep/wake 
timelines, the control options for improving his/her reliability are suggested. The model 
applies FBN construction to allow researchers to appreciate a novel attempt of unifying 
possibility and probability theories by introduction of the FBN approach and symmetric 
model. 
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The container supply chain can be assumed as a series network and for a series network 
the reliability of a system can be calculated through the reliability of its components 
(i. e. importers, exporters, manufacturers, manufacturing sites, inland carriers, 
warehouses, ports, containerships, container consolidation and deconsolidation 
facilities, etc. ). In Chapter 5, methodologies for evaluating the reliability of different 
commercial operators and premises are generated. Furthermore, by use of the Fuzzy 
Bayesian Network (FBN) a conceptual and sound methodology for evaluating a 
container's security score is developed. The methodology implemented in this chapter 
can be used for targeting those containers which pose high risk to the container supply 
chains. Furthermore, it can be used to identify the commercial operators that do not act 
appropriately to secure their supply chains. Based on the model output, in order to 
obtain a competitive advantage and to improve the commercial operators' motivations, 
the financial burden can be placed upon those operators that do not act appropriately. 
Thus the cost of any security system may be justified. 
Based on IMO rules (2003, Codes 2.9-2.11, Part A), individual governments are 
required to assess the risk facing their ports and establish a tree-tier security system. 
Chapter 6 generates a new approach to pre-processing of input data that allows the use 
of standard BN techniques and software tools for evaluating the security level of a port. 
The aim of this study is to exploit a FBN decision making model for assessing the 
security level of a port, based on the security score of a ship's cargo containers prior to 
ship/port interface. It is further suggested that regardless of scanning all import cargo 
containers, one realistic way to secure the supply chain, due to lack of information and 
number of variables, is to enhance the ocean or sea carriers' reliability through 
enhancing their ship staffs reliability. Accordingly a decision making model to analyse 
the cost and benefit (i. e. CBA) is developed. 
Chapter 7 provides conclusions from the overall study. The chapter begins by 
discussing the main conclusions and whether these conclusions have been addressed in 
this research project. This chapter will also ascertain as to whether this investigation has 
been a contribution to research. The limitations of this research are also given together 
with possible future research which can expand and explore this body of research. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
Summary 
In this chapter, the important literature influencing the current study is reviewed. It 
includes the demonstration of the operation processes of container supply chain 
systems, container security, technology overview, rules and regulations, the analysis of 
historical failure data, the review of risk assessment methodology related to 
containerships and prior studies of using uncertainty treatment methods to risk 
assessment and decision-making. 
2.1. Introduction 
Legal maritime trade that is driven by global economic growth and flourishing 
international trade will be tripled by 2020 (CSI, 2006). The most significant growth will 
be in the container shipping industry with the trend toward larger ships carrying more 
containers. Global trade along with the volume of cargo and size of ships needs 
modified container terminals. Therefore, all container terminals have to expand their 
infrastructure, deepen the channels in their harbours and provide more virtual ports with 
online processing to remain competitive (CSI, 2006). 
The commercial advantages of containerisation appear to have become a focus at the 
expense of safe operations. For the safe operation of a container vessel, the application 
of good seamanship and cautious operational practice is essential. Conversely, these 
requirements are not widely recognised by many in the containership industry (AIMS, 
2008). Container carriers are unique from structural, strength, stability, cargo, ballast 
condition, manoeuvrability, cargo handling, and operational points of view. Currently 
the numbers of sea going officers and available maintenance timing have decreased. 
Due to short port stay and reducing the manning scale, working pressure on ships' staff 
are drastically increased and subsequently the fatigue level is increased. The annual cost 
of container losses as consequences of serious disturbances arising from hazards is 
estimated as $500 million per year (AIMS, 2008). 
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change for the bill of lading from the shipping company. When the loading is 
completed, the forwarders should send the shipping advice to the consignee, in order 
that the consignee could organise the payment, balance the bills and be ready to receive 
cargoes (ibid. ). 
2.2.2. Handover of Container Transport Cargo 
Container transport includes FCL (Full Container Load) and LCL (Less Container 
Load). A consignor (e. g. a factory or a warehouse) boxes up FCL. Then it is delivered 
directly to the container terminal for loading. When the cargoes arrive at the destination, 
the consignee can pick them up directly from the destination container terminal or 
disembarkation port. The carrier is responsible for the whole goods, and handover of the 
box. As long as the container's appearance looks similar when being collected and the 
seal is intact, the carrier's job is completed. LCL refers to when the goods do not fill a 
whole container, the carrier should put small amount of goods of different consignors 
into a container at the container freight station. When the carrier is responsible for the 
container stuffing / consolidation and un-stuffing / deconsolidation, consignors pay the 
related fees. The carrier's responsibility for LCL is the same as the traditional break- 
bulk transportation (ibid. ). 
The general handover method of container goods can be categorised as follows (ibid. ): 
1. FCL/FCL refers to the carrier's handover of the goods in full container from 
departure place to destination. 
2. FCL/LCL refers to one consignor with more than one consignee, so that after 
arrival, the goods should be delivered in break bulk. 
3. LCL/ FCL refer to more than one consignor with one consignee. 
4. LCL/LCL refers to the case where both consignors and consignees are more than 
one. 
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documents required for a container's transport (ibid. ): 
" Equipment Interchange Receipt (EIR) is used for picking empty containers and 
sending the loaded containers to a container terminal. 
" Container load plan (CLP) records the name, weight, size, amount of the loaded 
goods in each container, according to the actual filled-in goods. A CLP is of five 
copies, each of which is given respectively to the terminal, the carrier, the shipping 
agent, the shipper and the party that stuffs the container. 
" Dock Receipt (DR), the consignors send the containers to a container terminal, and 
get a DR in exchange for the bill of lading (BL). 
2.3. Container Security 
The degree of uncertainty is highly proportional to availability of data. Help of 
technology development can detect the contents of a container. As a result, the 
probability of detecting a container that contains illicit materials can be increased and 
consequently the security of the global supply chain can be enhanced. 
Custom and Border Protection (CBP) targets vulnerabilities to containerised cargo 
destined for the United States in the maritime environment through advance and 
enhanced information and trade data. This is done using the twenty-four hour rule, 
implemented in January 2003. Based on this rule, manifest and bill of lading 
information has to be submitted to the CBP twenty-four hours in advance of the cargo 
being loaded on a ship at a foreign port. The twenty-four hour rule allows CBP officers 
to pre-screen and target high-risk shipments and containers before they arrive in a 
United States port (CSI, 2006). Failure to comply with the regulation may lead to a civil 
penalty, and permission to load or unload cargo' to or from the vessel may be denied 
(CSI, 2006). 
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When examining a container, that poses a potential terrorist threat, the CBP officers are 
conducting either non-intrusive or physical inspections. The Non-Intrusive Inspection 
(NII) involves use of X-ray or gamma ray scanners to generate an image of the contents, 
which CBP officers review for anomalies (CSI, 2006). The CBP officers also scan a 
cargo container by using radiation detection devices. If an irregularity is identified, 
officers may physically examine all or a portion of the container's contents (CSI, 2006). 
Based on expert opinion added security provided by the container security initiative 
(CSI) is illusory since, in large part, targeting is based on the description of contents 
provided by supplier, statistically, less than one per cent of containers passing through 
CSI ports ever get scanned and only a tiny fraction of them are ever opened for 
inspection ( Kelly, 2007) 
The milestone of CBP personnel, working side-by-side with overseas customs partners, 
is to identify and embargo containers posing a high-risk of terrorism before they arrive 
at a U. S. port. As correspondence is achieved, this strategy will both secure global 
supply chains and reduce the number of security inspections required upon arrival at 
U. S. ports (CSI, 2006). The CSI programme guidelines for securing global supply 
chains are listed as follows (CSI, 2006): 
" All shipments have to be screened through an Automated Targeting System (ATS). 
" CBP officers have to use ATS to review and hold all high-risk shipments for 
examination. 
" Cooperation and intelligence sharing has to be established. 
" Foreign countries need to conduct thorough risk assessments of each nation's 
exports. 
2.3.1. Technology Overview 
Essentially two types of scanning systems are deployed or tested on maritime cargo 
containers at different ports. The first type is the radiation portal monitors, which are 
designed to detect the presence of radioactive material in containers. The second type of 
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scanning equipment is the gamma ray, which is used to scan the contents of a container 
for dense material that would indicate the presence of explosives or, more likely, 
explosives shielded in lead (CSI, 2006). Both technologies are provided for enhancing 
the security of global supply chains but still substantial vulnerabilities exist. 
Portal monitors and gamma ray machines have their limits. Although they can do a 
creditable job of addressing two types of threat (i. e. radioactive materials and dense 
materials), they leave other potential threats untouched. These technologies cannot 
detect the presence of chemical or biological agents. They cannot determine if a 
container has been breached at some point in time from its stuffing to its final 
destination and they add little overall value in supply chain visibility in the event of an 
actual detonation (Kelly, 2007). 
To reduce the possibility of pilferage and/or tampering incidents a combination of 
container's seal, tracking system and smart box is suggested by experts. Tracking 
systems rely on three principal technologies. The advantages and limitations of these 
technologies are listed as follows (Balog et al., 2005): 
1. Bar Code Scanning is the most widely used data capture method for tracking and 
tracing. A broad spectrum of industries has adopted this method for the last several 
decades. Consequently, its wide usage has led to consistent research into improving 
the technology of capturing bar codes. Holographic scanners can now read codes 
from almost any orientation and pen-based portable scanners allow workers to read 
bar codes anywhere. These technological advances have greatly increased 
distribution efficiency and data integrity. However, the bar code scanning system 
possesses a few inherent limitations that include the need for human intervention at 
several points along the distribution route, non-continuous updates of the container 
location, and inadequate safeguard against theft. 
2. Radio Frequency Identification Device (RFID) uses radio frequencies to 
communicate information from a small tag, implanted on pallets or containers, to 
readers. Tags are passive, drawing their power from the reader, or active, drawing 
their power from an internal battery. Passive systems have limited range, but can be 
useful in close quarters. Active systems have greater range, but cost more and 
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require regular maintenance, all due to the batteries. Once information from RFID 
tags is read, it is organised and stored in users' computers. RFID tags reduce the 
amount of manual inventory work that the industry conventionally performs, 
trimming both labour and logistical costs. For effective deployment of RFID tags, 
the device's limitations have to be adequately addressed in order to fuel further 
justification for using them. 
3. Global Positioning System (GPS) appears to be an ideal tracking system for 
containers while they are on vessels. The software is relatively inexpensive to 
implement and the system provides instant information on the vessel's location 
using satellites to fix geographical positions. The system does have drawbacks, 
including the limited coverage in remote areas of the world, battery dependence, 
reliance on human intervention, and requirement of extensive maintenance. The 
remote coverage limitation is the main drawback that prevents GPS from tracking 
individual container positions on land. GPS offers significant prospects in the future 
as its area of coverage increases and if its ability to promote system flexibility, by 
reported ease of integration with other systems is improved. 
"The RFID and GPS are the technologies of information storage and transfer that must 
then be integrated into a security system. One way of doing this is through the "Smart 
Box" technology, promoted by the U. S. Customs, and beginning to be used in the 
industry" (Balog, et al., 2005). "A smart box uses an electronic seal to register every 
opening of the container, legitimate or illegal. Combined with an access code, the smart 
box records each access to the container and maintains a register of the container 
number, time, date, and seal number. The container security device transmits this 
information to a receiver, which can then be attached to any cell phone with global 
capability" (Balog, et al., 2005). 
Advantages of the smart box include the minimal cost to implement and the ability to 
track the container in real time. Several disadvantages also accompany this technology 
choice such as the visual presence of the smart box acting as a restriction and being 
tampered with and disrupting the viability of data. The system runs from batteries, 
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which require maintenance and testing to ensure that they are always in working order 
(Balog, et al., 2005). 
Based on expert opinion the limitation of container seals and Container Security 
Devices (CSDs) can be listed as follows (Maritime Security Expo, 2006): 
1. A container seal verification requirement could not be realistically implemented 
without the deployment of technology on a global scale. 
2. The deployment of RFID container technology, dependent on fixed readers at 
thousands of locations around the world. 
3. The uncertain number of false alarms that CSDs may generate, would cause many 
containers to be stopped for an undetermined time. 
4. Most security experts think that, if terrorists were to use a container, they would be 
involved in the container stuffing origin of the shipment, and almost certainly affix 
appropriate container seals or devices to the container. 
5. Contrary to many container device-marketing efforts, such devices have not been 
shown to have significant supply chain management benefits to commercial 
shippers. 
6. A number of the technology vendors interested in such products apparently can 
only find a profit if they capture the devices' readings in a proprietary data network 
that they control and resell, a proposition that has clearly received little interest or 
support from container owners or from their customers. 
Based on expert opinion two determined strategies that can be focused by CBP are 
listed as follows (Maritime Security Expo, 2006): 
1. Using of better shipment data for better container targeting capability. 
2. Complete inspection and 100% scanning of all containers. 
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2.3.2. Detection of Nuclear Material 
Detecting smuggled fissile material that can be used to make a nuclear weapon is an 
onerous task, since highly enriched uranium has a relatively low level of radioactivity 
and is therefore very difficult to be detected by radiation detection equipment (Hecker, 
2002). Because of the complexity of detecting nuclear material, the customs officers 
responsible for operating the equipment must also be trained in using handheld radiation 
detectors to pinpoint the source of an alarm, identifying false alarms, and responding to 
cases of illicit nuclear smuggling (Hecker, 2002). Radioactive materials that can be used 
in conjunction with conventional explosives to create a so-called dirty bomb are 
somewhat easier to detect, because they have much higher levels of radioactivity 
(Hecker, 2002). 
Detection of nuclear materials inside a container relies on three principal technologies, 
the advantages and limitations of those technologies are listed as follows (Hecker, 
2002): 
1. X- Ray Compatible Detectors: these radiation detectors are installed on X-ray 
machines, which are able to screen the small packages. These detectors are not large 
enough to screen entire containers or other large cargo. 
2. Portal Monitors: these detectors are larger than X-ray machines and are capable of 
screening the entire contents of containers, cars, or trucks. 
3. Radiation-Detection Pagers: customs acquired radiation-detection pagers, which are 
worn on a belt, have limited range, and were not designed to detect weapons-usable 
radioactive materials. These pagers are more effectively used in conjunction with 
other detection equipment rather than as a primary means of detection. 
2.4. Rules and Regulations 
For conducting any kind of safety and security research, reviewing the international 
rules and regulations is essential. The rules and regulations concerning cargo containers, 
container vessels, and security of the CLSCs are elucidated in Appendix 1. 
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2.5. Containership Accident 
Within this section, accident reports of containerships are reviewed and the most 
significant factors that have contributed to those accidents recorded. Subsequently 
generic data are extracted and used as a tool for hazard identification. 
2.5.1. Collision between P&O Nedlloyd Vespucci and Wahkuna 
The contributing factors concerning the collision between the containership P&O 
Nedlloyd Vespucci and the yacht Wahkuna in English Channel on 28 May 2003, are 
listed as follows (MIAB, 2003): 
" Wahkuna's skipper misunderstood the collision regulations that are applicable in the 
fog. 
" The containership's Master was highly confident in the accuracy of ARPA. 
" The Master of the containership accepted a small passing distance. 
" Yacht's skipper was unable to use the radar effectively. 
9 The failure of both vessels to keep an effective radar lookout. 
" To meet the commercial schedules the container vessel maintained the high speed. 
" Both vessels visibility was poor due to the fog. 
" Poor bridge resources management. 
The overreliance on the electronic equipments and automations is affected the deck and 
engineering officers. The engineers mostly recorded the information in the logbook 
from electronic data within the control room without even approaching the concerned 
machinery. They started auxiliary engines automatically from the control room, without 
even blowing through the engines and knowing the consequences of existing water or 
fuel on top of the pistons. 
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2.5.2. P&O Nedlloyd Genoa (Loss of Cargo Containers) 
The contributing factors concerning the loss of cargo containers (P&O Nedlloyd 
Genoa) at North Atlantic Ocean on 27 January 2006, are listed as follows (MIAB, 
2006): 
9 The process of lashing containers is physically highly demanding and potentially 
dangerous, and if the process is not closely supervised then shortfalls are likely to 
occur. 
" The cargo-planning program used by "Blue Star Ship Management" met statutory 
requirements, but it did not provide the Chief Officer with the information necessary 
to identify weaknesses in the loading plan. 
" No mechanism existed for verifying declared container weights. 
" In countering the effects of heavy weather, the Master generated the preconditions 
for parametric rolling. 
9 The current container inspection requirements do not consider structural strength 
and rigidity. 
Parametric rolling can be a particular problem on ships (e. g. P&O Nedlloyd Genoa) 
designed with a flat transom and with large bow flare. This is a common design, found 
on many modem containerships in order to maximise deck cargo capacity while 
minimising water resistance with fine hull lines (MIAB, 2006). 
2.5.3. Annabella (Loss of Cargo Containers) 
The contributing factors concerning the loss of cargo containers (Annabella) on passage 
in the Baltic Sea on 25 February 2007, are listed as follows ( MIAB, 2008a; MAIB, 
2008b; Learning from Annabella, 2008; Time for Some Serious Rethinking, 2008; 
British Steam Ship Insurance Association Limited, 2007): 
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" Effective communications and procedures should exist between all parties involved 
in the planning and delivery of containers to ensure that ship staff have the resources 
and the opportunity to supervise the loading and securing of cargo safely. 
" Cargo securing manuals should be comprehensive and in a format which provides 
ready and easy access to all relevant cargo loading and securing information. 
" Loading computer programmes should incorporate the full requirements of a 
vessel's cargo securing manual. Such computers should be properly approved to 
ensure that officers could place full reliance on the information provided. 
" The availability or otherwise of a reliable, approved, loading computer programme 
is a factor to be included in determining an appropriate level of manning for vessels 
on intensive schedules. 
" The resultant increase in acceleration forces and consequent reduction in allowable 
stack weights when a vessel's GM is increased above the value quoted in the cargo- 
securing manual has to be understood by vessels' officers. The consequential effect 
on container stack weight, height and lashing arrangement for changes in the 
vessel's GM should be readily available and clearly displayed to ships' staff. 
" Those involved in container operations are aware that containers with allowable 
stack weights below the ISO standard are in regular use. Therefore, they must be 
clearly identified at both the planning and loading stages to avoid the possibility of 
being crushed. 
" Cargo planners should have appropriate marine experience or undergo training to 
ensure that ship safety considerations are fully recognised. 
" Cargo planning software provided should be capable of recognising and alerting 
planners to the consequences of variable data (e. g. metacenteric height (GM), non- 
standard container specifications). 
" Ships' staff should be provided with sufficient time to verify/approve proposed 
cargo plans. 
" The shipping companies must ensure that when officers are promoted into the senior 
ranks they receive sufficient familiarisation. 
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" Officers should be fully familiar with the contents of the vessel's cargo securing 
manual before taking responsibility for loading and securing cargo. 
" The officers and crews allocated to the vessel have to be sufficient to ensure that the 
requirements of the company's safety management system can be fully met. 
2.5.4. Total Loss of Napoli 
In January 2007, Napoli experienced heavy weather in the English Channel, causing 
heavy pitching and a reduction in speed over the ground. A catastrophic hull failure in 
the engine room resulted in flooding, abandonment of the vessel, its stranding, and total 
loss. The contributing factors concerning the total loss of Napoli are listed as follows 
(MAIB, 2008c; AIMS, 2008; Lessons to be learned from Napoli, 2008): 
" Napoli when built had been one of the largest containerships ever constructed. 
Based on the design of earlier and smaller vessels, the ship was built in 1991 to 
Bureau Veritas class with no buckling strength requirement in the area of hull 
failure. Although the engine room was sited, further forward than most other ships 
being built at the time, because it was outside of the 0.4L amidships area, class rules 
did not require the buckling strength to be calculated at that point. 
" It is almost certain that a reduction of speed would have significantly reduced the 
risk of hull failure. 
" It was also revealed that the ship's electronic main engine governor that prevents the 
engine from over speeding or tripping when the propeller emerges from the sea in 
heavy weather was out of action at the time of accident. 
"A check of containers removed from Napoli indicated that the declared weights of 
many of them were inaccurate. This discrepancy is widespread within the container 
ship industry. 
" As most containerships invariably sail very close to the permissible seagoing 
maximum bending moments, the additional undeclared weight can cause vessels to 
exceed these maxima. 
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Container shipping is the only sector of shipping in which the weight of a cargo is not 
known. If the stresses acting on container ships are to be accurately controlled, it is 
essential that containers be weighed before loading (AIMS, 2008). 
2.5.5. Fire Breakout Onboard Maersk Doha 
The contributing factors concerning the breakdown and subsequent fire onboard Maersk 
Doha in Chesapeake Bay, off Norfolk, Virginia, USA on 2nd October 2006, are listed 
as follows (MIAB, 2007c; MAIB, 2007e): 
" Inappropriate techniques were used to fight the fire initially, because the crew did 
not understand enough about the construction of the exhaust gas economiser (EGE). 
Moreover, they did not know how to deal with the fire effectively. 
" The vessel had an extensive Quality and Safety Management System, but it lacked 
sufficient detail to assist the crew in dealing with either the machinery breakdown, 
or the subsequent fire. 
" Further problems became evident during the emergency when other equipment did 
not work correctly. The records of emergency drills and maintenance of machinery 
made it difficult for the vessel's managers to assess the quality of the work being 
conducted onboard. Neither these systems, nor the quality and technical audits 
carried out on the vessel, had been able to detect the underlying condition of 
equipment, which subsequently failed during the emergency. 
" The crew, with the exception of the Chief Engineer, were from Eastern European 
countries. Despite meeting the requirements for gaining UK Certificates of 
Equivalent Competency and being able to use the working language of the ship, 
there was a tendency for the majority of the crew to revert to their shared native 
language. This had the effect of isolating the Chief Engineer and hindered his ability 
to understand and control the response to the emergency. 
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2.5.6. Collision between Skagern and Samskip Courier 
The contributing factors concerning the collision between cargo ship Skagern and 
containership Samskip Courier in the Humber Estuary on 7 June 2006, are listed as 
follows (MIAB, 2007a): 
" Failure in applying long established methods concerning collision avoidance by the 
Masters and Pilots of both vessels. 
" Both Masters were highly confident and over reliant on the Pilots. 
9 The communication and interaction was poor among the bridge teams. 
" Samskip Courier's Pilot level of situation awareness was low. 
" During manoeuvring, the Pilot on the bridge was using a mobile phone. 
2.6. Container Cargo Claims 
With around 12,000,000 containers in circulation and 95,000,000 loaded container 
movements each year the cargo container claim is a real problem for the industry. 
Within this section, the data that are provided by UK Protection and Indemnity Club 
(P&I Club) are reviewed. 
The incident categories involving containerships, as shown in Figure 2.3, clearly 
indicate that 54% of Incidents belong to the category of container cargo damage (Wang 
and Foinikis, 2001). Based on UK P&I Club (2008) reports, "a considerable proportion 
of the club's time is taken up handling container cargo claims". The comparison of 
container cargo claims and all other cargo claims is illustrated in Figure 2.4. The main 
reasons for container cargo damage are listed as follows (UK P&I Club, 2008): 
" One of the biggest contributory causes of container cargo damage is found to be bad 
stowage, causing nearly 20% of the claims. 
" Shore error accounts for around 27% of large container cargo claims compared with 
19% for all types of cargo claims. The problem originates at the time of stuffing. 
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2.7. Human Error 
Containerships are a unique type of vessel. The existing high level of human stress on 
board containerships is unique. The consequences of such highly stressful environment 
will be error and negligence. The result of a safety study showed conclusively that the 
poor manning levels and human fatigue are the major causal factors in collisions and 
groundings (MAIB, 2004). "It is an anachronism in the 21st century that seafarers are 
falsifying their timesheets to prove that they are working only ninety-eight hours per 
week. In addition, many of these seafarers work every week, without a break, for 
between four and nine months before getting leave" (MAIB, 2004). 
The vulnerability of CLSCs from the employees as internal people and others as 
external people during operations can be categorised as follows (Peck and Jüttner, 
2002): 
" Human errors can be due to lack of knowledge, wrongdoing, and negligence. 
" People can deliberately take risks by putting late arriving containers on a vessel that 
is ready to sail, under the insistence of shippers. 
" Employee health and safety scare, which is considered as the fourth most important 
scenario covered by Formal Business Continuity Planning (FBCP). 
" Stevedores and crane operators can deliberately or unintentionally destroy the 
containers due to careless loading/unloading. 
" Baleful attacks of external people, such as terrorist attacks and hacker activities, 
which are beyond the chains' direct control. 
2.8. Historical Failure Data & Statistical Analysis 
In order to conduct any kind of safety analysis, obtaining the reliable failure data is 
essential. Accident statics on generic vessel types and its effect on supply chains can be 
obtained from two sources, field experience and agreed judgmental estimates of experts 
(Wang and Foinikis, 2001). 
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Several organisations conducted statistical analysis of marine accidents, for instance the 
Lloyds Maritime Information Service (LMIS), and the Institute of London Underwriters 
(ILU). On the other hand, classification societies such as Det Norske Veritas (DNV) 
conducted their own statistical updates of marine causalities, which are used mostly for 
their own internal purposes. Each marine accident can be described by a series of 
distinct events that take place in a specific order, for example, it is possible that a ship 
experiences a main engine problem, which under certain circumstances can cause 
drifting, grounding and eventual sinking. The existing problem with statistical data is 
the fact that the collected data only divulge the outcome without concerning a 
"proximate cause" (i. e. the first event in a chain of events that gives rise to an accident 
or claim). To overcome the mentioned problem, the accident statistics by nature of 
accident for UK vessels and non-UK vessels in UK waters are extracted from MAIB 
annual reports (2007d) and presented in Tables 2.1-2.3. The percentages of five accident 
categories (i. e. collision, contact, fire/explosion, grounding, and machinery failure) 
relative to the total number of accidents, extracted from Table 2.3, are shown in Table 
2.4. Surveillance of Table 2.4 clearly indicates that from year 2000 onwards, the five 
mentioned accident categories contribute to 80% of total accidents. The percentage of 
each accident relative to the total number of accidents involving UK dry cargo vessels, 
extracted from Table 2.1, is shown in Figure 2.5. Based on Figure 2.5, the machinery 
failure contributes to 40% of accidents followed by grounding (18%), contact (18%) 
and collision (10%). 
Based on port state control annual reports, as shown in Figure 2.6, the percentage of 
detention by the type of ship in 2006 for containerships is estimated as 37% (Port State 
Control in New Zealand, 2006). The highest percentage of deficiencies by category, as 
shown in Figure 2.7, are associated with life saving appliances (12%), fire safety 
measures (12%), safety of navigation (11 %), and propulsion & auxiliary machinery 
(11%). 
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Table 2.1: UK Merchant Vessels in Accident by Nature of Accident and Vessel Category 
[Source: MAIB, 2007] 
Dry 
Cargo 
Passenger Passenger 
Cargo 
Tanker/Combination 
carrier 
Other Total 
Capsize/Listing 0 0 0 0 2 2 
Cargo Handling Failure 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Collision 4 3 0 2 5 14 
Contact 7 13 1 1 8 30 
Escape of Harmful 
Substances 
0 1 0 0 1 2 
Fire/Explosion 0 2 0 1 3 6 
Flooding/Foundering I 1 0 0 0 2 
Grounding 7 1 0 0 3 11 
Heavy Weather 2 1 0 0 1 4 
Machinery Failure 15 10 0 2 9 36 
Person Overboard 1 4 0 0 2 7 
Total 38 36 1 6 34 115 
Table 2.2: Non-UK Vessels in UK Water by Nature of Accident and Vessel Category 
[Source: MAIB, 2007] 
Dry 
Cargo 
Passenger Passenger 
Cargo 
Tanker/Combination 
carrier 
Other Total 
Capsize/Listing 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Cargo Handling Failure 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Collision 8 0 0 5 4 17 
Contact 13 2 1 8 1 25 
Escape of Harmful 
Substances 
2 0 0 0 0 2 
Fire/Explosion 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Flooding/Foundering 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Grounding 23 3 0 3 2 31 
Heavy Weather 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Machinery Failure 21 0 0 3 4 28 
Person Overboard 1 0 0 0 1 2 
Pollution 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Total 72 5 1 20 14 112 
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2.9. Hazard/Threat Identification 
Container supply chains are vulnerable to many risks. Based on the previous discussions 
(Section 2.1-2.7) the generic contributing factors concerning vulnerability (i. e. exposure 
to serious disturbances arising from a hazard or a threat) of the container line supply 
chain are listed as follows: 
1. Direct attack to ports by a terrorist group. 
2. Transport of illicit materials through ports for use in terrorist plot elsewhere. 
3. Using a containership as a weapon of mass destruction. 
4. Using a container as a weapon of mass destruction. 
5. Commercial pressure to sail rather than to be safe. 
6. Ignoring reduction in speed during bad weather due to the commercial pressure. 
7. Overreliance on electronic equipments. 
8. Shortfall of container lashing material. 
9. Inability to verify the exact container weight. 
10. Miscalculation of parametric rolling. 
11. Untrained cargo planner. 
12. Lack of ship staff competency and familiarisation. 
13. The poor manning levels. 
14. Unavailability of maintenance timing and wrong planning during dry-docking. 
15. Lack of communication. 
16. Lack of situation awareness. 
17. Lack of teamwork. 
18. Masters' overreliance on the pilots. 
19. Environments. 
20. Machinery failure. 
21. Wrong packaging and stuffing. 
22. Wrong handling of a container. 
23. Wrong container loading/unloading. 
24. Wrong container stowage and response procedure associated with what is in that 
container. 
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2.10. Risk Assessment Techniques 
In the 1960s, significant progress in the effectiveness and sophistication of risk 
assessment was achieved due to the application of risk assessment methodologies in 
different areas in industry. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was developed at the beginning 
of 1960s and was used as a tool in risk assessment. At the same time, a PhD thesis was 
published that introduced a methodology for probabilistic integrated systems for 
analysing the safety of nuclear power plants (Garrick et al., 2004). The breakthrough in 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of technological systems came in 1975 with the 
publication of the `Reactor Safety Study' by the US Atomic Energy Commission. 
2.10.1. Fault Tree Analysis 
Watson between 1961 and 1962 developed fault tree analysis (FTA) during an Air 
Force study contract for the Minuteman Launch Control System. Since the early 1970s, 
FTA technique has been utilised as a tool in risk assessment methodologies (Kumamoto 
and Henley, 1992). It is probably the most widely used technique for hazard 
identification and risk estimation. This technique is a process of deductive reasoning, 
which can be applied to a system of any size for risk assessment purposes (Wang and 
Trbojevic, 2007). FTA is particularly suitable for the risk assessment of large marine 
and offshore engineering systems for which the associated undesired events (i. e. top 
events) can be identified by experience (i. e. from previous accident and incident 
reports). FTA is a diagrammatic method used to estimate the probability of an accident 
(i. e. top event) resulting from sequences and combinations of faults and failure events 
(i. e. basic events). This technique can handle both quantitative and qualitative 
assessments. However, qualitative assessment may not always be possible because FTA 
requires knowledge of probabilities associated with basic events (Mauri, 2000). 
A fault tree contains gates, which serve to permit or inhibit the passage of fault logic up 
the tree. The gates show the relationship of events needed for the occurrence of a higher 
event [i. e. top event] (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). Based on the historical failure data 
and statistical analysis (Section 2.8), the five accident categories (i. e. machinery failure, 
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collision, grounding, fire/explosion, and contact) contribute to 80% of total accidents 
and they can be regarded as top events. The top event is the output of the gate and the 
lower events are the inputs to the gate. Based on IMO (2007)'s research (i. e. formal 
safety assessment of containerships) the lower events of the four top events (i. e. 
collision, grounding, fire/explosion, and contact) are shown in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5: Top and Lower Events [Source: IMO, 2007] 
TOP EVENT LOWER EVENTS 
Collision Navigational Technical External Visibility Terminal Main 
Error Failure Environmental Line Location Engine 
Conditions (High 
Power) 
Contact Navigational Technical External Mooring Submerged Wind 
Error Failure Assistance Failure Undetected 
Failure Objects 
Grounding Navigational Error Technical Failure Bad Weather 
Fire/Explosion Technical Bad Stowage Collision Weather Human Error 
Failure 
Based on Table 2.5 and by further scrutiny of lower events, fault tree diagrams are 
illustrated (Figures 2.8-2.11). The gate symbol denotes the type of relationship of the 
input events required for the output event. For example an AND gate denotes the output 
occurs if all inputs occur while an OR gate denotes the output occur if at least one of the 
input faults occurs (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007). The pathways through the fault tree 
diagram represent all the events, which give rise to a top event. These pathways are 
known as cut sets. Basic events (e. g. E, H, and S) are those events with sufficient data. 
For instance, navigational error can be due to ship staff error (wrong decisions on 
course, speed or timing of manoeuvres) or machinery failure (e. g. failure of bridge 
equipment). The machinery failures are mostly due to one or combination of the 
following: 
" Unreliability of supplied component or spare parts. 
" Unreliability of designated person, the one designated to carry out maintenance and 
operation (i. e. human error). 
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" Incorrect maintenance timing and procedures. 
" Insufficient time to carry out maintenance. 
" Design failure. 
" Incorrect dry docking procedures and timing. 
Based on Figures 2.8-2.11 and the above discussions, the most significant failure event 
is the ship staff error. 
Figure 2.8: Fault Tree Diagram for Contact 
Machinery Ship Staff Error Machinery Ship Staff Error 
Failure Failure 
lk I 
Figure 2.9: Fault Tree Diagram for Grounding 
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Figure 2.10: Fault Tree Diagram for Collision 
Figure 2.11: Fault Tree Diagram for Fire/Explosion 
2.11. Decision Making Techniques 
Bayesian networks (BNs), fuzzy logic and multiple attribute utility theory (MAUT) 
have proven to be powerful tools for decision-making. While BNs and fuzzy logic deal 
with the decisions under uncertainty, MAUT focuses on the problems with multiple 
attributes or criteria. In complex safety critical systems, decisions are usually made on 
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multiple uncertain attributes. Therefore, it is possible to consider the synthesis of BNs, 
fuzzy logic and MAUT (or its extension - Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM)) 
together in the forming of a more powerful risk based decision support tool. Although 
the work by Fenton and Neil (2001) has provided a theoretical foundation for the 
combination of BNs and MCDM, it uses subjective point estimation to define attribute 
states, which may not be well suited to modelling the safety attribute, and thus, cannot 
be appropriately applied to the risk domain without further research. Actually, the 
attempt to synthesise these techniques can be better considered as an alternative 
explanation to simple Influence Diagrams (IDs) including one decision node (Howard 
and Matheson 1981). In order to make use of the advantages of BNs, fuzzy logic and 
MCDM in risk based decisions; the relevant literature needs to be reviewed in the 
following context and in Chapter 4 (BNs is discussed in Chapter 4). 
2.11.1. Fuzzy Logic 
An important point of dealing with uncertainty came in 1965 with the publication of a 
fuzzy logic based paper by Zadeh (1965). Fuzzy logic is a superset of conventional 
Boolean logic with extensions to account for imprecise information. There is nothing 
fuzzy on the subject of fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic permits vague information, knowledge 
and concepts to be used in an exact mathematical manner. Simply, it can be said that the 
nature of possibility theory differs from the probability theory, because in possibility 
theory the values are not indicated by numbers, but words, in natural or artificial 
language. Linguistic variables such as "definite", "likely", "average", "unlikely" and 
"impossible" are necessary media used to describe continuous and overlapping states. 
This enables qualitative and imprecise reasoning statements to be incorporated with 
fuzzy algorithms. Since linguistic variables are useful properties of possibility theory, 
fuzzy logic modelling was quickly developed in the 1970s and became one of the most 
recognised approaches in the expert decision system. 
Fuzzy logic is based on the principle that every crisp value belongs to all relevant fuzzy 
sets to various extents, called the degrees of membership. Furthermore, membership 
functions of fuzzy sets are regularly used to deal with the ambiguity inherent in the 
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description of the event itself. Fuzzy logic has various techniques, which can be used in 
uncertainty treatment. They are namely fuzzy sets and fuzzy rule base. The application 
of these fuzzy logic techniques depends on the situation and they are widely used in 
many applications. Fuzzy sets have two other categories namely discrete and continuous 
fuzzy sets. Fuzzy sets are based on possibility theory and most of the fuzzy techniques 
are developed by using fuzzy sets (Yen and Langari, 1999). 
2.11.2. Fuzzy Set Theory and Fuzzy Membership Function 
Zadeh (1965) introduced the notion of fuzzy sets to model vague predicates and 
informal reasoning in the form of fuzzy logic. The theory of fuzzy set has, one of its 
aims, the development of a methodology for formulation and solution of problems that 
are too complex, or too ill defined, to be susceptible to analysis by conventional 
techniques (Kandel, 1986). 
Crisp variables or traditional variables do not have the natural capability to express and 
deal with observation and measurement of uncertainties, but the significance of fuzzy 
variables is that they facilitate gradual transition between states and consequently gain 
the natural capability (Klir and Yuan, 1995; Pillary and Wang, 2001). Although the 
definition of states by crisp sets is mathematically correct, in many cases, it is 
unrealistic in the face of unavoidable measurement errors. A measurement that falls into 
a close neighbourhood of each precisely defined border between states of crisp variables 
is taken as evidential support for only one state, in spite of the inevitable uncertainty 
involved in the problem. 
Let X be a classical set of objects, denoted by x, called the universe. Let C be a classical 
subset of X and m(x) be a function from X to the pair of values (0,1) such that if x r= C, 
m(x) = 1, and if x%C, m(x) = 0. In classical sets, then, either elements of the universe 
belong to a set or they do not. The set is characterized by a sharp boundary and is 
identical with its members. By contrast, a fuzzy set F, is a subset characterized by the 
set of pairs "F= ((x, u (x)), XE X) ", where 1u (x) represents the 
degree of 
membership with possible values ranging over the real interval [0,1]. A membership 
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function (MF) value of one means full representation of the set under consideration. A 
MF value of zero implies that the value does not belong to the set under consideration. 
A membership somewhere between these two limits indicates the degree of 
membership. In each context of application of the predicate P, the fuzzy set F will be 
normalised if there exists one x, such that 1u (x) =1. A fuzzy set whose MF only takes 
on the value of zero or one is called crisp. 
The fuzzy set is characterized by a membership function and there is no sharp boundary. 
In this way, fuzziness formalizes a kind of deterministic uncertainty and ambiguity. For 
instance, if P represents the vague predicate "Tall", the fuzzy set of tall individuals 
will include "Very Tall" individuals, with 1uP(x) closer to one, and "Short" 
individuals, 
with , uF(x) closer to zero (Cat, 2006). As an interpretation of fuzzy logic, the 
membership function designates a degree of truth valuation for statements of the form `x 
is F'. This provides the extensional semantics for multivalent logic (Cat, 2006). 
For fuzzy sets, one can introduce an algebra of set-theoretic operations. The most basic 
ones, introduced by Zadeh (1965), are listed as follows: 
9 Union: u (F U G)(x) = max (uP(x), fpö(x) ) 
" Intersection: p (F fl Ö)(x) = min (u (x) , pö(x) ) 
" Complement: F is the set of x such that, a' F (x) =1- pP(x) , where 
W(x) is the 
degree of membership in but u' F (x) is the degree of membership in F) and 
F is the complement of F. Unlike classical sets, for fuzzy sets, FUF0 S2 where 
S2 is the universe and FnF#Q. 
" Subset: FCG ifJ' Ax) < AZ(x), for all x. 
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2.11.3. Operation of Triangular Fuzzy Numbers 
Let F and G be two triangular fuzzy numbers parameterized by triples (fl, f2, J3) and 
(gl, g2, g3) respectively as shown in Figure 2.12. Then the operation laws of these two 
triangular fuzzy numbers are as follows (Wang and Chang, 2007): 
(11,. 1Z, ß) + (g1, g2, g3) 
(fl, J2, J3) - (81, g2, g3) 
(fl, J2, J3) x (gl, g2, g3) 
(11, J2, J3) - (gi, g2, g3) 
1 
0 
(fi + g], J2 + g2, 
.+ 
g3) 
(/1 -g3,. 2-g2, J3-SI) 
(fi x g1, 
. 
1Z X g2,. f3 x g3) 
(fl 
f2 f3 
g3, g2'g1) 
Figure 2.12: Operation of Triangular Fuzzy Numbers 
2.11.4. Discrete Fuzzy Sets 
Discrete fuzzy sets have been applied to many activities in the marine industry. This is 
because discrete fuzzy sets have several useful characteristics: 
1. A linguistic term is defined by its own set of categories and their associated 
membership values. 
2. The numerical value calculation process of each linguistic term is not complex. 
2.11.5. Fuzzy Rule Base 
Fuzzy rule base produces simpler, more intuitive and better-behaved models. In marine 
safety assessment, fuzzy "if - then" rules were used to model qualitative aspects (Sii et 
al., 2001). Such a rule base has been used because Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) 
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fl f2 gl B g2 g3 
was not well suited to deal with a system having a high level of uncertainty. "If - then " 
rules have two parts, namely, an antecedent (i. e. input) and a consequent part (i. e. the 
result) (Bowels and Pelaez, 1995; Pillary and Wang, 2003). For example, If occurrence 
is Low and severity is Very High and detectability is Moderate then the risk is 
Important. The fuzzy rule base has several useful properties that are listed as follows 
(Sii et al., 2001; Bowles and Pelaez, 1995): 
1. The rules are usually more conveniently formulated in linguistic terms than in 
numerical terms. 
2. They are often expressed as "if - then" rules, which are easily implemented by fuzzy 
conditional statements. 
2.11.6. Application of Fuzzy Logic 
Fuzzy logic has been successfully applied for a wide range of single and MCDM 
problems. 
" Yager (1981) proposed a fuzzy logic based methodology for qualitative multi- 
criteria decisions. 
" Khouja and Booth (1995) applied a fuzzy cluster analysis to choose industrial 
robots. 
" Wang et al. (1995) presented a new methodology for safety analysis and synthesis 
of a complex marine engineering system with a structure capable of being 
decomposed into a hierarchy of levels. In this methodology, discrete fuzzy sets were 
developed to describe each failure event and an evidential reasoning (ER) approach 
was then employed to synthesise the information thus produced to assess the safety 
of the whole system. 
" Since fuzzy set theory (FST) was introduced more than four decades ago, it has 
found many useful applications in the electrical and electronic engineering, civil 
engineering, research and development projects, business management, information 
and control, economics and marketing, education, health and medicine, and safety 
engineering (Wang et al., 1995; Yen and Langari, 1999). 
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" Lee (1996) applied fuzzy set theory to evaluate the rate of aggregative risk in 
software development. 
" Liang (1999) combined the idea of the Technique for Order Preference by Similarity 
to an Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) with FST to propose a novel fuzzy MCDM based on 
the concepts of ideal and anti-ideal points. 
" Fuzzy discrete MCDM algorithms for optimising the cost of steel structures 
developed and studied by Sarma and Adeli (2000). 
" Singh and Tiong (2000) described a multiple criteria linguistic decision model using 
FST to evaluate the capability of a contractor to deliver projects as the owner's 
requirements. 
" Chen (2001) used fuzzy group decision making for evaluating the rate of 
aggregative risk in software development. 
" Chen (2001) used a new multiple criteria decision-making method to solve the 
"distribution centre location selection problem" under fuzzy environment. 
" Shipley et al. (2001) described a multiple criteria linguistic decision model to satisfy 
goals for successful product/service introduction. 
" Kapoor and Tak (2003) proposed a fuzzy logic based methodology for making 
qualitative multi-criteria decisions in facilities planning. 
" Wang and Lin (2003) produced a fuzzy logic approach for configuration item 
selection in software development based on multiple qualitative criteria. 
"A multi-criteria port competitiveness evaluation problem was solved by Huang et 
al., (2003) using a fuzzy multi-criteria grade classification approach. 
"A fuzzy rule based ER approach was used to analyse the safety of a marine and 
offshore engineering system (Liu et al., 2005). 
" Yang et al. (2005) carried out risk analysis of container supply chains. Combining 
discrete fuzzy sets and an ER approach, that study presented a subjective method for 
dealing with vulnerability. 
45 
" Sadiq and Hassan (2005) applied a fuzzy-based methodology for an aggregative 
environmental risk assessment of drilling waste. 
" Zeng et al. (2006) applied an aggregative risk assessment model for information 
technology project development. 
"A fuzzy rule based ER was employed in the location of key bus stations of a 
geographically featured Chinese city, Dalian (Xie et al., 2006). 
" Wand and Elhang (2007) used fuzzy group decision making for bridge risk 
assessment. 
2.11.7. Evidential Reasoning 
The theory of evidence was first generated by Dempster (1967) and further developed 
by Shafer (1976); it is often referred to as Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence or D-S 
theory. The D-S theory was originally used for information aggregation in expert 
systems as an approximate reasoning tool (Buchanan and Shortliffe, 1984; Lopez de 
Mantaras, 1990). Subsequently it has been used in decision making under uncertainty 
(Yager, 1992; 1995). 
In the 1990s, to deal with Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) problems under 
uncertainty based on the D-S theory, evidential reasoning (ER) was developed. The use 
of ER as a decision making tool has been widely reported in the literature. An important 
achievement of applying ER to decision analysis is to incorporate it into traditional 
MCDM methods (Beynon et al., 2000). The ER approach developed particularly for 
MCDM problems with both qualitative and quantitative criteria under uncertainty 
utilises individuals' knowledge, expertise and experience in the forms of belief 
functions. 
The ER criteria aggregation process is in general a non-linear process as compared to 
traditional weighting MCDM methods. The non-linearity is decided by the weights of 
criteria and the way each criterion is assessed. Furthermore, the ER frameworks not 
only provide flexibility in describing a MCDM problem but also prevent any loss of 
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information due to conversion from a distribution to a single value in the modelling 
process. To handle incomplete information, utility intervals can be established to 
describe the impact of missing information on decision analysis; this provides a basis 
for improving the quality of original data and for conducting sensitivity analysis. 
2.11.8. Application of Evidential Reasoning 
Several applications of the ER approach can be addressed in the literature (Wang et al., 
1995,1996; Yang and Sen, 1996,1997; Yang, 2001; Sii et al., 2002; Yang et al., 2004). 
Some typical studies making useful contributions towards the use of ER for representing 
and managing uncertainty in decision analysis include the works produced by Yen 
(1990), De Korvin and Shipley (1993), Xu (1997), Denoeux (1999), Murphy (2000) and 
Vourous (2000). 
The ER approach was applied to select the best prime contractor for a civil engineering 
project (Sonmez et al., 2001). In that study, the process of building a multiple criteria 
decision model of a hierarchical structure was presented with both quantitative and 
qualitative criteria. The process of converting lower level criterion assessments to upper 
level criterion was shown. 
The ER algorithm, which was generated by Yang and Singh (1994), later updated by 
Yang (2001) and further modified by Yang and Xu (2002). Tang et al. (2004) used ER 
to assess the condition of a transformer. ER was combined with a diagnosis technique to 
provide a meaningful and accurate diagnosis. The result showed that ER was capable of 
producing the condition of a transformer. The major advantages of ER are listed as 
follows: 
" It is capable of handling incomplete, uncertain and vague as well as complete and 
precise data. 
" It is capable of providing its users with a greater flexibility by allowing them to 
express their judgements both subjectively and quantitatively. 
" It is capable of accommodating or representing the uncertainty and risk that is 
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inherent in decision analysis. 
" As a hierarchical evaluation process, it is capable of offering a rational and 
reproducible methodology to aggregate the data assessed. 
" It is capable of obtaining the assessment output using mature computing software, 
Intelligent Decision System (IDS) (Yang and Xu, 2002). 
2.11.9. Evidential Reasoning Algorithm 
The combination of D-S theory and fuzzy set theory is an appropriate way to solve 
complex problems that include fuzzy information from multiple sources. One direction 
is to extend D-S theory to include the feature of fuzzy set theory so that its capability 
can be enhanced to process both crisp and fuzzy information. In D-S's rule of 
combination, suppose subsets B and C defined on 9 are associated with confidence 
estimates mj and m2 respectively that are obtained from two independent sources. The 
orthogonal sum of mj and m2 is defined as follows: 
ym, (B)xm2(C) 
(m, (Dm2 )(A) =1 
a"C"A 
m (B) X M2 C , c) () Bnc. o 
In continuously researching and practicing processes, based on the D-S theory the ER 
algorithm has been developed, improved and modified towards a more rational way 
(Yang and Xu, 2002). The algorithm can be analysed and explained as follows: 
Let "S" represent the set of the four safety expressions and be synthesised by two 
subsets S1 and S2 from two different assessors. Then S, Sl and S2 can separately be 
expressed by: 
S={ ß1 'Poor", ßZ "Fair", ß3 "Average", 84 "Good"} 
S1= { ß; "Poor", ß; "Fair", ß3 "Average", ßý "Good"} 
S2= j, 62 "Poor", ß2 "Fair", ßZ "Average", P42 "Good'} 
where "Poor", "Fair", "Average", "Good" are assessed with their corresponding 
degrees of belief. 
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Suppose the normalised relative weights of two safety assessors in the safety evaluation 
process are given as COI and 602 (COI + C02 = 1) and w and W2 can be estimated by using 
established methods such as simple rating methods or more elaborate methods based on 
pair wise comparisons (Yang et al., 2001). Suppose Al', and 1I"2 (m = 1,2,3 or 4) are 
individual degrees to which the subsets Sj and S2 support the hypothesis that the safety 
evaluation is confirmed to the four safety expressions. Then, Al', and M"2 can be 
obtained as follows: 
M"`1= wý Qý 
M2 
where m=1,2,3,4. Therefore, 
Al', -co 1N1 
= wI /ý l3I 
M_, w1f3 
4 
%= wi /3 
= w2 QZ 
2W2ßß 
2=! A2ß2 
d2 
C02 P2 
Mai = (0Z P2 
Suppose Hi and H2 are the individual remaining belief values unassigned for Al'11 and 
AP2 (m = 1,2,3,4). Then, H, and H2 can be expressed as follows (Yang and Xu, 
2002): 
Hl = H1 + Hl 
H2 = H2 + H2 
where H (n =I or 2) representing the degree to which the other assessor can play a 
role in the assessment, and H (n =1 or 2) caused by the possible incompleteness in 
the subsets Sj and S2, can be described as follows respectively: 
Hi=1-0l=w2 
HZ= 1-t02 =ßv1 
Hý=wß(1-EQ1m)=w1+Qi+p +ý )] 
H2 = t02 C02 [1- (lß2 + JQ2 +)62 + Q2 )) 
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Suppose ß" (m = 1,2,3 or 4) represents the non-normalised degree to which the safety 
evaluation is confirmed to the four safety expressions as a result of the synthesis of the 
judgments produced by assessors 1 and 2. Suppose Hu' represents the non-normalised 
remaining belief unassigned after the commitment of belief to the four safety 
expressions because of the synthesis of the judgments produced by assessors 1 and 2. 
The ER algorithm can be stated as follows (Yang and Xu, 2002): 
Q" =K (W 1A2+ M", H2 + Hl M"2) 
Hu '= K (Hi H2 ) 
Flu' =K (H, H2 + Hl H2 + H1 H2 ) 
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K=[1- EMiM2J 
T=1 R=1 
R*T 
After the above aggregation, the combined degrees of belief are generated by assigning 
Hu' back to the four safety expressions using the following normalization process: 
=ßm'/1-Hu' (m=1,2,3,4) 
Hu = flu'/ 1- HU' 
where Hu is the unassigned degree of belief representing the extent of incompleteness 
in the overall assessment. 
The above gives the pr ocess of combining two fuzzy sets. If three fuzzy sets are 
required to be combined, the result obtained from the combination of any two sets can 
be further synthesized with the third one using the above algorithm. In a similar way, 
multiple fuzzy sets from the judgements of multiple assessors or the safety evaluations 
of lower level risks in the chain systems (i. e. components or subsystems) can also be 
combined. 
2.11.10. Hybrid Multiple Criteria Decision Making 
MCDM problems with both qualitative and quantitative attributes are sometimes called 
hybrid MCDM problems (Sonmez, 2002). When faced with a hybrid MCDM problem, 
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the first thing to tackle is how to measure the qualitative criteria (Yang and Sen, 1994). 
An ER based decision-making approach for MCDM problems with both qualitative and 
quantitative criteria under uncertainty was developed in the early 1990's (Yang and 
Singh, 1994; Yang and Sen, 1994). When conflicting evidence exists in MCDM 
problems, the ER approach by using a distributed evaluation framework has conquered 
the inability of the D-S theory. The ER approach can be described as a hierarchical 
evaluation process in which all decision criteria are aggregated into the goal of the 
problem. Consequently, the process of applying the ER approach to MCDM can be 
briefly described in a stepwise manner as follows (Sonmez, 2002): 
" Display a decision problem in a hierarchical structure. 
" Assign weights to each criterion and to their sub-criteria. 
. Choose a method for assessing a criterion either quantitatively or qualitatively. 
" Transform assessments between a main criterion and its associated sub-criteria if 
they are assessed using different methods (i. e. qualitative and quantitative). 
" Evaluate each alternative based on the lowest level criteria in the hierarchical 
structure. 
Quantify qualitative assessments at the top level if necessary and determine an 
aggregated value for each alternative. 
" Rank alternatives and choose the one with the highest average value. 
2.12. Conclusion and Discussions 
Within this chapter, a careful analysis of some typical historical failure data concerning 
the containership accidents clearly elucidates that container cargo damage, machinery 
failure, collision, grounding, fire/explosion, and contact are the most significant 
accident categories with high percentages of occurrence. Another important finding is 
that the most significant basic event contributing to the supply chains' vulnerability is 
human error. Thus, to create a model for the safety of container supply chain systems, 
firstly, a methodology for measuring human reliability has to be developed. 
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The operational process of container supply chain systems including physical cargo 
flow, information flow and custody flow has been reviewed. Container supply chains 
include dozens of stakeholders who can physically come into contact with containers and 
their contents and are potentially related with the container trade and transportation. 
Security-based disruptions can occur at various points along the supply chain. The 
literature review in the context of container supply chains from a security point of view 
clearly elucidates that the best methodology to secure the chain is to use better shipment 
data for enhanced container targeting capability. Experience has shown that even a 
limited percentage of inspection, coupled with a targeted approach based on risk 
analysis, can provide an acceptable security level. Thus, in order not to hamper the 
logistical process in an intolerable manner, the number of physical checks should be 
carefully chosen. Furthermore, the container supply chain can be assumed as a series 
network and for a series network the reliability of a system can be calculated through 
the reliability of its components (i. e. importers, exporters, manufacturers, manufacturing 
sites, inland carriers, warehouses, ports, containerships, container consolidation and 
deconsolidation facilities, etc. ). Thus to create a model for the security of container 
supply chain systems, firstly, methodologies for evaluating and aggregating the 
reliability of different commercial operators and premises have to be developed; 
secondly, the strength of the supply chain's weakest link via the components' reliability 
has to be determined. 
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Chapter Three 
Ergonomics Contribution to the Safety and Reliability of 
Containerships 
Summary 
Ergonomics has been recognised to be essential for improving safety and productivity. 
The focus of ergonomics is the design of human-system interface. This includes 
interfaces between personnel and hardware, software and physical environments 
associated with systems. The difference between high and low system performances is 
highly dependent on human reliability. In this chapter for evaluating seafarers' 
reliability a generic model with a hierarchical structure, based on the ergonomics 
model, literature review, historical failure data and statistical analysis, is constructed. 
Subsequently assessment grades are assigned to all the criteria in the hierarchical 
structure, those assessment grades could be either qualitative or quantitative. Each 
quantitative criterion is transformed to a qualitative criterion by using the membership 
functions of continuous fuzzy sets. Each lower level qualitative criterion is converted 
into an associated upper level qualitative criterion by formulating a mapping process. 
An analytic hierarchy process (AHP) methodology is used for assigning the weights to 
each criterion and also to their sub-criteria. The evidential reasoning (ER) algorithm is 
used to synthesise the generic seafarer's reliability criteria. The concept of expected 
utility is used to obtain a single crisp value for a seafarer's reliability. Finally, based on 
an engineering viewpoint a frame of reference is constructed and employed for 
assessing the distance of any seafarer's reliability value from an ideal one. 
Accordingly, the control options to enhance the seafarer's reliability value are 
suggested. The proposed methodology enables and facilitates the decision makers to 
evaluate the reliability of a person before his/her designation to any kind of activities 
and to nominate a correct person for a specific task Moreover, the decision makers 
should realise that a seafarer's reliability value depends upon many variables. 
Therefore, in order to correct any deviation on time, it has to be measured 
appropriately and regularly. 
3.1. Introduction 
The number of container ships and their size has increased rapidly over the last 40 years. 
Due to the increase of customer demand and the lowering of total cost, by the beginning 
of 2010, the number of container carriers is estimated to be 5240 ships with the total slot 
capacity of 14.23 million TEU (Vernimmen et al., 2007). Accordingly, the number of 
container carriers with the capacity of more than 7500 TEU is estimated to be 291 ships 
with the total slot capacity of 2.6 million TEU (Vernimmen et al., 2007). As a result, the 
reliability of container vessels will have significant effects on the container supply 
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chains reliability. 
A schedule reliability survey was conducted by the maritime analyst Drewry Shipping 
Consultants (2006), based on 5410 container vessel arrivals on 23 different trade routes. 
It revealed that more than 40% of vessels deployed on worldwide liner services arrived 
one or more days behind schedule. The factors causing liner schedule unreliability are 
found to be bad weather at sea, congestion or labour strikes at different ports of call, as 
well as knock-on effects of delay suffered at previous ports. More serious liner delays, 
leading to significant time losses for the cargoes involved or even the loss of cargo 
altogether are found to be fire, collision and grounding (Vernimmen et al., 2007). 
Therefore, a reliable container industry not only has to be schedule driven but also has 
to be safe; its reliability is highly dependent on its container shipments and its safe 
operation. Consequently, the application of good seamanship and prudent operational 
practice is highly required. 
Container supply chains are vulnerable to many risks. In a supply chain context, 
logistics internal and external risks together endanger the continuity and reliability of 
the chains. Therefore, vulnerability can be defined as an exposure to serious 
disturbances arising from the risks within supply chains as well as the risks external to 
the supply chain (Yang et al., 2005). By analyzing the nature of results, vulnerability 
can also be defined as exposure to serious disturbances arising from a hazard or a threat 
(Yang et al., 2005). 
The conducted HAZID concerning the containership accidents (in Chapter 2) clearly 
elucidated that the container cargo damage, machinery failure, collision, grounding, 
fire/explosion, and contact are the most significant accident categories with high 
percentages of occurrence. Another important finding is that the most significant basic 
event contributing to the supply chains' vulnerability is human error. 
The supply chain flow can be segregated into two groups, which are described as links 
and nodes. The links are trucks, trains, containerships, information transmission 
facilities and their infrastructures, roads, rails, inland waterways, liner shipping lanes 
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and cables/satellites. The nodes are warehouses, LCL premises, rail termini/stations and 
ports. No links or nodes will function without the people who understand how to 
operate and maintain them. Therefore, any activity deviation coming from such persons 
may lead to a severe disruption in the chains (Yang et al., 2005). 
The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) stated that one factor, human 
error still dominates the majority of marine accidents (MAIB, 2000). The most common 
human factor causes were error of judgement and improper look out or watch keeping, 
followed by failure to comply with regulations (Hetherington et al., 2006). 
Risk factors in maritime transportation were analysed and researched by Psarafits et al. 
(2008). After analysing many accident reports (7,553 records) and by taking the vessels' 
flag, ownership, type, age, type of cargo, and location of accident into account the 
human factors were found to be the prevalent causes. 
Based on expert opinion, the large amount of downtime in container terminals and ports 
concern the error of gantry crane operators, which is the main cause of physical damage 
to a vessel's cell guides, railings, container cargoes, and tank tops. The investigation 
conducted by CellStack (2008) clearly indicated that the large amount of downtime in 
modern container ports or container terminals is caused by the motion sickness (human 
fatigue) of crane operators. 
In marine operations, the officers and crews are usually designated by a manning and 
crewing agent or a fleet personnel department; masters and chief engineers usually have 
limited influence on selection of designated persons. In certain circumstances especially 
on board a container vessel due to short port stay, the newly incoming officers may 
relieve the outgoing officers in a matter of hours without properly following the handing 
and taking over pro cedures. The proposed methodology enables and facilitates the 
decision makers to evaluate the reliability of a person before his/her designation to any 
activities and to nominate a correct person for a specific task. 
If the aim of managers is to have a safer and more profitable industry (e. g. shipping 
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lines, container terminals, stevedores and packaging companies), they should not only 
calculate their employees' reliability value but also enhance their reliability value. 
Choosing the correct personnel for a job or a task is critical to the overall safety and 
business performance. Selection of personnel who do not have the requisite skills, 
training, or tools can adversely affect vessel safety by reducing personnel efficiency and 
increasing the potential for error (ABS, 2003). 
3.2. Literature Review 
Measurement of reliability of human behaviour in a human-machine system has been a 
source of interest since 1963. Swain (1963), Meister (1964) and Askren (1967) have 
conducted research in this area. Adams (1982) has used Monte Carlo simulations for 
calculation of human reliability. Due to lack of consideration of the factors that 
influence human error, precise prediction of human behaviour in complex environments 
may not be possible. Furthermore, given that human reliability is normally expressed in 
both quantitative and qualitative terms, decision makers may often carry out their 
judgments based on both quantitative data and experiential subjective assessments. 
Therefore, measuring the human reliability by means of probability theory cannot be a 
precise measurement. 
Wagenaar and Groeneweg (1987) stated that "accidents do not occur because people 
gamble and lose, they occur because people do not believe that the accident that is about 
to occur, is at all possible". Therefore, for a safe operation, operators should be trained 
to seek for the causes and the consequences. They should pay attention to any incoming 
alarm (e. g. fire, oil mist in crankcase, boiler water level) and acknowledge it as a 
genuine alarm. However, it was elucidated as a false alarm in so many occasions. 
3.3. Ergonomics Model 
"Ergonomics is the scientific discipline concerned with the understanding of 
interactions among humans and other elements of a system, and the profession that 
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applies theory, principles, data, and methods to design in order to optimise human well- 
being and overall system performance" (International Ergonomics Association, 2000). 
The focus of ergonomics is the design of human-system interface. This includes 
interfaces between personnel and hardware, software and physical environments 
associated with the systems. The most important elements that affect safety and 
efficiency in job performance are listed as follows (ABS, 2003): 
" Design and layout considerations. 
9 Ambient environmental considerations. 
" Management and organisational considerations. 
" Considerations related to people. 
3.3.1. Design and Layout Considerations (Human-System Interface) 
Design and layout considers the integration of personnel with equipment, systems, and 
interfaces. It is important for designers and engineers, during the design stage, to 
consider the following factors that may influence work performance and the likelihood 
of human error (ABS, 2003): 
1. Personnel's social, psychological, and physiological capabilities, limitation and 
needs. 
2. Hardware and software design, arrangement, and orientation. 
3. Workplace design includes the physical design and arrangements of the workplace 
and its effect on safety and performance of personnel. 
4. The cultural and regional influences on personnel's behavioural patterns and 
expectations. 
Human-system interface can be evaluated by aggregation of the following seven criteria 
that directly relate to equipment and system performance in the context of reducing the 
potential for human error (ABS, 2003): 
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1. Controls. 
2. Displays. 
3. Alarms. 
4. Integration of controls, displays, and alarms. 
5. Video-display units and workstation. 
6. Manual valve operation, access, location, and orientation. 
7. Labelling, sign, graphics, and symbols. 
For further inquiry, kindly refer to the guidance notes for the application of ergonomics 
to marine systems (ABS, 2003). 
3.3.2. Ambient Environmental Considerations (Design & Habitability) 
The ambient environmental aspect of the ABS (2003) ergonomics model addresses the 
habitability and occupational health characteristics related to human whole-body 
vibration, noise, indoor climate, and lighting. Substandard physical working conditions 
undermine effective performance of duties, causing stress and fatigue. Ambient 
environmental considerations also include appropriate design of living spaces that assist 
in recovery from fatigue. The ambient environmental conditions can be evaluated by 
aggregation of the workplace and the living space environmental conditions. The 
workplace environmental conditions can be evaluated by aggregation of the following 
seven elements: 
1. Location (e. g. in the engine room, in the control room, on an open deck, inside a 
tank). 
2. Time and duration (e. g. inside a tank at night for six hours). 
3. Ventilation (i. e. cubic meters of ventilation air per minute per person). 
4. Climate (i. e. air temperature, air velocity, humidity, and mean air temperature). 
5. Vibration level (i. e. vibration velocity and acceleration at a working area). 
6. Noise level. 
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7. Lighting. 
The living space environmental conditions can be evaluated by aggregation of the 
following five elements: 
1. Vibration level (i. e. vibration velocity and acceleration at a living area) 
2. Noise level. 
3. Indoor climate (i. e. air temperature, air velocity, humidity, and mean air 
temperature). 
4. Lighting. 
5. Accommodation's design (i. e. location, arrangement, and outfitting of 
accommodation spaces). 
For further inquiry, kindly refer to the ABS guide for crew habitability on ships. 
3.3.2.1. Vibration 
Developments in the global economy during the last two decades have changed the 
traditions of shipbuilding. Accordingly, ship design is advanced, vessels' speed is 
increased, the safety factor is reduced, the construction is optimized, and the tendency 
for vibration problems is pronounced. One of the factors that can significantly influence 
human error and fatigue is vibration. Short-term exposure leads to headaches, stress, 
and fatigue. Long-term exposure leads to hearing loss and causes constant body 
agitation (Calhoun, 2006). In 1977, the International Labour Organization (ILO) listed 
vibration as an occupational hazard and recommended that measures have to be taken to 
protect employees from vibration (ILO, 1977). Vibration level at living spaces and 
workplaces can be evaluated by the ISO 6954-2000 guideline. The ISO 6954-2000 
guideline for the workplaces and the living spaces on boards a ship is presented in Table 
3.1. 
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3.3.3. Management and Organisational Considerations 
An atmosphere for error can be segregated into two groups that are described as 
preventable (e. g. a ship's design & habitability, a ship's design & layout) and inevitable 
(e. g. sea conditions). Preventable factors, during the preparation of a specification for 
new building of a vessel and throughout its lifetime, should be considered and 
determined by a ship's owner. The seafarers' motivations, fatigue, and hours of rest are 
highly dependent on the manager's strategies. The effective implementation of a well- 
designed safety policy that includes ergonomics creates an environment that minimises 
risks (ABS, 2003). 
3.3.4. Consideration Related to People 
The difference between high and low system performances is highly dependent on 
human reliability. Choosing the correct personnel for a duty is essential for overall 
safety. The following factors should be considered when selecting personnel for a task 
(ABS, 2003): 
1. Knowledge, skills, and abilities that stem from an individual's basic knowledge, 
general training and experience. 
2. Maritime-specific training and abilities (certificate and licences), and vessel or 
offshore installation specific skills and abilities. 
3. Bodily dimension and characteristics of personnel such as stature, shoulder breadth, 
eye height, functional reach, overhead reach, and weight. 
4. Physical stamina; capabilities, and limitation, such as resistance to and freedom 
from fatigue; visual activity; physical fitness and endurance; acute or chronic 
illness; and substance dependency. 
5. Psychological characteristics, such as individual tendencies for risk taking, risk 
tolerance and resistance to psychological stress. 
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3.4. Technical Proficiency 
The standards for training certification and watch-keeping (STCW, 1995) prescribes the 
mandatory requirements for certification of deck and engineer officer and watch ratings 
including requirements relating to age, medical fitness, seagoing service and standards 
of competence. To satisfy the requirements candidates for the UK certificates of 
competency have to meet certain medical standards; satisfactorily complete a minimum 
period of seagoing service; reach the required vocational and academic standard; 
undertake ancillary technical training. Moreover, in the case of officer candidates, on 
completion of programmes of education and training approved by the Maritime and 
Coastguard Agency (MCA), they should pass an oral examination conducted by an 
MCA examiner (MCA, 2002). 
As a result, a seafarer's technical proficiency can be evaluated by aggregation of the 
following criteria: 
"A seafarer's qualification. 
"A seafarer's experience. 
"A seafarer's specific training. 
3.4.1. Qualification 
In 1993, the International Maritime organization (IMO) embarked on a comprehensive 
revision of the Standards for Training Certification and Watch-keeping (STCW 78) to 
establish the highest practical standards of competence for mariners and to reduce 
human error as a major cause of marine causalities. On 7 July 1995, a conference of 
parties to STCW adopted a package of amendments to the convention, which 
establishes requirements for qualification of masters, officers, watch-keeping and other 
crew personnel on seagoing merchant vessels operating outside the boundary line and 
the responsibilities of companies. The abilities specified in the standards of competence 
are grouped as appropriated under the following seven functions (STCW, 1995): 
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1. Navigation. 
2. Cargo handling and stowage. 
3. Controlling the operation of the ship and care for persons on board. 
4. Marine engineering. 
5. Electrical, electronic and control engineering. 
6. Maintenance and repair. 
7. Radio communications. 
Each deck/navigational officer must qualify in functions 1,2 and 3 (deck). A 
deck/navigational officer may then qualify in the additional functions of 3 (engineer), 4, 
5,6, and 7. Each engineer officer must qualify in functions 3 (engineer), 4,5, and 6. 
An engineer officer may then qualify in the additional functions of 1,2, and 3 (deck). A 
radio operator must qualify in function 7. 
The levels of responsibility under STCW (95) are categorised as follows: 
1. M stands for management level. 
2.0 stands for operational level. 
3. S stands for support level. 
3.4.2. Specific Training 
The compulsory and additional courses for deck and engineering officers under STCW 
(95) are listed as follows: 
" Advanced Fire Fighting- Every candidate for a master or mate's certificate or an 
engineer officer's certificate for service on vessel over 750 kW propulsion power 
must complete an advanced marine fire-fighting course. 
" Radar Simulation Training - Every candidate for a master or mate's certificate must 
complete a marine radar simulation course. 
" GMDSS Certification- Every candidate for a third mate/ second mate/mate's 
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certificate must hold GMDSS certification. 
9 First Aid Training- Every candidate for a second mate/ third mate's certificate on 
vessels over 500 gross tons, every candidate for a master/mate's certificate on 
vessels less than 500 gross tons and every candidate for an engineer officer's 
certificate serving on vessels of over 750 kW propulsion must complete first aid 
training. 
" Survival Craft/ Rescue Boat Training- Every candidate for a master, chief mate, 
second mate, third mate or mate's certificate and every candidate for an engineer 
officer's certificate on vessels of over 750 kW propulsion power must complete 
proficiency in survival craft/rescue boats training. 
" Automatic Radar Plotting Aids (ARPA) Training- Every candidate for a master, 
chief mate, second mate, third mate or mate's certificate must complete ARPA 
training. 
9 Advanced Medical Training- Effective 1 August 1998, every candidate for a master 
or chief mate's certificate on vessels over 500 gross tons must complete advanced 
medical training. 
" Bridge Team/ Resource Management- all deck officers must attend the BRM course 
and obtain a certificate. 
All ocean going mariners are required to demonstrate the basic safety training (BST) 
proficiency by completing an approved course. Basic safety training consists of the 
following four elements: 
1. Personal survival. 
2. Elementary first aid. 
3. Elementary fire fighting and fire prevention. 
4. Personal safety and social responsibility. 
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3.5. Human Fatigue 
The IMO (2001) has formulated a definition of fatigue in which fatigue is 
conceptualised as a "reduction in physical and/or mental capacity as the result of 
physical, mental, or emotional extension which may impair nearly all physical abilities 
including: strength, speed, reaction time, coordination, decision making or balance". 
Global concern with the extent of seafarer fatigue and its potential environmental cost is 
widely evident across the shipping industry. Maritime regulators, ship owners, trade 
union and P&I clubs are all alert to the fact that with certain ship types a combination 
of minimal manning, sequences of rapid turnarounds, adverse weather conditions and 
high level of traffic may find seafarers working long hours and with insufficient 
recuperative rest (Smith et al., 2006). Despite the rest hours, additional issues such as 
rolling, pitching, vibration, and noise are also contributing to human fatigue 
(McNamara et al., 2000). 
MAIB (2004) conducted a safety study, during 1994-2004, in which the results 
conclusively showed poor manning levels and human fatigue as the major causal factors 
in collisions and groundings. 
As a result, a seafarer can be subjected to the variable amounts of fatigue due to 
aggregation of the following criteria: 
9 Environmental states. 
" Rest hours. 
" Design & Habitability (Section 3.3.2). 
3.5.1. Environmental States 
Slow frequency vibrations that are created by various environmental states (e. g. sea 
conditions, wind actions, vessel's speed, and heading) result in motion sickness, 
unsteadiness and motion induced muscle fatigue. The consistent application of labour 
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legislation rules and higher demand for living comfort underlines the need to minimise 
the vibration level and the simplest way to avoid vibration is to prevent resonance 
conditions. This procedure is successful as long as natural frequencies and excitation 
frequencies can be regarded as being independent on environmental conditions. In the 
question of ship technology, this prerequisite frequently remains unfulfilled. For 
instance, for different filling stages the natural frequency of a tank structure changes. 
For different loading conditions due to a change of draught, the overall hull of the ship 
takes on a different natural mode and natural frequency. Moreover, there might be 
variable excitation frequencies for propulsion plants having a variable speed. 
Parametric rolling due to rough sea conditions and improper choice of speed and 
heading can be a particular problem on ships (e. g. P&O Nedlloyd Genoa) designed with 
a flat transom and with a large bow flare. This is a common design, found on many 
modern container ships, which maximises deck cargo capacity while minimising water 
resistance with fine hull lines (MIAB, 2006). 
Springing can be defined as steady state resonance vibration of hull girder due to linear 
and non-linear wave excitation. The effect of springing seems to increase as the ships 
become faster, larger, lighter and wider. For reduction of springing, the following 
suggestions are listed (Strohaung et al., 2007): 
" Springing can be reduced by reducing the speed. 
" Springing can be reduced by increasing the heading angle. 
Some container vessels are designed with a large metacentric height at partially loaded 
conditions. A large metacentric height can cause vessels to be too stiff. A stiff vessel 
rolls with a short period and high amplitude, resulting in high angular acceleration. The 
stiff vessel quickly responds to the sea as it attempts to assume the slope of a wave and 
is uncomfortable for the seafarers. 
As a result, the influences of environmental states on human fatigue can be evaluated by 
one or aggregation of the following criteria: 
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" Sea conditions. 
" Vessel's speed. 
" Vessel's heading. 
9 Vessel's stability. 
3.5.2. Rest Hours 
The maximum seafarers' hours of work and the minimum seafarers' hours of rest are 
listed as follows (ILO 180,1996): 
(a) Maximum hours of work shall not exceed: 
i. 14 hours in any 24-hours period; and 
ii. 72 hours in any seven-day period; 
or 
(b) Minimum hours of rest shall not be less than: 
i. 10 hours in any 24-hours period; and 
ii. 77 hours in any seven-day period. 
Hours of rest may be divided into no more than two periods, one of which shall be at 
least six hours in length, and the interval between consecutive periods of rest shall not 
exceed 14 hours. 
Due to short manning scales, seafarers are increasingly expected to take on heavier 
workloads with less crew support, and to work longer hours with less time off. The 
following results are elucidated by comprehensive research, published in 2006, on 
seafarer fatigue (ITF, 2009): 
" One in four seafarers said that they had fallen asleep while on watch. 
" Almost 50% of seafarers reported working weeks of 85 hours or more. 
" Around 50% of seafarers reported that their working hours had increased over the 
past 10 years, despite new regulation intended to combat fatigue. 
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" Almost 50% of seafarers surveyed considered that their working hours presented a 
danger to their personal safety. 
" Some 37% said that their working hours sometimes posed a danger to the safe 
operations of their ship. 
The symptoms of fatigue due to less duration of rest hours are listed as follows (ITF, 
2009): 
" Inability to stay awake. 
" Clumsiness. 
9 Headaches and giddiness. 
" Loss of appetite. 
" Insomnia. 
9 Moodiness and needless worrying. 
" Poor judgement of distance, speed, time and risk. 
" Slow response. 
" Difficulty of concentrating. 
3.6. Personal Issues (Non-Technical Skills) 
Hetherington et al. (2006) have subdivided the factors, which contribute to 
organizational accidents in shipping and influencing the human error, to three different 
issues: 
1. Design issues. 
2. Personal issues. 
3. Organisational and management issues. 
Personal issues deal with human performance factors or behaviour that may contribute 
to marine incidents or accidents. Non-technical skills are an additional set of 
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competencies that are used integrally with the technical shipping skills or the technical 
proficiencies, such as those to manoeuvre the vessel, or set down the anchor. They 
encompass both interpersonal (i. e. mental and communicative algorithms applied during 
social communications and interactions) and cognitive skills (i. e. mental skills that are 
used in the process of acquiring knowledge) such as situation awareness, 
communication, team working, and leadership (Hetherington et al., 2006). The 
following is a review of research that has focused on non-technical skills within the 
maritime domain. 
3.6.1. Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness (SA) is especially important in working domains where the 
information flow can be quite high and poor decisions may lead to serious 
consequences. Situation awareness is the ability of an individual to process a mental 
model of what is going on at any one time and to make projections as to how the 
situation will develop (Hetherington et al., 2006). 
Endsley (1988) has categorised the situation awareness to three levels: 
1. Individuals must have the correct perception of elements in the situation in order to 
form an accurate picture. 
2. The acquired information has to be combined, interpreted, and stored to form a 
picture of the situation, whereby the significance of particular objects and events can 
be understood. 
3. Acquired information in levels one and two has to be combined to obtain a 
projection. 
For instance, let us assume that a boiler feed water pump (out of two) on board a 
container carrier has failed. The consequences of failure of the second pump will be the 
breakdown of the boiler, stopping of the main engine and delay. However, the failure 
possibility of the second pump is low but the current situation should warn the 
engineers to repair the failed pump at once. 
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3.6.2 Communication and Language Skill 
Misunderstanding is a term that contributes to accidents or near misses. It potentially 
reflects lack of situation awareness and poor team working as well as inadequate 
communication and language problem (Hetherington et al., 2006). 
The Canadian Transportation and Safety Board (CTSB, 1995) questionnaire regarding 
pilot, master and officer on watch relationship has revealed that 81 % of bridge officers 
sometimes and 12% of bridge officers were always reluctant to question a pilot's 
decision. These communication issues can often result in error and accident 
(Hetherington et al., 2006). Perrow (1999) stated that it is not unusual for a deck officer 
to remain aghast and silent while his captain grounds the ship or collides with another 
vessel. 
The aim of the IMO Standard Marine Communication Phrases (SMCP) is to get round 
the problem of language barriers at sea and avoid those misunderstandings which can 
cause accidents (Alert, 2007). Communication was one of the main factors that 
contributed to breakdown and subsequent fire onboard Maersk Doha (Subsection 2.5.5). 
"The key to improved verbal communication is in the recruitment of seafarers who have 
an understanding of the English language; in education in the art of effective 
communication and in the correct use of the English language in the maritime 
environment; and in a programme of regular testing in their knowledge of the English 
language" (Alert, 2007). 
3.6.3. Teamwork 
Working as a team is an important factor for the marine industry. The system reliability 
and performance is directly proportional to each individual attitude towards teamwork. 
The maritime equivalent of Crew Resources Management (CRM) is termed Bridge 
Resources Management (BRM) or Bridge Team Management (BTM) and has been used 
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in the maritime industry for the last decade. Engine Room Resource Management 
(ERM) was introduced in the 1980s and has been used to train teams in skills of systems 
resource and crisis management (Barnett et al., 2003). However, the teamwork has been 
recognised as an important factor by the maritime organisations but resources 
management has not been implemented internationally (Hetherington et al., 2006). 
3.6.4. Decision Making and Cognitive Demands 
In nautical environments, both the physical environment (wind, currents, and 
sandbanks) and the navigation behaviour of other vessels affect uncertainty. Woods 
(1988) defined uncertainty as an intrinsic feature of complex systems, associated with 
unavailability or ambiguity of data and reduced predictability of future states. Thus, 
uncertainty can be considered to push the operator toward the use of knowledge based 
processing rather than rule based behaviour associated with the standard to prevent or 
avoid the collision. 
An experimental study regarding cognitive demands of collision avoidance in simulated 
ship control, demonstrated that high mental workloads create a detriment in 
performance on a secondary task, when operator has to monitor numerous pieces of 
equipment concurrently (Hockey et al., 2003). 
For clarification of human-environment interface, let us assume that in a city, driving is 
based on knowledge rather than the rules and regulations. Therefore, nobody can be 
confident about the others' decision or action and has to presume their behaviour of 
driving. Consequently, due to uncertainty, mental workload will be increased and 
primary task (i. e. safe driving) will be sacrificed for prophecy of others' behaviour of 
driving (i. e. secondary task). Thus, the number of accidents (frequency) will be 
increased. 
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3.7. Fitness & Strength 
The fundamental purpose of the seafarer fitness assessment is to ensure that the 
individual seafarer is fit for the work for which he or she is to be employed, taking into 
account the particular risk associated with working at sea (MCA, 2002). 
Fitness to undertake the full range of tasks on board ship and to cope with living 
conditions at sea has long been a requirement. More recently, the focus of medical 
assessment has been on (MCA, 2002): 
" Fitness to navigate a ship safely. 
" Fitness in both physical and psychological terms to deal with an emergency at sea. 
" Freedom from foreseeable risk of disease while at sea, especially where this might 
spread to others on board, require emergency treatment or lead to evacuation or 
diversion. 
" Recognition that seafaring careers can be terminated prematurely by conditions, 
which can be prevented, such as ischemic vascular disease and lung cancer. 
However, a seafarer's medical fitness certificate is a good indication of a seafarer's 
fitness and strength but due to influences of external and ambient environmental 
conditions, it is not sufficient. As a result, in addition to holding a valid medical fitness 
certificate, a seafarer's fitness and strength at different environmental conditions may be 
evaluated by aggregating the following criteria: 
" Health (i. e. due to influences of alcohol or due to sleep deprivation). 
9 Stress (i. e. due to workload). 
" Nutrition (i. e. the quality and quantity of foods, which are served on board a ship 
due to manager's strategies). 
" Age (i. e. muscle's strength). 
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3.7.1. Health 
The health of seafarers is not only a major concern of seafarers themselves but also a 
primary concern of a ship's owner/manager. Approximately 80% of maritime accidents 
are caused by human error. Sickness and injury benefit represents a growing proportion 
of the shipping industry's third party liability insurance claims (ILO, 2001). 
Substance abuse (Drugs & Alcohol) undoubtedly contributes to lower performance and 
productivity. Regretfully, no procedure is available for measuring the officers or the 
engineers' blood alcohol concentration before their designation to any kind of activity. 
Therefore, a medical fitness certificate anyway is a good indication of seafarer's health 
but it is not sufficient. Around a third of seafarers (32%) out of a selected seafaring 
sample in Australia exceeded the safe limit of alcohol consumption (Parker et al., 2002; 
Hetherington et al., 2006). A study conducted in the US showed that when airline pilots 
had to perform routine tasks in a simulator under three-alcohol test conditions, the 
following results were obtained (ILO, 2001): 
1. First test: before any alcohol ingestion, 10% could not perform all tasks correctly. 
2. Second test: after reaching a blood alcohol concentration of 0.1 g/ 100m1,89% 
could not perform all tasks correctly. 
3. Third test: fourteen hours later, after all alcohol has left their systems, 68% could 
not perform all tasks correctly. 
3.7.2. Stress 
A containership is a unique type of vessel. The existing high level of stresses on board 
the container carriers as well as the ship management is unique. The consequences of 
such a highly stressful environment will be poor health and diminished performance. 
Stress is identified as a contributory factor to the productivity and strength costs of an 
organization as well as to the personal health. Exposure to elevated stress levels for an 
extended period of time leads to negative mental and physical health outcome 
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(Hetherington et al., 2006; Cooper et al., 2001; Quick et al., 1997). 
The survey results regarding the frequency and level of stresses at sea are listed as 
follows (Quick et al., 1997): 
1. Eighty percent of seafarers had the frequency of stresses as occasional to frequent at 
sea. 
2. Over 65% of engineers, 60% of crew, and over 60% of masters had the level of 
stresses as moderate to high at sea. 
3. The significant sources of stress that are reported by seafarers had work pressure or 
workload at sea. 
3.7.3. Nutrition 
Good nutrition, like other vital occupational safety and health issues, is the foundation 
of workplace productivity and safety. It is well documented that unhealthy foods can 
lead to obesity and chronic disease, while macro-and micronutrient can cause 
malnutrition (Wanjek, 2005). A seafarer's fitness and strength is directly proportional to 
the foods' quality, quantity, frequency and timing. Moreover, fresh fruits and drinking 
waters' quality and quantity also play a great role in seafarer's fitness and strength. 
The contributing factor concerning the grounding of Aqua-boy is listed as follows 
(MAIB, 2007f): 
The master ate very sparingly on the day before the accident, having had breakfast 
consisting mainly of coffee, a light meal at lunchtime, and then despite offers from the 
mate to bring him food, nothing to eat in the evening. This would have lowered the 
master's blood sugar level that, in turn, would have adversely affected his ability to 
concentrate. 
3.7.4. Age 
A muscle's strength has a strong relationship to its cross-sectional area in both men and 
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women. Men and women reach peak strength around 20 to 25 years of age. After age 
25, strength generally decreases with the rate of about 1% per year. Individuals who are 
more active, or those who continue to strength training, can considerably decrease this 
tendency for declining muscular strength (Welle, 1996). Thus if a ship is equipped with 
a gymnasium and fitness facilities, a seafarer is able to maintain his/her fitness and 
strength. 
The aging process is characterised by a reduction of the physical capacities and 
coordination, flexibility, strength, and power. Strength generally remains relatively high 
until 50 years of age when decreases of about 10% per year begin to result in a loss of 
function and independence. However, little is known about whether neuromuscular 
power declines in a similar manner or at the same rate as strength (Bemben and 
McCalip, 1999). 
3.8. Motivation 
For years, managers, psychologists and academics have been interested in theories 
about motivation and one of the theories, which have gained prominence, was 
Hertzberg's dual factor theory. He identified two separate groups of factors that had a 
strong bearing on motivation. He called the first group hygiene factors because they 
strongly influenced feelings of dissatisfaction amongst employees. Hygiene factors 
include working conditions, pay, and job security. According to Hertzberg, they do not 
motivate employees as such, but if they are not there, they can adversely affect job 
performance. He referred to the other group as motivation factors because they had a 
role in positively influencing performance such as achievement, career progression and 
learning. Hertzberg states that managers can forget about their workforce motivation if 
they do not get the hygiene factors right first (Herzberg, 1968). 
The author's experience of more than twenty years at sea and as a technical 
superintendent has given him the opportunity to talk with many seafarers from different 
cultures and nationalities. The outcome clearly indicates that motivation factors, which 
have been elucidated by Mitroussi (2008), are valuable. Mitroussi (2008) examined 
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twenty motivation factors in the shipping context; the six most important factors from 
employees' viewpoint are listed as follows: 
1. Opportunity to learn new skill. 
2. Higher pay. 
3. Friendly working atmosphere. 
4. Cash bonuses. 
5. Personal growthidevelopment. 
6. Chance for promotion. 
The results do not show great differences among the different contingencies such as age, 
gender and position in a company. 
3.9. Methodology 
For conducting the research, a combination of different decision-making techniques, 
such as fuzzy logic and an evidential reasoning approach (FER) can be used. Fuzzy 
logic and evidential reasoning techniques and their mathematical backgrounds were 
presented in Chapter 2. The proposed methodology in stepwise order is described as 
follows: 
Firstly, the seafarers' reliability is displayed in a hierarchical structure (Figure 3.1). 
Assessment grades are assigned to all the criteria in the hierarchical structure. Those 
assessment grades could be either qualitative or quantitative. 
Secondly, each quantitative criterion is transformed to a qualitative criterion by using 
membership functions of continuous fuzzy sets. 
Thirdly, a fuzzy rule base is developed to demonstrate the mapping process. By 
formulating a mapping process, each lower level qualitative criterion is converted into 
an associated upper level qualitative criterion. 
Fourthly, a weight is assigned to each criterion by using an analytic hierarchy process 
(AHP) method. 
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Fifthly, the evidential reasoning (ER) algorithm is used to synthesise the generic 
seafarers' reliability criteria. The ER can be described as a hierarchical evaluation 
process in which all the decision criteria are aggregated to one (the goal). Synthesis may 
be achieved through manual calculation (Sub-subsection 2.11.9) or through use of 
mathematical software by coding. In this study, the intelligent decision system software 
(IDS) is used for synthesis of the basic criteria in the hierarchical structure (Yang and 
Xu, 2002). Selection of IDS is attributable to its ease of use and its accessibility to 
other industries and academia. It is noteworthy to mention that, the software is tested 
prior to the commencement of calculations. 
Sixthly, the concept of expected utility is used to obtain a single crisp value for a 
seafarer's reliability. 
Finally, the sensitivity of the model will be analysed. 
3.9.1. Generic Model for Seafarers' Reliability (First Step) 
Decision makers should understand and have a clear picture of the whole problem 
before attempting to solve it especially when there are many criteria to be considered, 
which in turn may comprise sub-criteria and even sub-sub-criteria. For this reason, it is 
useful to display the problem in a form of a hierarchical structure. In a hierarchical order 
as a first level, the goal of problem is stated. In the second level, there are several 
criteria, each of which has different contribution to measuring, and helping achieve the 
overall goal. Then, some of these criteria may be broken down further. The process 
continues up to the level where decision makers are able to make practical assessments 
(Sonmez, 2002). 
A generic model with a hierarchical structure, as shown in Figure 3.1, based on the 
ergonomics model, the literature review, historical failure data and statistical analysis 
(in Chapter 2), is constructed. It is noteworthy to mention that for constructing a 
hierarchical structure and to avoid unnecessary extension of the model's size, only those 
criteria that were significant are considered and those insignificant criteria were omitted 
from the model. 
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Based on the above discussions the main, sub, sub-sub, and sub-sub-sub-criteria that are 
contributing to a seafarer's reliability (i. e. goal) are presented in Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: Generic Model for Seafarers' Reliability 
3.9.2. Quantitative Data Transformation (Second Step) 
A quantitative criterion can be transformed to a qualitative criterion by using 
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Goal Main Criteria Sub-Criteria Sub-Sub-Criteria Sub-Sub-Sub-Criteria 
membership functions of continuous fuzzy sets. Membership functions (MFs) are found 
in different shapes, namely triangular, trapezoidal, S curves, n curves, bell curves and 
Gaussian curves (Yen and Langari, 1999). 
In general, the membership is often indicated on vertical axis and with possible values 
ranging over the real interval [0,11 - Whether a particular shape is suitable or not can be 
determined only in the application context. The fuzzy set shape defines the relationship 
between the domain and the membership value of a set. The triangular and trapezoidal 
MFs are the most commonly used in practice due to their simple formulas and 
computational efficiency. Obviously, the triangular MF is a special case of the 
trapezoidal MF. 
3.9.2.1. Triangular Membership Function 
Pursuant to Figure 3.2, the triangular MF formula is written as follows: 
10, if x5a 
x-a 
m-a 
if xE ]a, m 
ftF(x)= 1, if x=m 
(3.1) 
bm' 
if xe ]m, b[ 
0, if xzb 
In this case "m" is modal value where #P(x) =1 , lower and upper 
bounds are 
presented by "a " and "b " as shown in Figure 3.2. 
3.9.2.2. Trapezoidal Membership Function 
Pursuant to Figure 3.2, the trapezoidal MF formula is written as follows: 
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0, if x5a 
x-a if xE ]a, m[ 
m-a (3.2) 
PT (x) = 1, if xE [m, n] 
b-x, 
if 
b xe 
}n, b[ 
-n 
0, if x>-b 
In this case "m " and "n " are modal value where , ui (x) =I, 
lower and upper bounds 
are presented by "a" and "b " as shown in Figure 3.2. 
up(a 
0 
Triangular Membership Function 
(x) 
i 
Figure 3.2: Triangular and Trapezoidal Membership Functions 
3.9.3. Mapping Process (Third Step) 
Because a different number of grades are used for the upper level criterion and the sub- 
criteria, the decision makers have to establish appropriate rules to propagate the sub- 
criterion assessments to the associated upper level criterion. The mapping process has 
been used for transforming the lower level qualitative criterion into the upper level 
criterion. In nature, there are situations with a different amount and different types of 
linguistic terms in the lower level criteria and the associated upper level criterion. To 
apply the evidential reasoning approach, it is necessary to have all the data and 
information on the same universe. Therefore, the information and data need to be 
transformed before being aggregated. The fuzzy rule base is most suited to transform 
fuzzy input to fuzzy output. 
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ambx 
Trapezoidal Membership Function 
Let "I" (e. g. qualification) be a lower level qualitative criterion and "J" (e. g. technical 
proficiency) be an upper level qualitative criterion. As shown in Figure 3.3, "Li" stands 
for the lower level linguistic term (e. g. L1 stands for excellent, L2 stands for very good, 
etc. ) and "I"' represents the fuzzy inputs of "Li". As shown in Figure 3.3 "Uj" stands 
for the upper level linguistic term (e. g. U, stands for very good, U2 stands for good, 
etc. ) and "uf " represents the fuzzy outputs. As shown in Figure 3.3,8/ stands for the 
belief degrees that are assigned by experts and they signify the relationship between 
linguistic variables of different levels. The relationship between fuzzy inputs and fuzzy 
outputs can be evaluated by Equations (3.4) and (3.5). It is noteworthy to mention that 
the sum of the belief degrees from one linguistic variable has to be equal to one 
(Equation (3.3)). 
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1ßi=1 , 
Eß 
=1, Elß =1, E ßq=1, E ß#=1 (3.3) 
Jj =l J j=1 J-1 
5 
u) (3.4) 
1=1 
5. 
E1` 51 (3.5) 
r=1 
FUZZY OUTPUT 
PUZZYINPUT 
Figure 3.3: Mapping Process 
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3.9.4. Analytic Hierarchy Process (Fourth Step) 
Using an Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) technique to calculate the relative 
importance of each attribute requires a careful review of its principles and background 
(Saaty, 1987). When considering a group of attributes for evaluation, the main 
objectives of the technique are to provide judgements on the relative importance of 
these attributes and to ensure that the judgements are quantified to an extent, which 
permits a quantitative interpretation of the judgement among these attributes (Pillay and 
Wang, 2003). 
The quantified judgements on pairs of attributes A, and Aj are represented by an n-by-n 
matrix (D). The entries ay are defined by the following entry rules: 
Rule 1: If ay =a, then aji = 1/a, a* 0. 
Rule 2: If A, is judged to be of equal relative importance as Ap then ay = aj, =1 
According to above rules the matrix D has the following form: 
1 a12 ..... aln 
11 
D=aý = ..... 
a2n a12 (3.6) 
% / 
Jn / a2n 
where, i, j=1,2,3.... n and each ay is the relative importance of attribute A, to attribute 
Aj. 
Having recorded the quantified judgements of comparisons on pair (A,, Aj) as numerical 
entry ay in the matrix D, what is left is to assign to the "n " contingencies Ai, A2......., An 
a set of numerical weights wi, w2,....., w that should reflect the recorded judgements. In 
general, weights wl, w2,...., w can be calculated by using the following equation (Pillary 
and Wang, 2003): 
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a 
Wk Eý=J( (k = 1,2,3 ... n) 
(3.7) 
ýi=1a 
where ay stands for the entry of row i and column j in a comparison matrix of order n. 
The weight vector of the comparison matrix provides the priority ordering. However, it 
cannot ensure the consistency of the pairwise judgements. Thus, AHP provides a 
measure of the consistency for the pairwise comparisons by computing a consistency 
ratio (CR). CR is designed in such a way that a value greater than 0.10 indicates an 
inconsistency in the pairwise judgements and the decision maker should review the 
pairwise judgements before proceeding. Thus, if CR is 0.10 or less, the consistency of 
the pairwise comparisons is considered reasonable, and the AHP can continue with the 
computations of the weight vectors. The CR value is computed according to the 
following equations (Andersen et al., 2003). 
CR = RI 
(3.8) 
C1= Amar-n 
n-I 
(3.9) 
n 
Zkn=1 wk a jk ýj=1 
Amax = 
wj (3.10) 
n 
where CI stands for consistency index, RI stands for average random index (Table 3.2), 
"n" stands for matrix order, and Amax stands for maximum weight value of the "n-by- 
n" comparison matrix D. 
Table 3.2: Value of RI versus Matrix Order (Saaty, 1990) 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
R! 0 0 0.58 0.9 1.12 1.24 1.32 1.41 1.45 1.49 
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Since decision makers or experts often feel more confident to give imprecise judgment 
by using qualitative descriptors, in this study linguistic variables with belief degrees are 
used to describe the relative importance of attribute A, to attribute Af. Saaty (2004) has 
recommended equivalent scores from 1 to 9 as shown in Table 3.3. A preference of 1 
indicates equality between two attributes while a preference of 9 indicates that one 
attribute is 9 times larger or more important that the one to which it is being compared 
with. 
Table 3.3: Comparison Scale (Saaty, 1990) 
Relative Importance of Definition 
Attribute (Scale) 
I Equal importance. ( EQ) 
3 Moderate importance of one over another. (MO) 5 Essential or strong importance. (ST) 
7 Very strong importance. (VS) 
9 Extreme importance. (EX) 
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values between the two adjacent judgments. 
(Inta, Intb, into, intd) 
Therefore, a single crisp number for the lth expert's judgment can be obtained as follows: 
e y . 
8# = Qkx1+ýntakx2+pMßkx. i+1gntokx4+ TkxS+ ntckx6 
+py x7+ ntdkx8+ EXkpij (3.11) Ily 
ýEgk+ , ýlntgk } ? 
t1IQk } fntkk+ STk+,, [ntck+ ysk+ýntdk+ k=1 (3.12) 
where 8EQ'k stands for the I ih expert's belief degree concerning equal importance of 
attribute A, over attribute Aj and pýT. k stands for the klh expert's belief degree 
concerning strong importance of attribute A, over attribute Aj. Subsequently the other belief degrees are defined accordingly. 
If "m" decision makers with an equal weight have judged the relative importance of 
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attribute A, over attribute A;, then the values of "a# " can be calculated as follows: 
m 
ej 
ay - m-1 (3.13) 
3.9.5. Evidential Reasoning Algorithm (Fifth Step) 
IDS incorporating the ER algorithm can be employed for a synthesis of criteria in a 
hierarchical structure. The evidential reasoning algorithm and its background were 
described in Chapter 2. For further information, kindly refer to (Yang and Xu, 2002). 
3.9.6. Expected Utility (Sixth Step) 
An expected utility approach was developed by Yang (2001). The main aim of using a 
utility approach is to obtain a single crisp number for the top-level criterion (final-result 
or the goal) of each alternative in order to rank them. 
Let the utility of an evaluation grade H be denoted by u(Hd and u(H+i) > u(H, 4) if 
H+l is preferred to H (Yang, 2001). u(H) stands for the utility values of each linguistic 
term and can be estimated using the decision maker's preferences. If no preference 
information is available, it could be assumed that the utilities of evaluation grades are 
equidistantly distributed in a normalised utility space, so that "u(H,, ) = (n- I) /(N -1) " 
(n = ],..., N). Otherwise, a probability assignment approach could be employed for 
utility estimation (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976; Farguhar, 1984; Winston, 1994). 
Therefore, the utilities of evaluation grades that are equidistantly distributed in a 
normalised utility space can be calculated as follows: 
u(Hn) _ 
yn -ymfn 
'max -'min 
(3.14) 
where V is the ranking value of the linguistic term that has been considered (H, ), V. 
is the ranking value of the most preferred linguistic term (H, ), and V, ,,, is the ranking 
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value of the least preferred linguistic term (HI). 
N 
PH =1- F-, ßn (3.15) 
n=1 
The utility of the top level or general criterion S(E) is denoted by u(S(E)). If ßH *0 
(the assessment is incomplete) there is a belief interval [ß,,, (ß+ßH)J , which 
provides the likelihood that S(E) is assessed to H. Without loss of generality, suppose 
the least preferred linguistic term having the lowest utility is denoted by u(H1) and the 
most preferred linguistic term having the highest utility is denoted by u(HN). Then the 
minimum, maximum and average utilities of S(E) are defined as follows (Yang, 2001): 
N 
umin(S(Eý% = ýQnu(Hn)+(Ql +QH)U(H1) (3.16) 
n=2 
N-1 
umax(S(E))= Eßnu(Hn)+(ßN+QH)u(HN) (3.17) 
n=1 
uaverage(S(E)) = umin(S(E)) 
2umax(S(E)) (3.18) 
Obviously if all the assessments are complete, then ßH =0 and the maximum, 
minimum and average utilities of S(E) will be the same. Therefore, u(S(E)) can be 
calculated as follows: 
N 
u(S(E)) = ýßnu(Hný (3.19) 
n=1 
It has to be made clear that the above utilities are only used for characterising an 
assessment, and not for criteria aggregation. 
86 
3.9.7. Sensitivity Analysis (Final Step) 
The objective of sensitivity analysis is to test the sensitivity of the FER model. 
Sensitivity analysis in FER refers to analysing how sensitive the conclusions (i. e. model 
outputs) are to minor change in inputs. The change may be variation of the parameters 
of the model or may be changes of the belief degrees assigned to the linguistic variables 
used to describe the parameters. If the methodology is sound and its inference reasoning 
is logical, then the sensitivity analysis must at least pursue the following three axioms 
(Yang, et al., 2009). 
Axiom 1: A slight increment/decrement in the degree of belief associated with any 
linguistic variables of the lowest level criteria will certainly result in the effect of a 
relative increment / decrement in the degree of belief of the linguistic variable and 
preference degrees of the model output. 
Axiom 2: If the degree of belief associated with the highest preference linguistic 
variable of a lowest level criterion is decreased by m and n (i. e. simultaneously the 
degree of belief associated with its lowest preference linguistic variable is increased by 
m and n (1 >n> m)) and accordingly the utility value of the model output is evaluated 
as Um and U respectively, then Um should be greater than U . 
Axiom 3: If "N" and "K" (K < N) criteria from all the lowest level criteria are selected 
and the degree of belief associated with the highest preference linguistic variables of 
each of such "N" and "K" criteria is decreased by the same amount (i. e. simultaneously 
the degree of belief associated with the lowest preference linguistic variables of each of 
such "N" and "K" criteria is increased by the same amount) and accordingly the utility 
value of the model output is evaluated as UK and UN respectively, then UK should be 
greater than UN . 
The reasons for selection of above-mentioned axioms are, firstly, to use a sensitivity test 
to measure the effect of one criterion over another. Axiom 1, for example, states a slight 
increase in the belief associated with a linguistic variable should result in a slight 
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increase in the output result. Secondly, to validate the methodology used for synthesis 
of the basic criteria (i. e. Axioms 2 and 3). Finally, to rank the criteria based on their 
effects on the model output. It is noteworthy to mention that, it is possible to define 
other axioms for further research, for instance, to distribute the dissimilar weights to the 
criteria. 
3.10. Test Case 
By help of the proposed methodology (Section 3.9) and the following information, the 
Master of a container vessel can assess the reliability of a Third Officer under his 
command and evaluate the variation of the Third Officer's reliability value by alteration 
of each criterion's value. 
3.10.1. Information 
9 The Third Officer is 30 years old. 
" He holds an approved "officer in charge of navigational watch" certificate of 
competency (STCW 95) with the level of competency as a second mate and does not 
hold a BSc degree in nautical science. 
9 He has a valid medical fitness certificate, and 31.2 months of qualifying sea service. 
9 He holds the following approved certificates: 
1. Ethic and leadership certificate. 
2. Basic safety training (BST) certificate. 
3. Advanced fire prevention & fire fighting certificate. 
4. Radar simulation training certificate. 
5. Global maritime distress safety system (GMDSS) certificate. 
6. First aid training certificate. 
7. Survival craft and rescue boat training certificate, 
8. Automated radar plotting aids (ARPA) training certificate. 
9. ISM attendance course certificate. 
10. Bridge resource management (BRM) attendance course certificates. 
" Pursuant to his statements, the quality of the foods, which are served on board, is 
"not bad". 
" He had 8 hours rest in the previous night. 
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" Based on his statements, the level of his stress is "moderate" and he is "healthy". 
" The values of Beaufort number for the last two days are indicated as 4 and 5 
respectively. 
The vessel is partially loaded and the value of metacentric height (GM) is 3 meters. 
9 Based on the available data (during design and construction) and pursuant to ABS 
guidance notes for the application of ergonomics to marine systems, the design & 
layout grade is estimated as 100% very good. 
" The design & habitability grade for the last two days is estimated as 100% good. 
" Based on the Master's observation, he is punctual, needs supervision occasionally, 
and is enthusiastic. 
" Based on the Master's judgement, the grade of his communication and language 
skill is medium, his teamwork is good, and the grade of his decision-making is 
medium. 
0 To estimate his situation awareness, the Master has demonstrated a scenario. The 
Master asked him to elucidate his actions regarding the presented scenario. 
Accordingly, the grade of his situation awareness is evaluated as good. 
3.10.2. Third Officer's Reliability Modelling 
Based on the generic model for the seafarers' reliability (Figure 3.1) and available 
information a specific model for the third officer's reliability can be constructed (Figure 
3.4). Assessment grades are assigned to all the criteria in the hierarchical structure and 
the quantitative and qualitative criteria are segregated (Tables 3.4-3.5). The linguistic 
terms for each qualitative criterion are defined and presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. 
Miller (1956) showed a number of remarkable coincidences between the channel 
capacity of a number of human cognitive and perceptual tasks. In each case, the 
effective channel capacity is between 5 and 9 equally-weighted error-less choices. With 
respect to Miller's investigation, it is "often recommended" that the number of 
categories be restricted to not more than nine (Karwowski and Mital, 1986). In this 
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study, five categories of linguistic representation are employed. 
Figure 3.4: Specific Model for Third Officer's Reliability 
Table 3.4: Linguistic Terms for Main Criteria 
Goal 
Seafarer's 
Reliability 
Linguistic Terms 
High Fairly High Medium Fairly Low 
Low 
Main Criteria Linguistic Terms 
Technical 
Proficiency 
Very Good Good Average Fairly Low Low 
Human Fatigue Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
Non-Technical 
Skill 
Very Good Good Average Fairly Low Low 
Fitness & Strength Very High High Medium Low Very Low 
Motivation Very High High Medium Low Very Low 
Design & Layout Very Good Good Average Bad Very Bad 
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Oo. l MýIn Critýrlý sub-C rltýrlý 
Table 3.5: Linguistic Terms for Sub-Criteria 
Sub-Criteria Linguistic Terms 
Qualification Excellent Very Good Good Average Low 
Experience Quantitative 
Specific training Excellent Very Good Good Average Low 
Rest Hours Quantitative 
Environmental 
State 
Quantitative 
Design and 
Habitability 
Very Good Good Average Bad Very Bad 
Situation 
Awareness 
Very Good Good Medium Low Very Low 
Communication & 
Language Skill 
Very Good Good Medium Low Very Low 
Teamwork Very Good Good Medium Low Very Low 
Decision Making Very Good Good Medium Low Very Low 
Age Qualitative 
Health Very Healthy Healthy Mol. Healthy Unhealthy 
Stress Very High High Moderate Low 
Nutrition Very good Good Average Bad Very Bad 
Note: Mol. stands for more or less. 
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3.10.3. Quantitative Data Transformation 
Based on the available information and the previous discussion (Section 3.9.2), the 
quantitative criteria can be modelled as follows: 
3.10.3.1. Environmental States 
Based on the available information and the previous discussion (Section 3.5.1), by 
considering the correlation between the vessel's stability (GM = 3m) and the sea 
conditions on the vessel's response (period, amplitude, and angular acceleration), the 
effect of environmental states on human fatigue can be evaluated. The correlation 
between the sea conditions and Beaufort number is presented in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6: Beaufort Number versus Sea Conditions 
Beaufort Number Sea Conditions 
0 Flat. 
1 Ripples without crests. 
2 Small wavelets. 
3 Large wavelets. 
4 Small wave. 
5 Moderate (1.2m) longer waves. Some foam and spray. 
6 Large wave with foam crests and some spray. 
7 Sea heaps up and foam begins to be blown in steaks in wind direction. 
8 Moderately high waves with breaking crests forming spindrift. 
9 High waves (6-7m) with dense foam. 
10 Very high waves. 
Source: [Beaufort scale, 2009] 
Based on Table 3.6 and the previous discussion (Section 3.9.2), the membership 
functions of sea conditions can be constructed (Figure 3.5). The horizontal axis shows 
the quantitative number, and vertical axis shows the degree of belief (membership 
value). If any quantitative number (e. g. h, ) is found in the range of h+i, i (with a grade 
Hn+, ) and h,,,, (with a grade H ), its belief degrees can be evaluated as follows: 
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If hn, i< ht" < hn+l, i then ßn, i= 
hn+l, i - hi = 1-, 6n, i (3.20) n+l, i hn+l, i - hn, i 
where,, ßn, stands for the degree of belief of the concerned quantitative number with 
the grade H and , (3n+l, i stands for the degree of belief of the concerned quantitative 
number with the grade H+1. Based on the given information, the values of Beaufort 
Number for the last two days are indicated as 4 and 5 respectively. Thus, the average 
value of Beaufort Number is evaluated as 4.5 (i. e. 
(4 
2 
5) ). Based on Figure 3.5 and 
Equation (3.20), the belief degrees are calculated as follows: 
" H+r stands for Moderate. 
. H, stands for Calm. 
9 h; = 4.5, h,, = 4, and h+1,; = 5. 
Thus, ß,,,, = (5 - 4.5) 1(5 - 4) = 0.5 with the Calm grade and ý6n+,,, =1- 0.5 = 0.5 with 
the Moderate grade. Therefore, the sea condition's set is assessed: 
{(Very Calm, 0), (Calm, 0.5), (Moderate, 0.5), (Rough, 0), (Very Rough, 0)) 
If Beaufort Number is 3.5, then the sea condition's set is assessed: 
{(Very Calm, 0), (Calm, 1), (Moderate, 0), (Rough, 0), (Very Rough, 0)) 
Degree 
Figure 3.5: Membership Functions of Sea Condition 
3.10.3.2. Experience (Qualifying Sea Service) 
Itlon 
Number 
Based on a seafarer's qualifying sea service a seafarer's experience can be modelled. 
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Qualifying sea service should be accounted from the commencement of a ship's voyage 
to the termination of such voyage. For instance, where a ship is laid up in a port for an 
unreasonably long period, such a period should not be accounted towards qualifying sea 
service. In addition, during reliability assessment, the consistency of sea service has to 
be accounted (i. e. ship's tonnage, type, route, mode of propulsion, and main engine's 
power). Thus, a promotion can be granted to a deck or an engineer officer by 
considering his/her qualifying sea service, confidential reports, oral examination's 
result, qualifications, and certificate of competency. A deck or an engineer officer is 
eligible for promotion after completion of the following months of qualifying sea 
service: 
9 Third Officer is eligible for promotion to Second Officer's rank after completing 18- 
24 months of sea service. 
" Second Officer is eligible for promotion to Chief Officer's rank after completing 36- 
42 months of sea service (i. e. at least sailing for 18 months as a second mate). 
" Chief Officer is eligible for promotion to Master's rank after completing 60-66 
months of sea service (i. e. at least sailing for 24 months as a chief mate). 
Based on the stated rules and by looking at a deck officer's experience as an 
independent criterion, a deck officer after completing 60-66 months of sea service is 
eligible for promotion to Master's rank. Thus, 60-66 months of sea service can be 
categorised as Very Good and accordingly the membership functions of experience, as 
shown in Figure 3.6, can be constructed. The horizontal axis shows the quantitative 
number, and vertical axis shows the degree of belief (membership value). 
Degree 
I 
Figure 3.6: Membership Functions of Experience 
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3.10.3.3. Age 
Based on the previous discussion (Section 3.7.4), a seafarer's age can be modelled. In 
this study, 0.33% declining of a seafarer's strength per year is considered (based on 
eight months working and four months leave). Thus, the membership function of age, as 
shown in Figure 3.7, can be constructed. The horizontal axis shows the quantitative 
number, and vertical axis shows the degree of belief (membership value). 
Degree 
2 
Figure 3.7: Membership Functions of Age 
3.10.3.4. Rest Hours 
Based on the ILO (180) convention (Section 3.5.2) and human psychology (most adults 
need approximately 8 to 9 hours of sleep each night to do their best), a seafarer's hours 
of rest can be modelled (Figure 3.8). The horizontal axis shows the quantitative number, 
and vertical axis shows the degree of belief (membership value). 
Degree 
Figure 3.8: Membership Functions of Rest Hours 
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3.10.4. Weight Assignment 
To show the relative importance of each sub-criterion for its associated upper level 
criterion, it is necessary to assign the weight to each sub-criterion. In order to conduct 
the assessment a group of experts, which is composed of three experts is used. To avoid 
prejudgment, all experts utilized in the assessments are containing both academia and 
industrial related experience and they are assigned with equal weight. 
1. A professor of marine technology who has been involved in the marine and offshore 
safety research for 20 years. 
2. A lecturer and head of maritime studies who has been involved in the maritime and 
marine industry for more than 20 years. 
3. A researcher who has been involved in the marine industry for more than 20 years. 
Let A1, A2 and A3 respectively stand for qualification, experience and specific training. 
Three experts with equal weight have judged and evaluated the relative importance of 
specific training, experience and qualification for their associated upper level criterion 
(i. e. technical proficiency) as shown in Table 3.7. Based on Equations (3.6-3.13), 
the ay values can be evaluated: 
e12=1 e 2=0.8+0.2x2=1.2 e12=0.7+0.3x2=1.3 
a12_(1+1.2+1.3) 
1 
=1.16 a21= =0.86 3 a12 
e13=1.2 e13=1.1 e3 13 =1.3 a13=1.2 a31-1.2 0.83 
e23=1 e23=1.3 e23=1.5 a23=1.26 a32= 
1 
=0.79 1.26 
The matrix D is obtained as follows: 
1 1.16 1.2 
D=0.86 1 1.26 
0.83 0.79 1 
Based on Equations (3.6)-(3.13), the consistency ratio is calculated as 0.0042 and the 
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weights of the three attributes, as shown in Table 3.8, are assessed. 
Table 3.7: Relative Importance of Qualification, Experience and 
Specific Training 
A2 A3 
A, 1, EQ 0.8, EQ 0.2, Inta 
0.8, EQ 0.2, Inta 0.9, EQ 0.1, Inta 
0.7, EQ 0.3, Inta 0.7, EQ 0.3, Inta 
A3 
A2 1, EQ 
0.7, EQ 0.3, Inta 
0.5, EQ 0.5, Inta 
Table 3.8: Calculated Weights (i. e. Qualification, Experience, and Specific Training) 
Description Weight 
Qualification 0.3708 
Experience 0.3408 
Specific Training 0.2884 
Table 3.9: Relative Importance of Rest Hours, Environmental State 
and Design & Habitability 
A2 A3 
A, 0.6, EQ 0.4, Inta 0.4, EQ 0.6, Inta 
0.4, EQ 0.6, Inta 0.3, EQ 0.7, Inta 
0.3, EQ 0.7, Inta 0.2, EQ 0.8, Inta 
A3 
A2 1, EQ 
0.9, EQ 0.1, Inta 
0.8, EQ 0.2, Inta 
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Let Al, A2 and A3 respectively stand for rest hours, environmental states, and design & 
habitability. Three experts with equal weight have judged and evaluated the relative 
importance of d esign & habitability, environmental states, and rest hours for their 
associated upper level criterion (i. e. human fatigue) as shown in Table 3.9. Based on 
Equations (3.6-3.13), the consistency ratio was calculated as 1.78 x 10-5 and the weights 
of the three attributes, as shown in Table 3.10, are obtained. 
Table 3.10: Calculated Weights (i. e. Rest Hours, Environmental State, and Design & Habitability) 
Description Weight 
Rest Hours 0.4491 
Environmental State 0.2880 
Design & Habitability 0.2629 
Let A1, A2, A3 and A4 respectively stand for stress, health, nutrition, and age. Three 
experts with equal weight have judged and evaluated the relative importance of age, 
nutrition, health, and stress for their associated upper level criterion (i. e. fitness and 
strength) as shown in Table 3.11. 
Table 3.11: Relative Importance of Stress, Health, Age, and Nutrition 
A2 A3 A4 
Al 0.6, EQ 0.4, Inta 1, Inta 0.7, Inta 0.3, MO 
0.5, EQ 0.5, Inta 0.8, Inta 0.2, MO 0.6, Inta 0.4, MO 
0.4, EQ 0.6, Inta 0.8, Inta 0.2, MO 0.5, Inta 0.5, MO 
A3 A4 
A2 0.2, Inta 0.8, MO 1, Inta 
0.3, Inta 0.7, MO 0.9, Inta 0. I, MO 
0.3, Inta 0.7, MO 0.8, Inta 0.2, MO 
A4 
A3 I, EQ 
0.9, EQ 0.1, Inta 
O. 8, EQ 0.2, Inta 
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Based on Equations (3.6-3.13), the consistency ratio is calculated as 0.0147 and the 
weights of the four attributes, as shown in Table 3.12, are obtained. 
Table 3.12: Calculated Weights (i. e. Stress, Health, Nutrition and Age) 
Description Weight 
Stress 0.3798 
Health 0.3205 
Nutrition 0.1518 
Age 0.1479 
Based on the experts' judgment, the situation awareness, communication and language 
skill, teamwork, and decision-making are equally important. Therefore, all the criteria 
are assigned with an equal weight (i. e. 0.25). Based on the experts' judgment, the main 
criteria are equally important. Therefore, the weights are distributed evenly between 
them (i. e. 1/6). 
3.10.5. Qualification 
Based on the previous discussion (Section 3.4.1) the decision makers have assigned the 
following fuzzy rules for a deck officer's qualification: 
" If a person holds a BSc degree in nautical science and an approved chief 
mate/master certificate of competency "STCW (95)" with the level of competency 
as a master, then his qualification is 100% excellent. 
" If a person holds an approved chief mate/master certificate of competency "STCW 
(95)" with the level of competency as a master, then his qualification is 20% 
excellent and 80% very good. 
" If a person holds a BSc degree in nautical science and an approved chief 
mate/master certificate of competency "STCW (95)" with the level of competency 
as a chief mate, then his qualification is 100% very good. 
" If a person holds an approved chief mate/master certificate of competency "STCW 
(95)" with the level of competency as a chief mate, then his qualification is 20% 
very good and 80% good. 
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" If a person holds a BSc degree in nautical science and an approved officer in charge 
of a navigational watch certificate of competency "STCW (95)" with the level of 
competency as a third or second mate, then his qualification is 100% good. 
" If a person holds an approved officer in charge of a navigational watch certificate of 
competency "STCW (95)" with the level of competency as a third or second mate, 
then his qualification is 20% good and 80% average. 
. If a person does not hold any certificate of competency, then his qualification is 
100% low. 
Based on the given information and the stated rules, the Third Officer's qualification set 
is assessed as follows: 
{(Excellent, 0), (Very good, 0), (Good, 0.2), (Average, 0.8), (Low, 0)} 
The decision makers have assigned the following fuzzy rules for mapping from 
qualification to technical proficiency (Figure 3.9): 
" If a person qualification is excellent, then his/her technical proficiency is 100% very 
good. 
If a person's qualification is very good, then his/her technical proficiency is 20% 
very good and 80% good. 
" If a person's qualification is good, then his/her technical proficiency is 10% good 
and 90% average. 
" If a person's qualification is average, then his/her technical proficiency is 20% 
average and 80% fairly low. 
9 If a person's qualification is low, then his/her technical proficiency is 100% low. 
Based on Equations (3.3-3.5), the following is obtained: 
u2=0.2x0.1=0.02, U3=0.2x0.9+0.8x0.2=0.34, u4=0.8x0.8=0.64 
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Figure 3.9: Mapping from Qualification to Technical Proficiency 
The fuzzy output set is assessed as follows: 
TQ = ((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0.02), (Average, 0.34), (Fairly Low, 0.64), (Low, 0)) 
3.10.6. Experience 
Based on the given information, the Third Officer has 31.2 months of qualifying sea 
service. Based on Figure 3.6 and Equation (3.20), the belief degrees are calculated as 
follows: 
" H+j stands for Average grade. 
" H,, stands for Low grade. 
" h; = 31.2, h,,,; = 30, and h+i, º = 36. 
Thus, 80 =(36-31.2)1(36-30)=0.8 with the Low grade and 8n+1, i=1-0.8=0.2 
with the Average grade. Therefore, the Third Officer's experience set is assessed: 
E= {(Very Low, 0), (Low, 0.8), (Average, 0.2), (Good, 0), (Very Good, 0)) 
The mapping process, as shown in Figure 3.10, is elucidated and elaborated. 
Accordingly, the fuzzy output set is evaluated as follows: 
TE = {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.28), (Fairly Low, 0.72), (Low, 0)) 
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Figure 3.10: Mapping from Experience to Technical Proficiency 
3.10.7. Specific Training 
Based on the previous discussion (Section 3.4.2) the decision makers have assigned the 
following fuzzy rules for a deck officer's specific training. It is noteworthy to mention 
that for special vessels (i. e. LNG, Tanker, RORO, passenger, etc) additional 
requirements have to be considered. 
If a person holds following certificates, then his/her specific training is 100% 
excellent. 
1. Ethic and leadership certificate. 
2. Advanced medical training certificate. 
3. Basic safety training (BST) certificate. 
4. Advanced fire prevention & fire fighting certificate. 
5. Radar simulation training certificate. 
6. Global maritime distress safety system (GMDSS) certificate. 
7. First aid training certificate. 
8. Survival craft and rescue boat training certificate. 
9. Automated radar plotting aids (ARPA) training certificate. 
10. ISM attendance course certificate. 
11. Bridge resource management (BRM) attendance course certificates. 
" If a person holds the following certificates, then his/her specific training is 20% 
excellent and 80% very good. 
1. Ethic and leadership certificate. 
2. BST certificate. 
3. Advanced fire prevention & fire fighting certificate. 
4. Radar simulation training certificate. 
5. GMDSS certificate. 
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6. First aid training certificate. 
7. Survival craft and rescue boat training certificate. 
8. ARPA training certificate. 
9. ISM attendance course certificate. 
10. BRM attendance course certificates. 
" If a person holds the following certificates, then his/her specific training is 100% 
good. 
1. BST certificate. 
2. Advanced fire prevention & fire fighting certificate. 
3. Radar simulation training certificate. 
4. GMDSS certificate. 
5. First aid training certificate. 
6. Survival craft and rescue boat training certificate. 
7. ARPA training certificate. 
8. ISM attendance course certificate. 
9. BRM attendance course certificates. 
9 If a person holds the following certificates, then his/her specific training is 20% 
good and 80% average. 
1. BST certificate. 
2. Advanced fire prevention & fire fighting certificate. 
3. Radar simulation training certificate. 
4. GMDSS certificate. 
5. First aid training certificate. 
6. Survival craft and rescue boat training certificate. 
7. ARPA training certificate. 
8. ISM attendance course certificate. 
" If a person does not hold any certificate, then his/her specific training is 100% low. 
Based on the stated rules and the information, the Third Officer's specific training set is 
assessed as follows: 
S= {(Excellent, 0.2), (Very good, 0.8), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0)} 
The mapping process is elucidated as shown in Figure 3.11, and the fuzzy output set is 
evaluated as follows: 
TS = {(Very Good, 0.2), (Good, 0.64), (Average, 0.16), (Fairly Low, 0), (Low, 0)} 
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Figure 3.11: Mapping from Specific Training to Technical Proficiency 
3.10.8. Aggregation of Sub-Criteria 
The weight of each sub-criterion can be extracted from Table 3.8. Moreover, by help of 
the IDS software, TQ , TE and TS are aggregated and the result is presented in Table 
3.13. 
Table 3.13: Aggregation of Sub-Criteria (Technical Proficiency) 
Technical Very Good Good Average Fairly Low Low Weight 
Proficiency 
7, 
Q 
0 0.02 0.34 0.64 0 0.3708 
7. 
E 
0 0 0.28 0.72 0 0.3408 
7, TS 0.2 0.64 0.16 0 0 0.2884 
Aggregation 0.0474 0.1605 0.2712 0.5209 0 
Result = 0.05 = 0.16 - 0.27 = 0.52 =0 
3.10.9. Mapping from Main Criterion (Technical proficiency) to Goal 
The main criterion (i. e. technical proficiency) can be transformed to the goal (i. e. Third 
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Officer's reliability) by formulating a mapping process. Based on Table 3.13, the fuzzy 
set for the Third Officer's technical proficiency can be written as follows: 
T= {(Very Good, 0.05), (Good, 0.16), (Average, 0.27), (Fairly Low, 0.52), (Low, 0)} 
The mapping process, as shown in Figure 3.12, is elaborated and elucidated. The fuzzy 
output set is evaluated as follows: 
GT = {(High, 0.08), (Fairly High, 0.16), (Medium, 0.34), (Fairly Low, 0.42), (Low, 0)) 
where GT stands for fuzzy output set that is evaluated by mapping from technical 
proficiency to the Third Officer's reliability. 
u'=0.08 u2=0.16 
High FR 
ßz = 0.2 
ßn = 0. 
B'. =1 lie=0.8 
V. Gooa Good 
I'= 0.05 12 = 0.16 
u 0.341 F 
ýý 
0.421 uýý Third Officers Reliability 
=0.9 , 
634 =0.2I 
ve F. Low LO Technical Proficiency 
= 0.27 1° = 0.52 j5=0 
FUZZY INPUT 
Figure 3.12: Mapping from Technical Proficiency to the Third Officer's Reliability 
3.10.10. Aggregation of Main Criteria 
Using the same technique with which GT has been calculated, the other fuzzy output 
sets (i. e. GH' GNT' GFS I GM and GDL) can also be evaluated where 
GH stands for fuzzy output set that is evaluated by mapping from human fatigue to 
the Third Officer's reliability. 
" GNT stands for fuzzy output set that is evaluated by mapping from non-technical 
skills to the Third Officer's reliability. 
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" GFS stands for fuzzy output set that is evaluated by mapping from fitness and 
strength to the Third Officer's reliability. 
" GM stands for fuzzy output set that is evaluated by mapping from motivation to the 
Third Officer's reliability. 
" GDL stands for fuzzy output set that is evaluated by mapping from design & layout 
to the Third Officer's reliability. 
For complete calculations, please refer to Appendix 2. Based on the experts' judgment, 
the main criteria are equally important. Therefore, the weights are distributed evenly 
between them (i. e. 1/6). Moreover, by help of the IDS software, GT, GH , GNT , 
GFS 
, 
GM and GDL are aggregated and the result is presented in Table 3.14. 
Table 3.14: Aggregation of Main Criteria (Goal) 
Ship-Staff High Fairly High Medium Fairly Low Low Weight 
Reliability 
GT 0.08 0.16 0.34 0.42 0 1/6 
GH 0.656 0.224 0.1 0.016 0.004 1/6 
GNT 0.18 0.32 0.4 0.08 0.02 1/6 
GFS 0.53 0.36 0.04 0.042 0.028 1/6 
GM 0.09 0.21 0.7 0 0 1/6 
GDL 1 0 0 0 0 1/6 
Goal Result 0.4449 0.2060 0.2581 0.0834 0.0076 
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3.10.11. Utility Value 
Evidently, the assessment based on a single value is much easier and more intuitive as a 
practical tool for a professional decision maker for ranking the alternatives. Therefore, 
to obtain a single crisp number for the goal, the utility value associated with each 
linguistic term has to be calculated. Based on Table 3.14, the fuzzy set for the Third 
Officer's reliability (Goal) can be written as follows: 
{(High, 0.4449), (Fairly High, 0.2060), (Medium, 0.2581), (Fairly Low, 0.0834), (Low, 0.0076)} 
In view of the fact that the fuzzy set for the goal has been characterised by five 
linguistic terms, the highest preference is given to the "High" linguistic term and the 
lowest preference is given to the "Low" linguistic term. Thus, the ranking value is 
designated from five (i. e. highest preference) to one (i. e. lowest preference). The goal's 
assessments, as shown in Table 3.15, are complete. Based on Equations (3.14) and 
(3.19) the goal's utility value can be calculated as shown in Table 3.15. 
Table 3.15: Utility Value 
Hn High Fairly High Medium Fairly Low Low 
Vn 5 4 3 2 1 
u(Hn) 5-1 
=1 
4-1 
=0.75 
3-1 
=0.5 
2-1 
=0 25 
1-1 
=0 5-1 5-1 5-1 . 5-1 5-1 
fin 0.4449 0.2060 0.2581 0.0834 0.0076 
5 
Alin = 0.4449 + 0.2060 + 0.2581 + 0.0834 + 0.0076 =1 --")6H =0 
n=1 
ýn x u(Hn) 0.4449 0.1545 0.12905 0.02085 0 
5 
Rr =2:, ßnxu(Hn)=0.74930.75 
n=l 
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Rr represents the goal's utility value and elucidates the Third Officer's reliability value. 
The same methodology, for computing all engineers and officers' reliability values, can 
be employed. Moreover, by comparing the results, the most eligible person can 
eventually be selected. It is noteworthy to mention that the comparison is only valid for 
the personnel at the same rank. 
3.10.12. Sensitivity Analysis 
The sensitive analysis is used to test the logicality of the delivery of the analysis result. 
Three Axioms introduced in Section 3.9.7 are used. To carry out the study the degrees 
of belief associated with the highest preference linguistic variables of all the sub-criteria 
(Table 3.16) as shown in Tables 3.17-3.19 are decreased by 0.1,0.2 and 0.3 (i. e. 
simultaneously the degrees of belief associated with the lowest preference linguistic 
variables of corresponding sub-criteria are increased by 0.1,0.2 and 0.3). It is 
noteworthy to mention that for decreasing the belief degree of the highest preference 
linguistic variable (/3H) of a criterion by "m ", simultaneously the belief degree of its 
lowest preference linguistic variable has to be increased by "m ". However if "fl, " is 
less than "m ", then the remaining belief degree (i. e. m -, 3H) can be taken from the next 
linguistic variable. This process continues until "m " is consumed. Accordingly, the 
results (the goal's utility value) as shown in Tables 3.17-3.19 are obtained. Based on the 
obtained results (Tables 3.17-3.19) Figure 3.13 (Data 1,2 and 3 for 0.1,0.2 and 0.3 
respectively) is drawn. All the results obtained keep harmony with Axioms 1 and 2. 
From Figure 3.13 it is obvious that the model output is more sensitive to the rest hours 
that the other sub-criteria. 
If the degrees of belief associated with the highest linguistic variables of all the sub- 
criteria are decreased by 0.3 the utility value of the model output (i. e. reliability of the 
Third Officer) is evaluated as "0.5888". By selection of ten sub-criteria (i. e. 
Qualification, Experience, Specific Training, Environmental States, Design and 
Habitability, Rest Hours, Nutrition, Age, Stress and Health) from 14 sub-criteria and by 
decreasing the degrees of belief associated with the highest preference linguistic 
variables of those selected sub-criteria (i. e. ten sub-criteria) by 0.3 the utility value of 
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the model output (i. e. reliability of the Third Officer) is evaluated as "0.6263". In view 
of the fact that "0.5888" is smaller than "0.6263", the result is aligned with Axiom 3. 
Table 3.16: Fuzzy Input Sets 
Sub-Criteria 
Description 
Fuzzy Input Set ( Based on Information) 
Qualification Excellen 0), (Very good, 0), (Good, 0.2), (Average, 0.8), (Low, 0)) 
Experience ((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.2), (Low, 0.8), (Very Low, 0)) 
Specific 
Training 
((Excellent, 0.2), (Very good, 0.8), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0)) 
Environmental 
States 
{(Very Calm, 0), (Calm, 0.5), (Moderate, 0.5), (Rough, 0), (Very Rough, 
0)) 
Design and 
Habitability 
((Very Good, 0), (Good, 1.0), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0), (Very Bad, 0)) 
Rest Hours ((Very Good, 1), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Nutrition e Good, 0), (Good, 0). (Avere, 0.4), (Bad, 0.6), (Very Bad, 0 
Age Ve young, 0), (Young, 1.0), (Average, 0), (Old, 0), (Very old, 0)) 
Stress {(Low, 0), Moderate, 1 (High, 0), (Very High, 0)) 
Health Ve Healthy, 0.5), (Healthy, 0.5), (Mol. Fit, 0), (Unhealthy, 0)) 
Communication 
and Language 
skills 
((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Medium, 1.0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Decision 
Making 
{(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Medium, 1.0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Teamwork Ve Good, 0), (Good, 1.0), (Medium, 0), (Low0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Situation 
Awareness 
((Very Good, 0), (Good, 1.0), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
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Table 3.17: Decrement of Sub-Criteria by 0.1 
Sub-Criteria The degree of belief associated with the highest Goal's utility 
Description preference linguistic variable is decreased and value (Rr ) 
simultaneously the degree of belief associated with 
the lowest preference linguistic variable is increased 
by 0.1. 
Qualification {(Excellent, 0), (Very good, 0), (Good, 0.1), 0.7464 
(Average, 0.8), (Low, 0.1 
Experience {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.1), (Low, 0.7475 
0.8), (Very Low, 0.1)) 
Specific {(Excellent, 0.1), (Very good, 0.8), (Good, 0), 0.7448 
Training (Average, 0), (Low, 0.1 
Environmental {(Very Calm, 0), (Calm, 0.4), (Moderate, 0.5), 0.7450 
States (Rough, 0), (Very Rough, 0.1 
Design and {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0.9), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0.7454 
Habitability 0), (Very Bad, 0.1 
Rest Hours {(Very Good, 0.9), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0.7411 
0), (Very Low, 0.1 
Nutrition {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.3), (Bad, 0.7492 
0.6), (Very Bad, 0.1 
Age {(Very Young, 0), (Young, 0.9), (Average, 0), (Old, 0.7481 
0), (Very Old, 0.1)) 
Stress {(Low, 0), ( Moderate, 0.9), (High, 0), (Very High, 0.7445 
0.1 
Health {(Very Healthy, 0.4), (Healthy, 0.5), (Mol. Fit, 0), 0.7447 
nhealth 0.1 
Communication {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Medium, 0.9), (Low, 0.7480 
and Language 0), (Very Low, 0.1)) 
Skills 
Decision {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Medium, 0.9), (Low, 0.7480 
Making 0), (Very Low, 0.1 
Teamwork {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0.9), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0.7461 
0), (Very Low, 0.1 
Situation {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0.9), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0.7461 
Awareness 0), (Very Low, 0.1 
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Table 3.18: Decrement of Sub-Criteria by 0.2 
Sub-Criteria The degree of belief associated with the highest Goal's utility 
Description preference linguistic variable is decreased and value (Rr ) 
simultaneously the degree of belief associated with 
the lowest preference linguistic variable is increased 
by 0.2. 
Qualification {(Excellent, 0), (Very good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.7438 
0.8), (Low, 0.2 
Experience ((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0.7458 
0.8), (Very Low, 0.2 
Specific ((Excellent, 0), (Very good, 0.8), (Good, 0), 0.7411 
Training Avera e0, (Low, 0.2)) 
Environmental ((Very Calm, 0), (Calm, 0.3), (Moderate, 0.5), 0.7428 
States (Rough, 0), Ve Rough, 0.2)) 
Design and ((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0.8), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0.7435 
Habitability 0), (Very Bad, 0.2)) 
Rest Hours ((Very Good, 0.8), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0.7330 
0), (Very Low, 0.2)) 
Nutrition {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.2), (Bad, 0.7487 
0.6). Ve Ba-I 11 'I'll 
Age {(Very Young, 0), (Young, 0.8), (Average, 0), (Old, 0.7466 
0), (Very Old, 0.2)) 
Stress ((Low, 0), ( Moderate, 0.8), (High, 0), (Very High, 0.7391 
0.2)) 
Health ((Very Healthy, 0.3), (Healthy, 0.5), (Mol. Fit, 0), 0.7401 
(Unhealthy, 0.2)) 
Communication ((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Medium, 0.8), (Low, 0.7470 
and Language 0), (Very Low, 0.2)) 
Skills 
Decision ((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Medium, 0.8), (Low, 0.7470 
Making 0), (Very Low, 0.2 
Teamwork ((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0.8), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0.7429 
0), (Very Low, 0.2)) 
Situation {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0.8), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0.7429 
Awareness 0), (Very Low, 0.2 
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Table 3.19: Decrement of Sub-Criteria by 0.3 
Sub-Criteria The degree of belief associated with the highest Goal's utility 
Description preference linguistic variable is decreased and value ( 
Rr ) 
simultaneously the degree of belief associated with 
the lowest preference linguistic variable is increased 
by 0.3. 
Qualification {(Excellent, 0), (Very good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.7423 
0.7), Low, 0.3 
Experience {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0.7445 
0.7), (Very Low, 0.3)) 
Specific {(Excellent, 0), (Very good, 0.7), (Good, 0), 0.7384 
Training (Average, 0), (Low, 0.3 
Environmental {(Very Calm, 0), (Calm, 0.2), (Moderate, 0.5), 0.7395 
States (Rough, 0), Ve Rough, 0.3)) 
Design and {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0.7), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0.7414 
Habitability 0), (Very Bad, 0.3)) 
Rest Hours {(Very Good, 0.7), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0.7249 
0), (Very Low, 0.3)) 
Nutrition {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.1), (Bad, 0.7483 
0.6), (Very Bad, 0.3)) 
Age {(Very Young, 0), (Young, 0.7), (Average, 0), (Old, 0.7451 
0), (Very Old, 0.3 
Stress {(Low, 0), (Moderate, 0.7), (High, 0), (Very High, 0.7337 
0.3)) 
Health {(Very Healthy, 0.2), (Healthy, 0.5), (Mol. Fit, 0), 0.7353 
nhealth0.3 
Communication {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Medium, 0.7), (Low, 0.7458 
and Language 0), (Very Low, 0.3)) 
Skills 
Decision {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Medium, 0.7), (Low, 0.7458 
Makin 0), (Very Low, 0.3) 
Teamwork {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0.7), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0.7398 
0), (Very Low, 0.3)) 
Situation {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0.7), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0.7398 
Awareness 0), (Very Low, 0.3 
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Figure 3.13: Sensitivity of the Model Output to the Same Variation of Each Sub-Criterion 
3.11. Results and Discussion 
The seafarers' reliability depends upon many variables. Alteration of a criterion's value 
will ultimately alter such reliability. From the above the reliability value of the Third 
Officer, sailing on board a ship with good design & habitability, at calm to moderate sea 
conditions, having sufficient number of rest hours, was evaluated as 0.75. However, his 
reliability value is not fixed and by alteration of a criterion's value, it will alter. To 
clarify these statements deviation of his reliability from 0.75 due to alteration of each of 
the following criteria as an independent variable (items 2-6), as shown in Table 3.20, is 
evaluated: 
Sailing in other ships with different design & habitability. 
" Different sea conditions. 
" Alteration of hours of his rest. 
" Alteration of his level of stresses due to workloads. 
" Alteration of his health's conditions due to acute sleep loss or sea conditions. 
If the grade of a ship's design & habitability is very bad and the grade of the sea 
condition is very rough, then due to noise and vibration, the Third Officer will not be 
able to sleep appropriately. Therefore, his rest hour's grade will descend from a good 
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grade to an average grade. Consequently, his stress levels and the condition of his health 
will alter. Based on these dependencies, the effect of a combination of items 2-6 is 
studied and the Third Officer's reliability, as shown in Table 3.20, is evaluated (item 7). 
Table 3.20: Third Officer's Reliability Value at Different Situations 
Item Description of event (change of event) Third Officer's reliability value 
According to Information (Test Case) 0.75 
2 Ship's Design & Habitability is Very Bad 0.72 
3 Sea Condition is Very Rough 0.72 
4 100% Average, Rest Hours 0.70 
5 100%, High, Stress level 0.71 
6 100%, Mol. Healthy 0.71 
7 Influencing factors -combination of items 2-6 0.56 
3.11.1. Seafarers' Selection 
Based on an engineering viewpoint, a comparison can only be made relative to a frame 
of reference. Therefore, to define the membership functions for the seafarers' selection, 
the following scenarios are prepared. It is noteworthy to mention that in these scenarios 
an ideal seafarer, who is sailing on board an ideal vessel at perfect environmental states, 
is called an ideal seafarer. 
" An ideal master of a container vessel is 45 years old. 
" The grade of his technical proficiency and his non-technical skills are 100% very 
good. 
" He is an expert. 
" The grade of his motivation is 100% very high. 
" According to his statements and his medical fitness certificate, he is 100% very 
healthy and his stress level is 100% low. 
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" The values of Beaufort number for the last two days are indicated as I and 2 
respectively. 
" The level of the ship's design and habitability is 100% very good. 
" The level of the ship's design and layout is 100% very good. 
" According to his statements the food, which is served on board, is 100% very good. 
" He obtained 8 hours of sleep in the previous night. 
Based on the above information, his reliability value is evaluated as 0.99. People who 
do not get enough sleep are subjected to moodiness and mood swing. When a person is 
exhausted from a lack of sleep, his emotions can get out of control. Occasionally sleep 
deprivation can lead to feeling of drowsiness and even nodding off at inopportune 
times. Those with significant sleep deprivation sometimes experience hallucinations. 
People who are sleep deprived often experience a decrease in hand eye coordination, 
their ability to balance, and their reaction time. Living in a state of sleep deprivation can 
have serious health implications. The human body needs sleep to sustain optimal 
immune system functioning. The immune system can become weakened very quickly in 
individuals who do not get enough sleep. Additionally, the inability to sleep leads to a 
physiological stress response, which can further weaken immune system functioning 
(APA, 2009). 
Suppose the above seafarer's rest hours' grade is reduced from 100% very good to 
100% very low. Consequently, based on the previous discussion (i. e. sleep deprivation) 
the grade of his non-technical skills and his fitness & strength is reduced to very low. 
Accordingly, his reliability value is assessed as 0.55. It is obvious that at this point (i. e. 
0.55 for his reliability value) an ideal seafarer is not able to perform his duty 
appropriately. Thus, the grade of his performance can be evaluated as 100% Low. 
During a seafarer's selection, his resistance to and freedom from fatigue and resistance 
to psychological stresses have to be considered (ABS, 2003). Thus, an ideal seafarer as 
a part of his duty and due to the nature of his job should be able to sustain his reliability, 
for a short time period, under any circumstances. The reliability value of an ideal 
seafarer due to alteration of a criterion's value for a short time period (i. e. the criterion 
being taken as an independent variable with limited or without side effects) and a long 
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time period (i. e. the criterion being taken as a dependent variable with side effects), as 
shown in Table 3.21, is assessed. 
Table 3.21: An Ideal Seafarer's Reliability Value at Different Circumstances 
Description Time period Side Effect Reliability value Grade of his 
Performance 
Ideal seafarer, based - - 0.99 High 
on the information 
100% Very Low, - NTS, Fitness and 0.55 Low 
Rest Hours Strength 
Very rough sea Short 0.95 High 
conditions 
Very rough sea Long Rest hours, 0.7 Fairly Low 
conditions Fitness and 
Strength 
Average rest hours Short 0.95 High 
Average rest hours Long Fitness and 0.78 Average 
Strength 
Medium fatigue Short - 0.9 Fairly High 
Medium fatigue Long Fitness and 0.6 Low 
Strength 
Very high Short - 0.9 Fairly High 
Stress level 
Very high Long Rest hours, 0.58 Low 
Fitness and 
stress level Strength 
High fatigue Short 0.86 Fairly High 
Note: NTS stands for Non-Technical Skills. 
Based on the previous discussion and Table 3.21, the membership functions that are 
suitable for the seafarers' selection, as shown in Figure 3.14, can be constructed. It is 
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noteworthy to mention that Figure 3.14 presents a frame of reference. In other words, by 
exploiting the frame of reference the performance of any seafarer can be compared with 
an ideal seafarer. A frame of reference can be employed for converting a reliability 
value to a grade (grades) of performance. 
Dpn 
Figure 3.14: Frame of Reference 
3.11.2. Control Options 
Based on the frame of reference (Figure 3.14) and the Third Officer's reliability value 
(i. e. 0.75) the grade of his performance can be assessed as 100% average. Therefore, if 
he is appointed for any kind of activity, his performance is expected to be 100% 
average. For improving his reliability the control options, as shown in Table 3.22, are 
suggested. 
Based on Table 3.22 and Figure 3.14, by improving the quality of the ship's provisions, 
his motivations and non-technical skills the grade of his performance can be enhanced 
from 100% average (i. e. 0.75 for his reliability value) to 100% fairly high (i. e. 0.9 for 
his reliability value). Pursuant to the previous discussion (Section 3.8), the hygiene 
factors include the quality of the foods and motivation factors include opportunity to 
learn a new skill, personal growth and development. Thus, one of the factors that can 
significantly influence personal performance is motivation. However, many in marine 
industries, regretfully, hardly consider and pay limited attention to the seafarers' 
motivation. 
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Table 3.22: Control Options 
Item Control option Description Reliability Value 
I Improving his qualification. According to the information, his 0.75 
qualification is sufficient for his rank. 
2 Improving his specific According to the information, his 0.75 
training. specific training is sufficient for his 
rank. 
3 Improving the ship's design According to the information, the grade 0.75 
& habitability. of the ship's design and habitability is 
. good 
4 Improving the number of According to the information, the grade 0.75 
his rest hours. of his rest hours is very good. 
5 5E Improving his non-technical It can be improved to a very good 0.82 
skills. grade. 
6 Improving his motivation. It can be improved to a very high 0.83 
grade. 
7 Improving the quality of the It can be improved to a very good 0.78 
ship's provisions. grade. 
8 C05+CO6+CO7 Improving the quality of the ship's 0.9 
provisions, his motivation and his non- 
technical skills. 
Note: CO stands for Control Option 
3.12. Conclusion 
Within the previous chapter and based on the formal safety assessment of 
containerships it was found that the most significant basic event contributing to the 
containerships' accident is ship staff error. Furthermore, it has been revealed that the 
container supply chain is a series network and for a series network, the reliability of a 
system can only be calculated via evaluating the reliability of its components. 
Containership is one of the container supply chain' components, and its reliability can 
be evaluated via the reliability of its personnel, its facilities and their interfaces. 
Within this chapter and based on literature reviews on seafarers' reliability, those 
significant criteria that are influencing the seafarers' reliability are found and 
methodology for evaluating the seafarers' reliability, by using fuzzy logic and ER 
approach, is revealed. Based on the analysis, firstly, it has been revealed that a 
seafarer's reliability is dependent on many variables and alteration of a criterion's value 
will ultimately alter his/her reliability. Secondly, it has been revealed that, during design 
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and fabrication of a new vessel, if the integration of personnel with equipments, system, 
and interfaces (i. e. design and layout) of a vessel is not considered, then the reliability of 
a seafarer is 23% lower than the same person living on board a vessel with very good 
grade of design and layout. Thirdly, during design and fabrication of a new vessel, if 
design and habitability is not considered, then the reliability of a seafarer is 25% lower 
than the same person living on board a vessel with very good grade of design and 
habitability. Therefore, during the preparation of a specification for new building of a 
vessel and throughout its life cycle, ergonomics should be considered and determined 
by ship owners. Furthermore, based on the analysis, it has been revealed that, if a 
seafarer's motivation grade is very high, then his/her reliability value is 21% more than 
a same person with very low motivation, however, many in marine industries, 
regretfully, hardly consider and pay limited attention to the seafarers' motivation. Based 
on-the analysis, a frame of reference (i. e. benchmark) for selection of seafarers based on 
their performance is developed. The seafarers' motivation, fatigue, and hours of rest are 
highly dependent on strategies of ship owners. It is revealed that the frequency of 
accidents and the severity of consequences can be reduced by improving seafarers' 
performance through ship owners' appropriate strategies. 
As it is revealed within this chapter, the seafarers' reliability depends upon many 
variables and alteration of a criterion value will ultimately alter their reliability. 
Although the developed FER methodology does provide a comprehensive view for 
assessment of seafarers' reliability, but it cannot deal with dependencies between 
criteria. Graphs have proven to be very intuitive language for communication and 
discussing dependence and independence relations among problem-domain variables. 
Therefore, it is essential to develop a FBN model for evaluating the seafarers' reliability 
within the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four 
A Proposed Fuzzy Bayesian Network (FBN) Model for 
Evaluating the Seafarers' Reliability 
Summary 
This chapter makes full use of the Bayesian network's advantages and further develops 
and extends Fuzzy Bayesian Network (FBNs) and a new "symmetric method" by 
exploiting a conceptual and sound methodology for the assessment of seafarers' 
reliability. In this chapter for evaluating the seafarers' reliability an initial graph, 
based on the ergonomics model, literature reviews, historical failure data and statistical 
analysis, is constructed. In the first stage, to produce the initial graph, all root causes 
that are not directly influenced by any other variables are found. All root causes are 
then assigned a node each. Because the variables are identified in an almost 
hierarchical way, from a higher level of sub-chains to the component level, the 
graphical structure will unavoidably have a hierarchical feature. As a result the nodes 
associated with the root causes at the first stage can be defined as level-1 nodes at the 
first stage. All the variables that are directly influenced by the variables in the level-1 
nodes can be discovered and the nodes associated with them can be defined as level-2 
nodes at the second stage. A given node at level-2 has as its parents all those nodes in 
level-1 that directly influence this particular node. This hierarchical process continues 
until all the variables have a place in the graph and all the parent-child links are 
accounted by the edges of the graph. Because the parents are identified through the 
subjective judgements of the individuals constructing the graph, the whole process is 
subjective. The procedure is, however, consistent because in the BNformalism, for any 
node, once the direct influences on it are known, all other potential influences are 
irrelevant as far as constructing the network is concerned. To calculate the 
unconditional prior probability of each node in level-1, it is necessary to have all data 
and information on the same universe (i. e. goal's universe). Thus, each quantitative 
criterion in level-1 is transformed to a qualitative criterion by using the membership 
functions of a continuous fuzzy set. Each qualitative criterion in level-1 at the fly' stage is 
converted into its associated qualitative criterion in level-2 at the (i+l)th stage by 
formulating a mapping process, the mapping process continues up to the goal's stage 
(leaf node). The concept of expected utility is then used to obtain a single crisp value 
which presents the unconditional prior probability of the concerned node in level-1. To 
show the relative importance of each parent node for its associated child node an 
analytic hierarchy process (AHP) methodology is used. Finally, the strength of direct 
dependence of each child node to its associated parents is quantified by assigning each 
child node a conditional probability table (CPT). 
4.1. Introduction 
The seafarers' reliability depends upon many variables and alteration of a criterion 
value will ultimately alter their reliability. For instance, if the grade of a ship's design 
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and habitability is very bad and the grade of the sea condition is very rough, then due to 
noise and vibration, a seafarer will not be able to sleep appropriately. Therefore, his/her 
rest hour's grade will descend from a good grade to an average grade. Consequently, 
his/her stress levels and the condition of his/her health will alter. Graphs have proven to 
be a very intuitive language for representing such dependence and independence 
statements, and thus provide an excellent language for communication and discussing 
dependence and independence relations among problem-domain variables. A large and 
important class of assumptions about dependence and independence relations expressed 
in factorised representations of joint probability distribution can be represented very 
compactly in a class of graphs known as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). Chain graphs 
are a generalisation of DAGs, capable of representing a boarder class of dependence and 
independence assumption (Fydenberg, 1989; Wermuth and Lauritzen, 1990). A 
Bayesian network (BN) is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of 
random variables and their conditional dependencies through a DAG. 
The reasons for choosing BNs can be summarised as follows: 
9 They are graphical models, capable of displaying relationships clearly and 
intuitively. 
" They are directional, thus being capable of representing cause-effect relationships. 
9 They can be used to represent indirect causation in addition to direct one 
The approach is based on conceptualising a model domain or system of interest as a 
graph of connected nodes and linkages. In the graph, nodes represent important domain 
variables and a link from one node to another represents a dependency relationship 
between the corresponding variables. Given their network structuring, Bayesian 
networks successfully capture the notation of modularity (i. e. a complex system can be 
built by combining simpler parts). Due to their Bayesian probability formalism, 
Bayesian networks provide a rational technique to combine both subjective (e. g. expert 
opinion) and qualitative (e. g. monitoring data) information (Das, 2000). The flexibility 
nature of Bayesian networks also means that new information can easily be incorporated 
as it becomes available. Only the conditional probabilities of the affected variable 
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require redetermination. Moreover Bayesian networks are helpful for challenging 
experts to articulate what they know about the model domain, and to join those 
influences into dependency network. The graphical nature of Bayesian networks 
therefore facilitates the easy transfer of understanding about key linkages. In addition, 
because subjective expert opinions are made explicit in the formal structure of the 
network, they can be challenged and revised, and can also be directly evaluated to 
determine whether the results are robust. 
Bayesian networks are a modem inclusion to a family of techniques known as expert 
systems. A common definition of an expert system is a software system that emulates 
the problem solving behaviour of human expert over some restricted domain. Other 
popular examples of expert system include rule based systems, fuzzy logic algorithms, 
and neural networks. As one kind of expert system, Bayesian networks, like rule based 
systems, may be developed using expert opinion instead of requiring historical data 
(Charniak, 1991). This is not always the case for all expert systems. For instance, 
historical data is required to train neural networks, which means that although data is 
not required for generic algorithms, the development of generic objective functions 
needs significant resources (McCabe et al., 1998). The major disadvantage of 
incorporating expert judgements into BNs is the general lack of understanding of 
probability theory so as to fail to precisely probabilistically estimate subjective 
fuzziness. Such inaccurate subjective estimates of the certainty of an event have been 
claimed as an unwanted introduction of bias into BNs (Tversky and Kahneman, 1990). 
The proposed Fuzzy Bayesian network (FBN) model is able to overcome this deficiency 
by challenging and revising the experts' opinions. 
FBN can be seen as compact representation of fuzzy cause-effect rules that, contrary to 
logical rule based system, are capable of performing deductive and abductive reasoning 
as well as intercausal reasoning. Deductive reasoning which is known as causal 
reasoning follows the direction of the causal links between variables of a model. 
Abductive reasoning which is known as diagnostic reasoning goes against the direction 
of casual links. Getting evidence that supports solely a single hypothesis or a subset of 
hypotheses automatically leads to decreasing belief in the unsupported competing 
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hypotheses; this property is often known as intercausal reasoning (Kjaerulff and 
Madsen, 2008). 
4.2. Bayesian Networks 
Bayesian Networks (BNs) also known as "Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs)", "Belief 
Networks", "Causal Probabilistic Networks", "Causal Nets", "Graphical Probability 
Networks", and "Probabilistic Cause-Effect" models are an emerging modelling 
approach of artificial intelligence research that aim to provide a decision-support 
framework for problems involving uncertainty, complexity and probabilistic reasoning 
(Neapolitan, 1990). Bayesian networks were first developed at Stanford University in 
the 1970s (McCabe et al., 1998). The first book on Bayesian network was published by 
Pearl (1988) and since then several other text books have been published (Neapolitan, 
1990; Jensen, 1996; Castillo et al., 1997). The first world application of Bayesian 
network was Munin (Andreassen et al., 1989). Since then, Bayesian networks have 
spread quickly and been used extensively to model many real world problems (Oliver 
and Smith, 1990; Ottonello et al., 1992; Burnell and Horvits, 1995; Szolovits and 
Pauker, 1993; Russell and Norvig, 1995). 
4.2.1. Notation 
Throughout this chapter the terms node, variable, criterion, and attribute are considered 
interchangeably. Similarly the terms edge and arc are considered interchangeably. The 
symbols are presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Table of Symbols 
X, Y, Z, ... 
One dimensional variables 
x, , z, ... 
Values of corresponding variables X, Y, Z ... 
pa; Set of parents of Xi 
I Set of edges of a BN 
lu Universe, set of variables/nodes in the domain: Xj, ..., X 
rr Directed acyclic graph (DAG) of a BN (i. e. W, 1) 
123 
4.2.2. Bayesian Networks Models 
A Bayesian network consists of a set of nodes and a set of directed edges. Each node 
represents a probability distribution, which may in principle be "continuous" or 
"discrete". In this chapter, the formulation is restricted to the discrete case in which each 
node represents a finite set of states where each state is associated with a probability 
measure. Nodes represent random variables and arcs represent probabilistic correlation 
between the variables. Arcs indicate conditional probabilistic dependence so that the 
probability of a dependent variable being in a particular state is given for each 
combination of the states of the preceding variables. The dependence structure is thus 
represented by a set of conditional probability distributions. A variable, which is 
dependent on other variables, is often referred to as a "child node". Likewise, directly 
preceding variables are called "parents". Nodes, which have no parents, are called "root 
nodes" and nodes without children are called "leaf nodes". Quantitative probability 
information is specified in the form of conditional probability tables (CPT). For each 
node the table specifies the probability of each possible state of node given each 
possible combination of states of its parents. The table for a root node just contains 
unconditional probabilities. 
In general a Bayesian network is a graphical representation of a probability distribution 
over a set of variables and it consists of two parts: 
1. The directed network structure in the form of a directed acyclic graph (DAG). 
2. A set of the joint probability distributions, one for each node, conditional on each 
value combination of the parents. 
The network structure is constrained to be acyclic. Undirected cycles (i. e. cycles along 
which not all edges are pointed in the same way) are allowed. Such a structure 
represents alternative paths of possible influences between certain variables in the cycle. 
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4.2.3. Interference Formulism of Bayesian Networks 
The basis of reasoning under uncertainty in BNs is called Bayesian interference 
formulism, which is developed for the task of computing the probability of each value 
of a node in a BN when other variables' values are known (Jensen, 1996). The 
uncertainty may be due to imperfect understanding of the domain, incomplete 
knowledge of the state of the domain at the time where a given task is to be performed, 
randomness in the mechanism governing the behaviour of the domain, or combination 
of these. One of the main advantages of BNs is that they allow interference based on 
observed evidence. The model can be updated in accordance with observation using 
Bayesian's rule. For random variables "XI " and "X2 ", as shown in Figure 4.1, 
Bayesian's rule states: 
P(X1 I X2)- 
P(X2 I X1)P(X1) 
(4.1) 
7- P(X2 1 X1 =xi)P(X1 =xi) 
all.. i 
Assume for instance that variable "X2 " is observed to be in state xj. The probability of a 
parameter value given the observation is referred to as the posterior probability. This 
distinguishes it from the prior probability held by the analyst prior to collection and 
analysis of the observation. By applying Equation 4.1 to each state of "XI " the 
probability distribution "P(X1 I Xl = xj) " is computed: 
_ 
P(X2 = xj 1 XI )P(x1) P`XI ýX2=xi) 
Z (x2 = x"1 XI =xi (X1=x1) 
(4.2) 
all..! 
Figure 4.1: BN Consisting of Two Nodes 
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Similar computations may be performed for large networks, allowing users to 
investigate different scenarios. Manually updating by this method is practical only if the 
network is small and each node represents only a few states. However, in the 1980s 
researchers discovered propagation algorithms that make it possible to break the overall 
graph down into smaller sub-sets within which information flows are largely self- 
contained (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988). With the introduction of software tools 
that implement these algorithms it is now possible to use Bayesian networks to solve a 
complex problem without doing it manually. 
4.2.4. Causal Relationship 
The parent-child relationships are identified by individuals constructing the graph using 
very simple semantics, namely causality. However, this does not mean that causality is 
an easy concept. It may be very difficult to experience causality and philosophically the 
concept is not fully understood so that many humans cannot sensibly organise casual 
relationships in a knowledge domain (Jensen, 2001). BNs correspond to a very broad 
class of models, one that can be used to represent nested, acyclic statistical models of 
virtually any kind of non-pathological joint probability distribution. Their remarkable 
characteristic is their ability to encode directional relations which can represent a cause- 
effect relationship, compared to other graphical models that cannot. As an added 
benefit, they are capable of representing the independence in a domain through their 
structure, which is a directed acyclic graph. BNs contain only random variables, and 
links represent direct dependences (often, but not necessarily, casual relationships) 
among the variables (Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008). To correctly represent the 
dependence and independence relations that exist among a set of variables of a problem 
domain it is very useful to have the casual relations among the variables presented in 
terms of directed links from causes to effects. If done the other way round the model 
may not properly represent the dependence and independence relations of the problem 
domain. Generally "a variable "X" is said to be a direct cause of "Y" if setting the value 
of "X" by force, the value of "Y" may change and there is no other variable "Z" that is a 
direct cause of "Y" such that "X" is a direct cause of Z" (Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008). 
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4.2.5. Joint Probability Distributions (JPDs) 
In addition to the BNs' ability to represent casual relationships, they can and have been 
used to represent joint probability distributions (JI'Ds) compactly. Indeed this is the 
most common usage of them today. This ability comes from local JPDs that are 
attached to each variable in the network, whose purpose is to quantify the strength of 
the causal relationships depicted in the BN through its structure. These local JPDs 
mathematically describe the behaviour of that variable under every possible value 
assignment of its parents. The JPD. s can be obtained using the combination of 
qualitative and quantitative relationship. Since to specify this behaviour one needs a 
number of parameters exponential in the number of parents, and since this number is 
typically smaller than the number of variables in the domain, this results in exponential 
saving in space and time. To understand this computational saving, let us assume a 
network, consisting of five variables (XI, X2, X3, X4, and X5) is constructed. Firstly, let 
us assume that all the variables are dependent on (i. e. influence) each other. Based on 
the chain rule from probability theory the joint probability distribution can be calculated 
as follows: 
P(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5) = P(X1 1 X2, X3, X4, XS) X P(X, I X3, X4, XS) x P(X3 I X4, Xs) x P(X4 I Xs) x P(X5) (4.3) 
Secondly, suppose that the dependencies are explicitly modelled as for the BN in Figure 
4.2. Then the joint probability distribution can be calculated as follows: 
P(XX1, X2, X3, X4, X. ) = P(Xl I X2) X P(X, 1 X3, X4) X P(X3 I X. 1 " P(X4) X P(X5) (4.4) 
Figure 4.2: BN Consisting of Five Nodes 
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More concretely, given the structure and the local joint probability distribution of a BN, 
the joint probability distribution of the domain of "n " variables can be calculated as 
follows: 
n 
P(X1, X2....... Xn)= fJP(Xi I Pai) (4.5) 
i=1 
where Pa; denotes the set of direct parents of variable X; in the Bayesian network whose 
structure is rx. The conditional probabilities P(X; I Pa; ) can be specified by 2I 
Pa' I 
rather than 2" parameters, resulting in the exponential space savings mentioned above. 
As a result for each node the conditional probability of that node taking a certain value 
given the value of its parents is required. For discrete networks this amounts to defining 
a conditional probability table (CPT). For consistency with the axioms of probability 
one has to ensure that these probabilities address the relation associated with the 
completeness of states. 
4.2.6. Directional Separation 
Directional separation, or d-separation, is a property of K- which may be exploited to 
identify irrelevant and the requisite information for specific queries in a BN or an 
influence diagram. D-separation is a very important concept, because not only does it 
assist in modifying the initial graphs toward more effective models, but also it provides 
the basis of inferring the quantitative calculation and combining the probabilities 
representing uncertainty in BNs. The notation of d-separation originates from Pearl 
(1986) but has been investigated by numerous researchers. Two nodes of a BN are said 
to be d-separated if they are conditionally independent given a specified set of nodes. 
Thus, If P(X2 I X3, X4) = P(X2 I X4) then X2 and X3 are conditionally independent, or d- 
separated, given X4. It is noteworthy to mention that when building the structure of BN 
models, assessors need not insist on having links going in a casual direction. On the 
other hand, they need to check its d-separation properties to ensure that the properties 
correspond to their perception of the world (Jensen, 2001). Furthermore, some scientists 
take the point of view that the networks are not causal models, but models for how 
information may propagate between events (Jensen, 1996). 
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In principle, only three types of connection in a directed graph exist, namely serial, 
diverging and converging connections. In a serial network (X --º Y -º Z) evidence may 
transmitted from X to Z only if Y is not observed to be in a specific state, in other words 
information may flow through (X -º Y -ý Z) unless the state of Y is known (Kjaerulff 
and Madsen, 2008). Instantiation blocks the communication between X and Z and they 
are thus conditionally independent given Y. In a diverging connection (X «- Y- Z) 
evidence may be transmitted through Y if it is not instantiated, in other words 
information may flow through (X F- Y --; Z) unless the state of Y is known (Kjaerulff 
and Madsen, 2008). In a converging connection (X -º Y +-- Z), X and Z are independent 
if nothing is known about Y, in other words information may flow through (X -º Y, -- Z) 
if evidence on Y or one of its descendants is available (Kjaerulff and Madsen, 2008). 
4.2.7. Hugin Software 
The Hugin software comes with an easy to use graphical user interface (GUI) and 
provides applicable programmer's interface (API). It can be used as a robust BN 
programming environment for modelling and interference. While Hugin software makes 
it easy to key the input and read the output of the network by providing a graphical 
representation of the properties of each node as a bar graph, the general strategy of 
using a Hugin BN model must be obeyed (Wang and Trbojevic, 2007): 
1. Firstly, the nodes of BNs must be mapped out (enter evidence for some variables). 
2. Secondly, the states of the nodes must be defined (observe the effect of the evidence 
on other variables). 
3. Thirdly, the probability of each state must be determined (explain the new 
probabilities). 
4.3. Determining the Conditional Probabilities 
As discussed previously (Section 4.2.5) the prior probabilities are only required locally 
to be assigned to the bunch of (Pa; -º Xi) links as conditional probabilities P(X; I Pa; ) . 
However, it is not often straightforward to obtain P(X; I Pa; ). The Bayesian approach 
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requires much information in a form of prior probability. In principle, most values could 
be acquired through failure database or experiments. However, experiments may be 
difficult to design and conduct correctly and historical data does not often satisfy the 
requirements of the Bayesian approach. In practice, it is often necessary and important 
to rely on subjective probabilities provided by expert judgments as a rational expression 
of an individual's degree of belief. However, since subjective probabilities are based on 
informed guesses, serious deviation could happen if they are accurately expressed with 
precise numbers. Moreover, it has been discovered that linguistic expressions of 
probabilistic uncertainty were more accurate than numerical values in estimating the 
likelihood of multiple attributes through experimental studies (Zimmer, 1986). Fuzzy 
logic has been widely used to model such subjective linguistic variables and deal with 
discrete problems using fuzzy numbers, which often reflect expert opinion more 
faithfully. 
4.3.1. Noisy-Or Approach 
In constructing a BN, the converging connections between nodes are always a problem 
for both Bayesian statisticians and experienced analysts. To understand the mentioned 
difficulties, let us assume "X1 " and "X2" be the two children listing all effects of the 
single parent "X3 ". Based on Equation 4.5 the joint probability distribution for the 
diverging connections can be calculated as follows: 
P(XI, X2, X3) P(X1 I X3)P(X2 I X3)P(X3) 
Alternatively let us assume "XI " and "X2 " be the two parent nodes of their single child 
"X3 ". Based on Equation 4.5 the joint probability distribution for the converging 
connections can be calculated as follows: 
P(XI, X21X3) =P(XI)P(X2)P(X31 X11X2) 
By comparing the results, because P(X3 I X1, X2) cannot be further decomposed, it is 
not friendly enough for human knowledge and may be too specific for any expert. Thus 
the converging connections are more difficult to be appropriately handled compared to 
130 
the diverging and serial connections in BNs. Many pioneers in the research field 
associated with BNs have generated some novel and effective methods to deal with this 
problem from both quantitative and qualitative viewpoints, such as "Noisy-Or" and 
"Divorcing" approaches (Jensen, 2001). 
Often conditional probability tables (CPTs) fall into one of several common categories 
or canonical distributions. These canonical forms are based on regularities that permit 
much more compact representation. The canonical models differ from general Bayesian 
network models in that they have a certain local structure within the CPTs. Canonical 
models were introduced by Pearl (1988) and successfully used in reliability engineering 
research (Reed, 1990). In literature they are also called casual independence models or 
models of independence of casual influence (ICI). "Noisy-Or" models are probably the 
most popular example of canonical Bayesian network models. "Noisy-Or" is generated 
with the strong assumption revealed by a deterministic OR gate, where the child will be 
present given the presence of any parent and child will be absent, if and only if all 
parents are absent. A standard "Noisy-Or" is correct only if it satisfies the requirement 
that the possible causes are collectively exhaustive, that is: 
P(Y=PresentI XI, X2,..., Xn =Absent)=0 (4.6) 
The "Noisy-Or" gate model is working under the following three assumptions 
(Neapolitan, 1997): 
" Casual inhibition: this assumption entails that there is some mechanism that inhibits 
a cause from bringing about its effect, and the presence of the cause results in the 
presence of the effect if and only if this mechanism is disabled. 
" Exception independence: this assumption entails that the mechanism that inhibits 
one cause is independent of the mechanism that inhibits another cause. 
" Accountability: This assumption entails that an effect can happen only if at least one 
of its causes is present and is not being inhibited. Therefore, all causes which are not 
stated explicitly must be lumped into one unknown cause. 
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In the situation of "Noisy-Or", the probability of a binary node "Y" conditional upon 
"n" binary parent nodes, X where r=1,2,..., n, is estimated as follows: 
n 
P(YI XI, X2...... Xn)=1- Ü(1-P(YI Xri) (4.7) 
r=I 
In Equation 4.7, P(Y I X1 ), P(Y I X2 ), P(Y I X3 ), ..., 
P(Y I X) are assessed and then 
used to estimate P(Y I X1, X2...... X) . Its theoretical base is that 
if any of the parents is 
present, then the child happens unless an inhibitor prevents it; if all inhibitors are 
independent, then the combined probability is easy to calculate as one minus the 
product of the appropriate probabilities for the inhibitor. 
4.3.2. Critical Review of "Noisy-Or" Methodology 
In order to explain the "Noisy-Or" methodology and for critical appraisal of this 
methodology, a simplified example (Figure 4.3) is given to represent a scenario for 
constructing and evaluating a CPT. This model represents the casual relationships 
among the variables, and each variable has only two values. A variable takes its first 
value if a feature is present and its second value otherwise. Let us assume in a certain 
province due to uncertainty the likelihood of existence and non-existence of malaria, flu 
and cold are equal. 
P(Malaria = Present) = P(Flu = Present) = P(Cold = Present) = 0.5 
P(Malaria = Absent) = P(Flu = Absent) = P(Cold = Absent) = 0.5 
Figure 4.3: The Parent-Child Relationship 
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An expert (a physician), based on his experience, has assessed the following conditional 
probabilities: 
P(Fever = Pr esent I Malaria = Present) = Q, (4.8) 
P(Fever = Pr esent I Flu = Pr esent) = Q2 (4.9) 
P(Fever = Present I Cold = Present) = a3 (4.10) 
Based on Equations (4.7 - 4.10) the following equations can be obtained: 
P(Fever = Pr esent I Malaria = Present, Flu = Absent, Cold = Absent) 
=1-(I-vt)=Q] 
(4.11) 
P(Fever = Present I Flu= Present, Malaria= Absent, Cold= Absent) 
=1-(1-Q2)=62 
(4.12) 
P(Fever = Pr esent I Cold = Pr esent, Malaria = Absent, Flu = Absent) 
=1-(1-Q3)=Q3 
(4.13) 
P(Fever = Pr esent I Malaria = Present, Flu = Present, Cold = Pr esent) (4.14) 
=1-(1-Qj)(1-Q2)(1-Q3)=ark +a2 +Q3 -01Q2 -a2a"3 -Qja3 +QJQ2O3 
P(Fever = Absent I Malaria = Present, Flu = Pr esent, Cold = Present) 
=(1-cr1)(1-o2)(1-Q3) 
(4.15) 
P(Fever = Pr esent I Malaria = Pr esent, Flu = Present, Cold = Absent) 
=1-(1-6j)(1-62)=of+Q2-ajQ2 
(4.16) 
P(Fever = Pr esent I Malaria = Pr esent, Flu = Absent, Cold = Present) 
=1-(1-Qj)(1-Q3)=o']+Q3-0J0'3 
(4.17) 
P(Fever = Pr esent I Malaria = Absent, Flu = Present, Cold = Pr esent) 
=1- (1- o2)(1- Q3) = 62 +Q3 - c2Q3 
(4.18) 
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Based on the Bayes chain rule the marginal probability of the presence of fever can be 
calculated as follows: 
P(Fever = Present) 
(4.19) 
_ [4(QJ +Q2 +63)-2(o7cr2 +x20'3 +Q1a3)+QJQ2Q3 Jx0.53 
Based on informed or genuine guesses of the expert the values of o 1, a2 and Q3 can be 
substituted as a, = 0.9, c72 = 0.8 and a3 = 0.4 respectively. Accordingly, based on 
Equations (4.8-4.18) the conditional probability table (CPT), as shown in the Table 4.2, 
can be evaluated. 
Table 4.2: Conditional Probability Table ("Noisy-Or" methodology) 
Malaria P Malaria A 
Flu (P) Flu A Flu (P) Flu A 
Cold P Cold (A) Cold (P) Cold (A) Cold (P) Cold A Cold (P) Cold (A) 
0 Fever 0.988 0.98 0.94 0.9 0.88 0.8 0.4 0 
SZ Fever 0.012 0.02 0.06 0.1 0.12 0.2 0.6 1 
where, 
Q (Fever) =P (Fever=Present) Malaria, Flu, Cold) 
SZ (- Fever) =P (Fever=Absent) Malaria, Flu, Cold) 
Based on Equation 4.19 the marginal probability of the presence and the absence of 
fever can be evaluated as follows: 
P(Fever = Present) = 0.736 
P(Fever = Absent) = 0.264 
For constructing and evaluating the CPT based on synthesising the "Noisy-Or" 
methodology and expert's judgement certain application problems that are listed as 
follows may be revealed. 
Firstly, as it is clear from Equation 4.15, if in the province malaria, cold and flu are 
present, then the likelihood of absence of fever can be estimated as follows: 
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(1-al)(1-a2)(1-73)=0.012 
However, in many real world situations, there are multiple possible causes for presence 
of a child node, some of which cannot be involved in the model (Jensen, 2001). Henrion 
(1989) proposed a direct extension of the "Noisy-Or" model which models that an effect 
Y (child node = Present) can also occur if all the causes are absent. He called this 
extension "Leaky Noisy-Or" model. This can be modelled by introducing an additional 
parameter (i. e. Pbckgrand) which is called the leaky probability. The leaky probability 
represents the phenomenon that an effect occurs spontaneously (i. e. in absence of the 
causes that are modelled explicitly). Thus, Equation 4.7 can be modified as follows: 
n 
P(Y I XI, X2....., Xn) =1- (1- Pbackground) II(1- NY IXr )) (4.20) 
r=1 
Secondly, the marginal probability of the presence of fever was evaluated as 0.736. This 
value indicated that in a certain province, although the likelihood of existence and non- 
existence of malaria, flu and cold are equal, without observation of any evidence, the 
likelihood of presence of fever is much more than its absence. In other words if 
someone is uncertain about existence and non-existence of a child's parents, then he can 
be persuaded that the likelihood of existence of the child is much more than its non- 
existence, which is not a logical hypothesis. The "Noisy-Or" model is not responsible 
for the mentioned deficiency; as a matter of fact the expert's certainty concerning the 
value of a1, Q2 and 173 has introduced a bias into BN. In general if someone is 
uncertain about existence and non-existence of a child's parents, he or she should 
remain uncertain about the existence and non-existence of their child. 
Thirdly, Equation 4.7 is asymmetric, it means it is only true in one direction (i. e. 
Y=Present). This scarcity may result in miscalculation by non-mathematicians for 
instance: 
P(Fever = Pr esent I Flu = Pr esent, Malaria = Absent, Cold = Absent) 
=1-(1-°2)=472 
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P(Fever = Pr esent j Flu = Present, Malaria= Absent, Cold = Absent) 
=1- P(Fever = Absent I Flu = Pr esnet, Malaria = Absent, Cold = Absent) 
a2 *1 41-Q1 )(I -Q3) 
To overcome the above mentioned problems a symmetric model is developed. 
4.3.3. Symmetric Model 
For synthesising the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) methodology with probability 
theory, a symmetric model is developed. This model, called the symmetric model, 
concerns the case in which the relationships among variables ordinarily represent casual 
mechanism, and each variable has only two values. The dissimilarity between this 
methodology and the "Noisy-Or" methodology is the fact that, in the "Noisy-Or" 
approach the expert's opinion is distributed by likelihood and in the symmetric model 
the expert's opinion is distributed by relative importance of each parent nodes for their 
associated child node. The strength of direct dependence of each child node to its 
associated parents is indicated by their normalized weights (these weights are 
normalized to a sum of unity). 
To understand the terminology of the symmetric model, let us assume that there are "n " 
viruses or diseases (parent nodes) with two states (present or absent) and each of them 
may cause the presence of fever (child node). Thus, P(Y = Present I Xl = Present) = 
P(A1) stands for the probability that the effect "Y" will occur, given that only one 
cause "X! " is present and all other causes are absent (i. e. the probability of presence of 
the fever given that the first virus is present). P(Y = Present I X = Present) = P(A) 
stands for the probability that the effect "Y" will occur, given that only one cause "X" 
is present and all other causes are absent (i. e. the probability of presence of the fever 
given that the n`h virus is present). Based on the "Noisy-Or" methodology, let us assume 
that in a room which has been occupied by one person, two viruses are present. The 
probability of presence of fever by the presence of first and the second virus are 
estimated as 80% and 79% respectively. Based on Equation 4.7 (if the A, and A2 are 
independent, then (P(Al u A2) = 0.8 + 0.79 - 0.8 x 0.79 = 0.958) by presence of both 
136 
viruses the likelihood of presence of fever is estimated as 95.8%. By increasing the 
number of viruses the likelihood of the presence of fever will be increased. For instance, 
if the probability of the presence of fever by presence of a third virus is estimated as 
85%, then based on Equation 4.14 by the presence of all three viruses the likelihood of 
presence of fever is estimated as 99%. Therefore, by increasing the number of viruses to 
"4,5,6,..., n" the value of P(Al v A2 u A3 U U. "u A) will eventually approach 100% 
or one. As it is obvious from this example A1, A2 and A3 are not disjoint. 
As mentioned earlier, in the symmetric model the expert's opinion is distributed by 
relative importance of each parent node for their associated child node (the normalised 
weights). Thus, in normalized space P(Y = Pr esent I X, = Present) = P(Ä1) stands for 
the relative importance of first parent node for its associated child node in absence of all 
other causes. In general: 
P(Y = Present 1 XI = Present) = P(Ä1) =n 
(AI ) 
Y, P(Am) 
m=1 
P(Y = Pr esent I X = Present) = P(An) = 
P(An) 
(4.21) 
n 
EP(Am) 
m=l 
P(A1)+P(A2)+P(A3)+... + p(Än) =1 
Based on the axioms of probability theory: 
P(Al vÄ2vÄ3U... uAn) 
=P(Ä1)+P(Ä2)+... P(An)-P(ÄjnÄ2)-P((Ä1 r)Ä2)-(A2 rA3))-... 
Owing to normalization and in normalized space Äl, Ä2, A3, '""& 
Ä remain disjoint: 
(P(Ä1 nÄ2) =P(Ä2 nÄ3) =""" =0) 
(4.22) 
P(Aý vA2 uA3 v"""uAn)=P(Aj)+P(A2)+P(Ä3)+"""+P(An) 
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Derived from the former example, the probability of presence of the fever by the first, 
second and third viruses in the normalized space can be calculated as follows: 
P(Ä1)= 
098 
=0.328, P(Ä2)=0.79_0.324 and P(Ä3)= 
0.85 
=0.348 2.44 2.44 2.44 
(P(AI uA2 LA3)=P(Ä1)+P(A2)+P(Ä3)=0.328+0.324+0.348=1) 
Thus, by presence of all the parent nodes the probability of the child's presence is equal 
to one and as a result of normalization the influences of all parent nodes remain disjoint. 
The kernel of the symmetric model can be described as follows: 
Firstly, to show the relative importance (influence) of each parent node for their 
associated child node an AHP methodology as explained in Section 3.9.4 can be used. 
In the normalized space, based on the influence of each parent node, the conditional 
probability of a binary child node Y given each binary parent node, X where r=1, 
2,..., n, can be estimated as follows: 
P(Y = Present 1 X, = Present) = to, 
P(Y = Pr esent 1X2 = Pr esent) = w2 
(4.23) 
P(Y = Present I X = Present) = rvn 
Emr 
r=l 
Based on Equation 4.22 in the situation of the symmetry approach (i. e. normalized 
space) the probability of a binary node "Y" conditional upon "n " binary parent nodes, 
Xr, where r=1,2,... ' n, can 
be estimated as follows: 
n 
NYI XI, XZ...... Xn)= Y- &r 
r=1 
{wr = wr If the state of the "rth parent node is identical to the state of its child 
{&r =0 If the state of the "rth parent node" is different from the state of its child 
(4.24) 
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Thus, based on Equation 4.24, the following can be obtained: 
P(Y = Present 1 X1, X2,..., Xn = Absent) =0 
P(Y = Absent 1 XI, X2,..., X = Absent) =1 
P(Y = Pr esent 1 X X2,..., X = Present) =1 
P(Y = Absent I Xj, X2,..., X =Present) =0 
To compare the results obtained by evaluating a CPT based on synthesising the "Noisy- 
Or" methodology and expert's judgement (Section 4.3.2, Figure 4.3 and Table 4.2) and 
results which will be obtained by evaluating a CPT based on synthesising the 
"symmetric" methodology and expert's judgement the illustrated example that 
presented in Section 4.3.2 (Figure 4.3) is recalculated using the symmetric 
methodology. Accordingly, the values of wj, o)2 and o)3 can be estimated as follows: 
01 = 
Qj 0.9 0.43, w2 = 
0.8 
0.38 
1+23 00.9+0.8+0.4 0.9+0.8+0.4 
_ 
0.4 
-w3 0.9+0.8+0.4 
0.19 
Based on Equation 4.24 the CPT, as shown in Table 4.3, can be quantified. 
Table 4.3: Conditional Probability Table (Symmetric model) 
Malaria P Malaria A 
Flu P Flu (A) Flu (P) Flu (A) 
Cold P Cold (A) Cold P Cold (A) Cold P Cold A Cold P Cold (A) 
(Fever) 1 0.81 0.62 0.43 0.57 0.38 0.19 0 
SZ Fever 0 0.19 0.38 0.57 0.43 0.62 0.81 1 
where, 
S2 (Fever) =P (Fever=Present) Malaria, Flu, cold) 
C2 (- Fever) =P (Fever=Absent] Malaria, Flu, cold) 
Based on the Bayes chain rule the marginal probabilities of the presence and absence of 
fever can be calculated as follows: 
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P(Fever = Present) = 0.5 
P(Fever = Absent) = 0.5 
It is noteworthy to mention that the above calculation is true not only for the concerned 
scenario but also for any number of parent nodes. In general as mentioned early, if 
someone is uncertain about the existence and non-existence of a child's parents, he/she 
should remain uncertain about the existence and non-existence of their child. However, 
the most important use of BNs is in revising probabilities in the light of actual 
observation of events. 
The objective of using BNs is to make the right decision depending on the 
corresponding posterior probabilities, which can also be explained as the interference of 
an unobservable situation using observable reality. The state of a variable is assumed to 
be known with certainty often termed as an instantiation of the variable. Prior to 
instantiation, the propagation process yields the marginal distributions (pre-posterior 
analysis), whereas the query posterior probabilities are calculated with the instantiation 
of evidence. With diagnosis interference which is typical in medical and industrial 
applications, one may use evidence of an effect to infer the most likely cause. 
Assume that the presence of fever is known with 100% certainty (i. e. instantiation of 
fever), by using the Hugin software the posterior probabilities of malaria, flu and cold 
by the "symmetric" and "Noisy-Or" methodologies, as shown in Figure 4.4, can be 
estimated. Based on Figure 4.4, the posterior probabilities of presence of malaria, flu 
and cold by the symmetric model are estimated as 71.5%, 69% and 59.5% respectively 
while the posterior probabilities of presence of malaria, flu and cold by the Noisy-Or 
model are estimated as 64.67%, 61.96% and 54.48% respectively. However, the values 
are different but the ratios are more or less identical. 
71.5ý 
~ 
64.67ý1.04 
69 61.96 
71.5 64.671 2 
59.5 54.48 
69 61.96X1.14 
59.5 54.48 
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Figure 4.4: Symmetric Model versus Noisy-Or Model 
It is noteworthy to mention that whatever the form of interference is utilised, the output 
for the hypothesis or query variable is a probability distribution representing the degrees 
of belief in each state rather than a simple scalar or vector. 
4.4. Methodology 
For conducting the research, a combination of different decision making techniques 
such as fuzzy logic and BN can be used. Fuzzy logic and its mathematical backgrounds 
were presented in Chapter 2. The methodology in stepwise orders is described as 
follows: 
Firstly, for evaluating the seafarer's reliability based on the ergonomics model (Chapter 
3), literature reviews (Chapter 3), historical failure data and statistical analysis (Chapter 
2), all the root causes that are not directly influenced by any other variables are found. 
All the root causes are then assigned a node each. As a result the nodes associated with 
the root causes at the first stage can be defined as level-I nodes (or root nodes) at the 
first stage. The nodes associated with the root causes at the second stage can be defined 
as level-1 nodes (or root nodes) at the second stage. In similar approach, such a 
definition can be conducted at higher stages. 
Secondly, all the variables that are directly influenced by the level-I nodes at the first 
stage can be discovered and the nodes associated with them can be defined as level-2 
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nodes at the second stage. A given node at level-2 has as its parents all those nodes in 
level-1 that directly influence this particular node. A given node at level-3 has as its 
parents all those nodes in level-2 and level-1 (if any) that directly influence this 
particular node. In general a given node at "level- (r)", where r=2,..., n, has as its 
parents all those nodes in "level- (r -1) ", "level- (r -2) ", "level- 
(r 
- 3) ",..... and 
"level-1" that directly influence this particular node. This hierarchical process continues 
until all the variables have a place in the graph and all the parent-child links are 
accounted by the edge of the graph (Table 4.4 and Figure 4.5). 
Thirdly, assessment grades are assigned to all the level-1 nodes in the graph. Those 
assessment grades could be either qualitative or quantitative. 
Fourthly, each level-1 quantitative criterion is transformed to a qualitative criterion by 
using a membership function of continuous fuzzy sets (Section 3.9.2). 
Fifthly, to have all the data and information on the same universe (i. e. goal's universe) a 
fuzzy rule base is developed to demonstrate the mapping process (Section 3.9.3). By 
formulating a mapping process, each level-1 qualitative criterion at the ith stage is 
converted into an associated level-2 qualitative criterion at the (i+])"' stage. Then the 
result is converted by another mapping process into an associated level-3 qualitative 
criterion (if any) at the 0+2)`h stage. The mapping process continues up to the goal's 
stage (leaf node). The concept of expected utility (Section 3.9.6) is then used to obtain a 
single crisp value which presents the unconditional prior probability of the concerned 
node in level-1. 
Sixthly, to obtain the relative importance (influence) of each parent node for its 
associated child node an AHP methodology is used (Section 3.9.4). 
Seventhly, the strength of direct dependence of each child node to its associated parents 
is quantified by assigning each child node a conditional probability table (CPT) by 
using the "symmetric model". 
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Finally, the sensitivity of the FBN model will be analysed. 
Table 4.4: Table of Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Description 
CL Communication and Language skills 
CTR Controls 
DH Design & Habitability 
DL Design & Layout 
DM Decision Making 
DP Displays 
ES Environmental States 
EXP Experience 
FS Fitness & Strength 
HF Human Fatigue 
ICDA Integration of Controls, Displays and Alarms 
LA Labelling 
MV Manual Valve 
NTS Non-Technical Skills 
U Qualification 
RH Rest Hours 
SA Situation Awareness 
ST Specific Training 
TP Technical Proficiency 
TW Teamwork 
VDU Video Display Unit & Workstation 
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Figure 4.5: Generic Model for Seafarers' Reliability 
144 
4.4.1 Directional Separation 
Using the concept of d-separation to check the network built in Figure 4.5, it is 
necessary to investigate one node after another starting from the level-1 nodes. Having 
given an example to demonstrate the practical usage of the concept in checking the 
accuracy of the network in the methodology, each node with its links in Figure 4.5 is 
carefully analysed. For example, if the node "technical proficiency" is given evidence, 
then the change of the probability distribution of the node "qualification" will affect the 
nodes "experience" and "specific training". Thus, it is aligned with the concept of d- 
separation discussed in Section 4.2.6. Such analysis is carried out smoothly for the 
complete network and the accuracy of the model is acknowledged. 
4.4.2. Significant and Insignificant Root Nodes 
For constructing a directed graph and to avoid unnecessary extension of the graph's 
size, firstly the importance of each root node to its associated child node has to be 
revealed. For revealing the significant and insignificant root nodes, they have to be 
transformed into the same universe such that experts are able to distribute the weights 
among them. The relative importance of each parent node for its associated child node 
may be revealed by their weights and accordingly those nodes with relatively less 
weight may be eliminated from the graph. 
To understand this computational saving, let us assume that a network which indicates 
the likelihood of a human fatality for the entry into an enclosed space is constructed. 
Based on the experts' judgement the root nodes are air, food and water. However, a 
human probably would die after 10 minutes without air, 24 hours (1440 minutes) 
without water and 7 days (10080 minutes) without food. Thus, by transforming all the 
root nodes to the same universe (1 minute) and normalizing the result to a sum of unity, 
the relative importance of air, water and food to their associated child node (human 
fatality) is calculated as: Air (0.992), Water (0.007) and Food (0.001). Therefore for 
entry into an enclosed space the significant root node is the air (i. e. before entry the 
percentage of oxygen has to be checked) and the other two nodes are comparatively 
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insignificant (i. e. may be eliminated from the graph). 
4.4.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
The objective of sensitivity analysis is to test the sensitivity of a FBN model output to 
the slight probability variation of the input nodes. If the model reflects the realistic 
situation, then an increment/decrement in the rate or probability at which any of its 
input nodes may occur would certainly result in the effect of a relative increment/ 
decrement in the rate or probability of occurrence of its output node. If the methodology 
is sound and its inference reasoning is logical, then the sensitivity analysis must at least 
pursue the following three axioms: 
Axiom 1: A slight increment / decrement in the rate or probability of occurrence of an 
input variable should certainly result a relative increment / decrement of the model 
output. 
Axiom 2: If the rate or probability of occurrence of an input variable is decreased by 
"1%" and "J%" (J < I) respectively and accordingly the rate or probability of 
occurrence of the model output is evaluated as PI and Pj respectively, then Pj should 
be greater than PI . 
Axiom 3: If "N" and "K" (K < N) input variables from all the input variables are 
selected and the rate or probability of occurrence of each of "N" and "K" input 
variables is decreased by the same percentage (e. g. "I % ") and accordingly the rate or 
probability of occurrence of the model output is evaluated as PK and PN respectively, 
then PK should be greater than PN. 
4.5. Test Case 
For calculation of percentage error between the results obtained by the FER (Fuzzy 
Evidential Reasoning) methodology and by a FBN methodology, the identical test case 
illustrated in Section 3.10 is reused here. 
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4.5.1. Third Officer's Reliability Modelling (Steps 1,2 and 3) 
Based on the generic model for the seafarers' reliability (Figure 4.5) and available 
information (Section 3.10.1) a specific model for the Third Officer's reliability can be 
constructed (Figure 4.6). It is noteworthy to mention that in the specific model (Figure 
4.6) for ease of calculation and due to available information DH (design and 
habitability), ES (environmental states) and DL (design and layout) are represented as a 
root node. Assessment grades are assigned to all the criteria in the hierarchical structure 
and the quantitative and qualitative criteria are segregated (Tables 3.4-3.5). 
Figure 4.6: Specific Model for the Third officer's Reliability 
4.5.2. Quantitative Data Transformation (Step 4) 
Each level-1 (root node) quantitative criterion (i. e. Environmental states, Experience, 
Age and Rest hours) is transformed to a qualitative criterion by using a membership 
function of continuous fuzzy sets (Sections 3.9.2 and 3.10.3). 
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4.5.3. Mapping Process 
As discussed previously in Section 3.9.3, the mapping process can be used for 
transforming the lower level qualitative criterion into the upper level criterion. By 
formulating a mapping process, each level-1 qualitative criterion at the i'h stage can be 
converted into an associated level-2 qualitative criterion at the (i+1)`h stage and the 
result can be converted by another mapping process into an associated level-3 
qualitative criterion (if any) at the (i+2)`h stage. The mapping process continues up to 
the goal's stage (leaf node). The mathematical equation which governs the two 
consecutive mapping processes can be written as follows: 
SS 
gm= E liPip Ißm2 
j=1 i=1 
(4.25) 
where gm represents the fuzzy output (the result), l' highlights the fuzzy input of a root 
node and ß; '1 & Bý '2 stand respectively for the belief degrees that are distributed in the 
first and second mapping processes by experts for indicating the relationship between 
linguistic variables of different levels. 
4.5.3.1. Unconditional Prior Probability of Root Nodes (Step 5) 
Based on the previous discussions (Sections 3.4.1 and 3.10.3) the Third Officer's 
qualification fuzzy set (fuzzy input) was assessed as follows: 
{(Excellent, 0), (Very good, 0), (Good, 0.2), (Average, 0.8), (Low, 0)) 
Based on Figures 3.9 and 3.12 the belief degrees in the first and second mapping 
processes, as shown in Table 4.5, are distributed by the experts. Based on Equation 4.25 
the fuzzy output (at goal's universe) for the Third Officer's qualification, as shown in 
Table 4.5, is calculated as follows: 
QG= 
{(High, 0.004), (Fairly High, 0.05), (Medium, 0.434), (Fairly Low, 0.512), (Low, 0)) 
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To obtain a single crisp number for the Third Officer's qualification (at the goal's 
universe) which represents the unconditional prior probability of the Third Officer's 
qualification, the utility value of QG must be calculated. Based on Equations 3.14-3.19, 
as discussed previously in Sections 3.9.6 and 3.10.11, the utility value can be calculated. 
The corresponding utility value (0.3865) indicates that the Third Officer's qualification 
is 38.65% reliable and accordingly 61.35% unreliable compared to an ideal seafarer. 
Using the same technique, the unconditional prior probabilities of the root nodes can be 
evaluated. For detailed calculations refer to Appendix 3. 
Table 4.5: Unconditional Prior Probability of the Third Officer's Qualification 
Fuzzy Input 1 1 1 14 1 
0 0 0.2 0.8 0 
Belief ß11, 
l ß2,1 ß2, l ß3, l ß3,1 ß4, l ßß, l ß5, l 
degrees in 1 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8 1 
First mapping 
Belief ß11'2 
2'2 2,2 ß3.2 ß3,2 ß3.2 ß44,2 ßi, 2 
degrees in 1 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8 1 
Second 
mapping 
Result g 9 S S 
0.004 0.05 0.434 0.512 0 
Unconditional 0.3865 
Prior 
Probability 
4.5.4. Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) Methodology (Step 6) 
The relative importance (influence) of each parent node for its associated child node is 
revealed by an AHP methodology. The AHP methodology and its mathematical 
backgrounds were presented in Section 3.9.4. The obtained results (Section 3.10.4) are 
shown in Table 4.7. 
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4.5.5. Conditional Probability Table (Step 7) 
The strength of direct dependence of each child node to its associated parents is 
quantified by assigning each child node a conditional probability table (CPT). By using 
the "symmetric model" and based on Equation 4.24 a CPT for each child node can be 
quantified. For instance, based on Table 4.7 (normalized weight) and Equation 4.24 the 
CPT for Technical proficiency is constructed as follows: 
Table 4.6: CPT for Technical Proficiency 
QU(R) U rR 
EXP R EXP -R EXP EXP -R 
ST(R) ST -R ST(R) ST (-R) ST(R) ST (-R) ST ST (-R) 
c2 P 1 0.7116 0.6592 0.3708 0.6292 0.3408 0.2884 0 
SZ -' TP 0 0.2884 0.3408 0.6292 0.3708 0.6592 0.7116 1 
where "R" and "rR" stand for reliable and unreliable respectively, 
c (TP) =P (TP = Reliable I QU, EXP, ST) 
CZ (- TP) =P (TP = Unreliable I QU, EXP, ST) 
4.5.6. Comparison of Results (FBN versus FER) 
Based on available information (Section 3.10.1) and by means of the subsequent six 
steps, the unconditional probabilities of all root nodes and their corresponding weights, 
as shown in Table 4.7, are evaluated. A CPT for each child node can be quantified via 
step 7. Accordingly by exploiting the Hugin software the marginal probability of the 
Third officer's reliability, as shown in Figure 4.7, is evaluated as 0.7231 (i. e. 72.31% 
reliable). The result was evaluated by the E'ER (Section 3.10.11, Table 3.15) as 0.7493 
(i. e. 74.93% reliable). 
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Table 4.7: Unconditional Prior Probabilities of Root Nodes 
Unconditional Prior Probability of Root Relative 
Child Node Root Node Node importance of each 
Description Description Reliable Unreliable parent nodes for 
(Normalized their associated 
Weight) child node 
(Normalized 
Weight) 
Technical Qualification 0.3865 0.6135 0.3708 
Proficiency Experience 0.363 0.637 0.3408 
(6) Specific Training 0.796 0.204 0.2884 
Human Fatigue Environmental States 0.64 0.36 0.288 
(6) Design & 0.84 0.16 0.2629 
Habitability 
Rest Hours 1 0 0.4491 
Fitness & Nutrition 0.276 0.724 0.1518 
Strength Age 0.88 0.12 0.1479 
(6) Stress 0.88 0.12 0.3798 
Health 0.94 0.06 0.3205 
Non-Technical Communication and 0.44 0.56 0.25 
skill language skills 
(6) Decision making 0.44 0.56 0.25 
Teamwork 0.84 0.16 0.25 
Situation awareness 0.84 0.16 0.25 
Goal (Third Motivation 0.5975 0.4025 (6 ) 
Officer's Design & Layout 1 
10- 
(1 ) 
6 
Reliabili 
The percentage error between the results obtained by FER and FBN can be calculated as 
follows: 
d_ 
(RFER - RFBN) 
x 100 (4.26) RFER 
where, d stands for percentage error, RFER and RFBN stand for the results that is 
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obtained by FER and FBN respectively. 
d_ 
(0.7493-0.7231)x100 
3.5% 
0.7493 
No- 
wnL Vy EXP x, 31 RELIABLE 
ýrr 27.69 UNRELIABLE TP 36.30 RELIABLE 
reliable 
- 49.82 RELIABLE 
-63.70 UNRELIABLE 
\`ý 
- 50.18 UNRELIABLE QU ri 0,00 unrebabe 1l -\ý 38.65 RELIABLE 
motivation 
59,75 RELIABILITY 
40.25 UNRELIABILITY 
FS 
X1.17 RELIABLE 
25.83 UNRELIABLE 
HEALTH 
RELIABLE 
6.00 LINRELIAE 
AGE N 
mä0 RELIABLE 
1 12,00 UNRELIABLE 
61.35 UNRELIABLE 
\ßü2 RELIABLE 
  14.38 UNRELIABLE ST 
x. 60 RELIABLE 
m 20.40 UNRELIABLE 
ES m 
NTS X64,00 RELIABLE 
ý 64 00 RELIABLE 36.00 UNRELIABLE 
36.00 UNRELIABLE 
RH 17 
RELIABLE 
0.00 UNRELIABLE 
DH 
X00 RELIABLE 
  16.00 UNRELIABLE 
SA 
X00 RELIABLE 
  16.00 UNRELIABLE 
6d 1 CL ABLE e 44.00 RELIABLE 
1[ABLE ®56.00 UNRELIABLE 
NUTRITION m X00 RELIABLE 44.00 RELIABLE 
27.60 RELIABLE 
" 16.00 UNRELIABLE 56.00 RELIABLE 
X2.40 UNRELIABLE 
Figure 4.7: Evaluation of the Third Officer's Reliability 
The following further studies are conducted for the calculation of the percentage error 
between the results obtained using the two developed methodologies (i. e. FER versus 
FBN): 
Firstly, the Third Officer's reliability value due to alteration of each of the following 
criteria's value as an independent variable is evaluated by the FER methodology. 
" 100% Low technical proficiency. 
0.00 UNRELIABLE 
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" 100% Very high human fatigue. 
" 100% Low non-technical skill. 
" 100% Very low fitness and strength. 
" 100% Very low motivation. 
" 100% Vey bad design & layout. 
" 100% Very low rest hours. 
" 100% Very bad design & habitability. 
Secondly, the posterior probability of the Third Officer's reliability by instantiation of 
each of the above variables to 100% unreliable is calculated by the FBN methodology. 
Finally, based on Equation 4.26 the percentage error can be calculated. 
By exploiting the two methodologies, as shown in Table 4.8, the results are obtained. 
By analysing the percentage error, as shown in Table 4.8, the maximum percentage 
error is 5.7% and accordingly the consistency of these two different methodologies can 
be confirmed. Alternatively a FBN methodology can provide an excellent way for 
communication and discussing dependence and independence relations among the 
problem-domain variables compared to the FER methodology. In other words a FBN 
model is capable of illustrating the dependency among the variables and the FER 
cannot. 
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Table 4.8: FER methodology versus FBN methodology (percentage error) 
Change of Event FER FBN Percentage 
error 
Third officer's reliability value (G) Third Third 0 
Officer's Officer's 
reliability reliability 
value value 
(Rr) 
{(High, 0.4378), (Fairly High, 0.1816), 
0.679 0.6402 5.7% 
100% Low (Medium, 0.2003), (Fairly Low, 0.0209), 
technical (Low, 0.1594)} 
proficiency 
100% Very high 
((High, 0.3253), (Fairly High, 0.1748), 
0.6035 0.5801 3.9% 
(Medium, 0.2516), (Fairly Low, 0.0852), 
human fatigue 
(Low, 0.1631)) 
{(High, 0.4205), (Fairly High, 0.1557), 
100% Low 0.6518 0.6165 5.4% 
(Medium, 0.1923), (Fairly Low, 0.0735), 
non-technical (Low, 0.158)) 
skill 
100% Very low 
{(High, 0.3486), (Fairly High, 0.1502), 
0.6129 0.5994 2.2% 
(Medium, 0.2627), (Fairly Low, 0.0805), 
fitness and 
(Low, 0.158)) 
strength 
100% Very low 
{(High, 0.4382), (Fairly High, 0.1736), 
0.66 0.6236 5.5% 
(Medium, 0.1404), (Fairly Low, 0.0862), 
motivation (Low, 0.1616)) 
100% Vey bad 
{(High, 0.2616), (Fairly High, 0.2164), 
0.5813 0.5561 4.3% 
(Medium, 0.2711), (Fairly Low, 0.0876), 
design and layout 
(Low, 0.1633)) 
100% Very low 
{(High, 0.3466), (Fairly High, 0.2160), 
0.6633 0.6474 2.5% 
(Medium, 0.2662), (Fairly Low, 0.0867), 
rest hours (Low, 0.0845)) 
100% Very bad 100% 
{(High, 0.4316), (Fairly High, 0.1820), 
0.719 0.6856 4.6% 
(Medium, 0.2606), (Fairly Low, 0.0849), 
design and 
(Low, 0.0409)) 
habitability 
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4.5.7. Sensitivity Analysis (Final Step) 
The sensitive analysis is used to test the logicality of the delivery of the analytical 
result. Three Axioms introduced in Section 4.4.2 are used. To carry out the research the 
reliability of all input variables (16 nodes) as shown in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 is decreased 
and increased by 5%, 10%, 15% and 20%. Accordingly the results (model output or 
goal) as shown in Tables 4.9 and 4.10 are obtained. Based on the obtained results 
(Tables 4.9 and 4.10) Figure 4.8 is drawn. All the results obtained keep harmony with 
Axioms 1 and 2. If the reliability of all input variables, as shown in Table 4.9, is 
decreased by 15% the rate or probability of occurrence of the model output (i. e. 
reliability of the Third Officer) is evaluated as "61.67% reliable" and "38.33% 
unreliable". By selection of ten input variables (i. e. Qualification, Experience, Specific 
Training, Environmental States, Design & Habitability, Rest Hours, Nutrition, Age, 
Stress and Health) from 16 input variables and by decreasing the reliability of those 
selected input variables (i. e. ten input variables) by 15% the rate or probability of 
occurrence of the model output (i. e. reliability of the Third Officer) is evaluated as 
"67.28% reliable" and "32.72% unreliable". In view of the fact that "61.67' is smaller 
than "62.78", the result is aligned with Axiom 3. 
Apart from the above, like all other models, FBNs can be over fit. To avoid such a 
problem, it is common practice to use a sensitivity test to measure the effect of one 
variable over another. Variables for which the model output is particularly insensitive 
should be removed in order to produce the most parsimonious model description. On 
the other hand given the same variation of input probabilities, comparing their influence 
magnitudes on the output node enables differentiating the importance of the input nodes 
in terms of the individual contribution to the output variable. Thus, the probability of 
occurrence (i. e. reliability) of an individual root node, which is at the same stage 
corresponding to other nodes, has been decreased by 20% while the probabilities of 
occurrence of all the other input nodes are left unchanged. The results (i. e. reliability of 
the Third officer) as shown in Table 4.11 are obtained. Based on the obtained results 
(Table 4.11) the sensitivity of the model output to the same variation of the each 
individual model input as illustrated in Figure 4.9 is assessed. Based on the analysis, as 
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shown in Table 4.11, the model is not over fit. From Figure 4.9 it is obvious that the 
model output is more sensitive to the rest hours than the other variables. As a result a 
FBN model (dependency network) which is capable of illustrating the dependency 
among the variables and by concentrating on rest hours has to be constructed. 
Table 4.9: Decrement of Root Nodes' Reliability 
Root Node Decrement of Reliability 
Description 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 
Reliability Unrctiabü RcUabiii UUMI"Olly &Habil Uwe i Itliabilitv UmIlability Rellabü0 Umbabilily 
Qualification 0.3865 0.6135 0.367 0.633 0.348 0.652 0.328 0.672 0.309 0.691 
Experience 0.363 0.637 0.345 0.655 0.327 0.673 0.308 0.692 0.290 0.71 
Specific 
Training 
0.796 0.204 0.756 0.244 0.716 0.284 0.676 0.324 0.637 0.363 
Environmental 
States 
0.64 0.36 0.608 0.392 0.576 0.424 0.544 0.456 0.512 0.488 
Design and 
Habitability 
0.84 0.16 0.798 0.202 0.756 0.244 0.714 0.286 0.672 0.328 
Rest Hours 1 0 0.95 0.05 0.9 0.1 0.85 0.15 0.8 0.2 
Nutrition 0.276 0.724 0.262 0.738 0.240 0.76 0.234 0.766 0.220 0.78 
Age 0.88 0.12 0.836 0.164 0.792 0.208 0.748 0.252 0.704 0.296 
Stress 0.88 0.12 0.836 0.164 0.792 0.208 0.748 0.252 0.704 0.296 
Health 0.94 0.06 0.893 0.107 0.846 0.154 0.799 0.201 0.752 0.248 
Communication 
and Language 
Skills 
0.44 0.56 0.418 0.582 0.396 0.604 0.374 0.626 0.352 0.648 
Decision 
Making 
0.44 0.56 0.418 0.582 0.396 0.604 0.374 0.626 0.352 0.648 
Teamwork 0.84 0.16 0.798 0202 0.756 0.244 0.714 0.286 0.672 0.328 
Situation 
Awareness 
0.84 0.16 0.798 0.202 0.756 0.244 0,714 0.286 0.672 0.328 
Motivation 0.5975 0.4025 0.567 0.433 0.537 0.463 0.508 0.492 0.478 0.522 
Design and 
Layout 
1 0 0.95 0.05 0.9 0.1 0.85 0.15 0.8 0.2 
Goal 
(Third officer's 
Reliability) 
0.7231 0.2769 0.6876 0.3124 0.6519 0.3418 0.6167 0.3833 0.5810 0.4190 
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Table 4.10: Increment of Root Nodes' Reliability 
Root Node Increment of Reliability 
Description 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 
ttdwnifi Unreftabdity Reliability UM&hu RRUUabil U-11Aü Reliability umetlabll Reu. nni Umtuba 
Qualification 0.3865 0.6135 0.405 0.595 0.425 0.575 0.444 0.556 0.464 0.536 
Experience 0.363 0.637 0.381 0.619 0.399 0.601 0.417 0.583 0.436 0.564 
Specific 
Training 
0.796 0.204 0.836 0.164 0.876 0.124 0.915 0.085 0.955 0.045 
Environmental 
States 
0.64 0.36 0.672 0.328 0.704 0.296 0.736 0.264 0.768 0.232 
Design and 
Habitability 
0.84 0.16 0.882 0.118 0.924 0.076 0.966 0.034 1 0 
Rest Hours 1 0 1 0 I 0 1 0 1 0 
Nutrition 0.276 0.724 0.289 0.711 0.303 0.697 0,317 0.683 0.331 0.669 
Age 0.88 0.12 0.924 0.076 0.968 0.032 1 0 1 0 
Stress 0.88 0.12 0.924 0.076 0.968 0.032 1 0 1 0 
Health 0.94 0.06 0.987 0.016 1 0 I 0 1 0 
Communication 
and Language 
Skills 
0.44 0.56 0.462 0.538 0.484 0.516 0.506 0.494 0.528 0.472 
Decision 
Making 
0.44 0.56 0.462 0.538 0.484 0.516 0.506 0.494 0.528 0.472 
Teamwork 0.84 0.16 0.882 0.118 0.924 0.076 0.966 0.034 1 0 
Situation 
Awareness 
0.84 0.16 0.882 0.118 0.924 0.076 0.966 0.034 1 0 
Motivation 0.5975 0.4025 0.627 0.373 0.657 0.343 0.687 0.313 0.717 0.283 
Design and 
Layout 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Goal 
(Third Officer's 
ReliabilitY) 
0.7231 0.2769 0.7527 0.2473 0.7676 0.2324 0.7878 0.2122 0.852 0.148 
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Table 4.11: Decrement of each Individual Root Node by 20% 
Root Node 
Description 
Decrement of reliability by 20% Goal 
Third Officer's Reliability) 
Reliable Unreliable Reliable Unreliable 
Qualification 0.309 0.691 0.718 0.282 
Experience 0.290 0.71 0.7189 0.2811 
Specific 
Training 
0.637 0.363 0.7152 0.2848 
Environmental 
States 
0.512 0.488 0.7169 0.2831 
Design and 
Habitability 
0.672 0.328 0.7154 0.2846 
Rest Hours 0.8 0.2 0.7078 0.2922 
Nutrition 0.220 0.78 0.7206 0.2794 
Age 0.704 0.296 0.7208 0.2792 
Stress 0.704 0.296 0.7137 0.2863 
Health 0.752 0.248 0.7152 0.2848 
Communication 
and Language 
Skills 
0.352 0.648 0.7192 0.2808 
Decision 
Making 
0.352 0.648 0.7192 0.2808 
Teamwork 0.672 0.328 0.7159 0.2841 
Situation 
Awareness 
0.672 0.328 0.7159 0.2841 
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Figure 4.9: Sensitivity of the Model Output to the Same Variation of each Model Input 
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4.6. Dependency Network 
As discussed previously in Section 4.5.7, the model output (i. e. the Third Officer's 
reliability) is more sensitive to the rest hours than the other variables. Based on the 
previous discussion (Section 3.3.2) the influence of a ship's design & habitability (e. g. 
if the grade of a ship's design & habitability is very bad, then due to noise and vibration, 
a seafarer will not be able to sleep appropriately) on a seafarer's hours of rest was 
revealed. Apart from that the influence of a seafarer's hours of sleep loss on his/her 
appetite, stress levels, health, situation awareness, teamwork, communication, and 
decision making was discussed in Section 3.5.2. Thus, to show the dependency between 
variables the specific model for the Third Officer's reliability (Figure 4.6) has to be 
modified (Figure 4.10). At this point it is noteworthy to mention that the influence 
magnitude of a ship with very bad design & habitability on a seafarer's hours of rest is 
difficult to predict; it can have zero to hundred percent influences at different occasions. 
On the other hand the influence magnitude of a seafarer's hours of sleep loss on his/her 
appetite, stress levels, health, situation awareness, teamwork, communication, and 
decision making is also difficult to predict; it can have zero to hundred percent 
influences at different occasions. Thus, to perform the research; The reliability value of 
the Third Officer, sailing on board a ship with "very bad design & habitability" that has 
zero to hundred percent influences on his hours of rest (sleep) with the following 
assumptions can be calculated : 
Acute sleep loss involves the total amount of sleep obtained in a 24-hour period. An 
average person that obtains only 5 hours of sleep one night has an acute sleep loss of 
3 hours (Rosekind et al., 1996). 
" Hours of his/her acute sleep loss (i. e. the number of hours he/she has slept less than 
8 hours in a 24-hour period) have equal influence magnitude on his/her appetite, 
stress levels, health, situation awareness, teamwork, communication, and decision 
making; it can have zero to hundred percent influences at different occasions. For 
instance if a person's hours of rest sailing on board a ship with "very bad design & 
habitability" falls from 8 hours in a 24-hour period (100% reliable) to 7.2 hours in. a 
24-hour period (90% reliable, 10% unreliable) and hours of his/her acute sleep loss 
have equal influence magnitude (e. g. 20%) on his/her appetite, stress levels, health, 
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situation awareness, teamwork, communication and decision making, then the 
reliability of his/her appetite, stress levels, health, situation awareness, teamwork, 
communication and decision making falls to 0.98 of their former reliability. 
Lack of sleep hours that occurs over several days builds into a cumulative sleep 
debt. An average person that obtains only 5 hours of sleep (i. e. each night) for 3 
consecutive nights has a cumulative sleep debt of 9 hours (Rosekind et al., 1996). 
" Generally, two nights of usual sleep, at a person's regular bedtime, can reduce the 
cumulative sleep debt to zero (Rosekind et al., 1996). 
Figure 4.10: Specific Model (Dependency Network) for Third Officer's Reliability 
Based on the above assumptions the Third Officer's reliability (i. e. Rr), as shown in 
Table 4.12, is evaluated. By further analysing the collected data it can be observed that 
the Third officer's reliability (i. e. based on Figure 4.7, which was calculated as 0.7231) 
has fallen to 0.6856 due to sailing on board a ship with "100% very bad design and 
habitability" (Table 4.8) and further decreased due to reduction of his rest hours. 
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Table 4.12: Calculation of Third Officer's Reliability 
The influence 
magnitude of a 
ship with very 
The influence magnitude of the Third Officer's hours of acute sleep loss on his appetite, 
stress levels, health, situation awareness, teamwork, communication, and decision 
making. 
bad design & 
habitability on 
the Third 
Officer's 
hours of sleep. 
00% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
0% 0.6856 0.6856 0.6856 0.6856 0.6856 0.6856 0.6856 0.6856 0.6856 0.6856 0.6856 
5% 0.6818 0.6808 0.6798 0.6787 0.6777 0.6767 0.6756 0.6745 0.6735 0.6724 0.6713 
10% 0.6780 0.6760 0.6740 0.6719 0.6698 0.6678 0.6656 0.6635 0.6614 0.6592 0.6570 
15% 0.6743 0.6712 0.6681 0.6651 0.6619 0.6589 0.6557 0.6525 0.6492 0.6460 0.6427 
20% 0.6705 0.6664 0.6623 0.6582 0.6541 0.6501 0.6457 0.6415 0.6371 0.6328 0.6283 
25% 0.6667 0.6616 0.6565 0.6514 0.6462 0.6412 0.6357 0.6304 0.6250 0.6196 0.6140 
30% 0.6629 0.6568 0.6507 0.6445 0.6383 0.6323 0.6257 0.6194 0.6129 0.6064 0.5997 
35% 0.6592 0.6520 0.6449 0.6377 0.6304 0.6234 0.6158 0.6084 0.6008 0.5932 0.5854 
40% 0.6554 0.6472 0.6391 0.6308 0.6226 0.6146 0.6058 0.5973 0.5887 0.5800 0.5711 
45% 0.6516 0.6425 0.6333 0.6240 0.6147 0.6057 0.5958 0.5863 0.5766 0.5668 0.5568 
50% 0.6478 0.6377 0.6274 0.6172 0.6068 0.5968 0.5859 0.5753 0.5645 0.5535 0.5425 
55% 0.6441 0.6329 0.6216 0.6103 0.5989 0.5879 0.5759 0.5642 0.5523 0.5403 0.5282 
60% 0.6403 0.6281 0.6158 0.6039 0.5911 0.5790 0.5659 0.5532 0.5402 0.5271 0.5139 
65% 0.6365 0.6233 0.6100 0.5966 0.5832 0.5702 0.5559 0.5422 0.5281 0.5139 0.4996 
70% 0.6328 0.6185 0.6042 0.5898 0.5753 0.5613 0.5460 0.5311 0.5160 0.5007 0.4853 
75% 0.6290 0.6137 0.5984 0.5829 0.5674 0.5524 0.5360 0.5201 0.5039 0.4875 0.4710 
80% 0.6252 0.6089 0.5925 0.5761 0.5595 0.5435 0.5260 0.5091 0.4918 0.4743 0.4566 
85% 0.6214 0.6041 0.5867 0.5693 0.5517 0.5346 0.5160 0.4980 0.4794 0.4611 0.4423 
90% 0.6177 0.5993 0.5809 0.5624 0.5438 0.5258 0.5061 0.4870 0.4675 0.4479 0.4280 
95% 0.6139 0.5945 0.5751 0.5556 0.5359 0.5169 0.4961 0.4760 0.4554 0.4347 0,4137 
100% 0.6101 0.5897 0.5693 0.5488 0.5280 0.5080 0.4861 0.4650 0.4433 0.4215 0.3994 
More concretely, based on the collected data in Table 4.12, the Third Officer's 
reliability value (i. e. R, -) can be linked to his reliability value on board a ship with "very 
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bad design and habitability" (i. e. 0.6856) and reduction of his reliability value due to 
reduction of his rest hours (i. e. Rs ). Accordingly the following formula can be written: 
RS = 0.6856 - Rr (4.27) 
Based on Equation 4.27, Table 4.13 which presents the reduction of the Third Officer's 
reliability value due to reduction of his rest hours is illustrated. 
Table 4.13: Reduction of Third Officer's Reliability Attributable to Acute Sleep Loss 
Percentage of sleep 
loss in a 24- hour 
period. 
The influence magnitude of the Third Officer's hours of acute sleep loss on his 
appetite, stress levels, health, situation awareness, teamwork, communication, and 
decision making. 
00% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5% 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.01 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.014 
10% 0.008 0.01 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.018 0.02 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.029 
15% 0.011 0.014 0.017 0.020 0.024 0.027 0.030 0.033 0.036 0.039 0.043 
20% 0.015 0.019 0.023 0.027 0.031 0.035 0.039 0.044 0.048 0.052 0.057 
25% 0.019 0.024 0.029 0.034 0.039 0.044 0.049 0.055 0.061 0.066 0.072 
30% 0.023 0.029 0.035 0.041 0.047 0.053 0.060 0.066 0.072 0.079 0.085 
35% 0A26 0.034 0.041 0.048 0.055 0.062 0.070 0.077 0.085 0.092 0.10 
40% 0.030 0.038 0.047 0.055 0.063 0.071 0.080 0.088 0.097 0.106 0.115 
45% 0.034 0.043 0.052 0.062 0.071 0.080 0.090 0.100 0.109 0.119 0.129 
50% 0.038 0.048 0.058 0.068 0.079 0.089 0.100 0.110 0.121 0.132 0.143 
55% 0.041 0.053 0.064 0.075 0.087 0.098 0.110 0.121 0.133 0.145 0.157 
60% 0.045 0.058 0.070 0.082 0.095 0.107 0.120 0.132 0.145 0.158 0.172 
65% 0.049 0.062 0.076 0.089 0.102 0.115 0.130 0.143 0.158 0.172 0.186 
70% 0.053 0.067 0.081 0.096 0.110 0.124 0.140 0.155 0.170 0.185 0.200 
75% 0.057 0.072 0.087 0.103 0.118 0.133 0.150 0.166 0.182 0.198 0.215 
80% 0.060 0.077 0.093 0.110 0.126 0.142 0.160 0.177 0.194 0.211 0.229 
85% 0.064 0.082 0.099 0.116 0.134 0.151 0.170 0.188 0.206 0.225 0.243 
90% 0.068 0.086 0.105 0.123 0.142 0.160 0.180 0.200 0.218 0.240 0.258 
95% 0.072 0.091 0.111 0.130 0.150 0.169 0.190 0.210 0.230 0.251 0.272 
100% 0.075 0.096 0.116 0.137 0.158 0.178 0.199 0.220 0.242 0.264 0.286 
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Based on Table 4.13 and by further scrutinizing the available data, an equation for 
reduction of the Third Officer's reliability due to his continuous hours of wakefulness, 
acute sleep loss and cumulative sleep debt, based on a regression principle, can be 
suggested as follows: 
Rs = 
At 
x (I+ 
k 
(4.28) 
100 4 
At =8xd -T (4.29) 
where k=0,1, ..., 
10 and "At" stands for cumulative sleep debt, "d" stands for the 
number of consecutive calendar days (i. e. 24-hour period) within the research period, 
"T" stands for hours of sleep obtained by a person within "d" consecutive calendar 
days. For instance, an average person that obtains only five hours of sleep in each night 
of three consecutive calendar days has a cumulative sleep debt of 9 hours 
(i. e. At =8x3 -15 =9). It is noteworthy to mention that "k =0" stand for the lower 
band and "k =10 " for the upper band of " RS ". 
Furthermore, by limiting the influence magnitude of the Third Officer's hours of acute 
sleep loss on his appetite, stress levels, health, situation awareness, teamwork, 
communication, and decision making a mathematical relationship between "k" and At, 
based on a regression principle, can be suggested as follows: 
a 
k=At+- (4.30) 
Equations 4.28 and 4.30 can be combined and an approximate equation for Rs is 
suggested as follows: 
n 
RS =-xt(AI)°' (4.31) 100 , _, m! 
where n=1,2,3 and "n =1 " stand for the lower band and "n =3" for the upper band 
of " RS ". 
164 
For instance, for 40% of sleep loss in a 24-hour period the calculation can be evaluated 
as follows: 
Hours of acute sleep loss = 0.4x8 = 3.2 hours in a 24-hour period. 
T= Hours of sleep = 8-3.2 = 4.8 hours. 
d= Number of consecutive calendar days within research period =1 
At=8x1-4.8=3.2 
Based on Equation 4.28 the lower and upper bands for Rs can be evaluated as follows: 
"k=0", Rs =100X12 = 0.032 and 
3 
"k=10", RS =1I x3.2x(1+14)=0.112. 
Based on Equation 4.31 (i. e. an approximate solution) the lower and upper bands for Rs 
can be evaluated as follows: 
n=1", Rs =100x1=0.032 and " 
32 
"n =3 "' Rs = 100 x[(31.2)' +(3.2 
2 
+(3.2 
)3 
0.059. 
J 
Based on the above calculation and as shown in Table 4.13 (i. e. bold type) the adjacent 
values to the above calculation for 40% of sleep loss in a 24-hour period can be 
estimated as 0.030 and 0.063 for the lower and upper bands of Rs. Based on Equations 
4.29 and 4.31 the lower and upper bands of R. for different percentages of sleep loss in 
a 24-hour period can be calculated. The adjacent values, as illustrated in Table 4.13, are 
shown in bold type. Therefore by exploiting Equation 4.31 the influence magnitude of 
the Third Officer's hours of acute sleep loss on his appetite, stress levels, health, 
situation awareness, teamwork, communication, and decision making is limited. For 
instance, as shown in Table 4.13, for 90% of sleep loss in a 24-hour period the upper 
band value is limited to 80%. If the reduction of the human reliability due to a person's 
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acute sleep loss follows the former assumption (i. e. hours of a person acute sleep loss 
have equal influence magnitude on his/her appetite, stress levels, health, situation 
awareness, teamwork, communication, and decision making), then Equation 4.31 can be 
suggested as a general equation. For validation of Equation 4.31 as a general equation 
for the reduction of the human reliability due to a person's continuous hours of 
wakefulness, acute sleep loss and cumulative sleep debt the following research is 
conducted. 
4.6.1. Lindbergh's Flight to Paris 
Charles Lindbergh undertook the first transatlantic flight in the Spirit of St. Louis in 
May 1927. The flight from New York (i. e. 7: 52 am, May 20) to Paris (i. e. 10: 22 pm, 
May 21) took over 33.5 hours (i. e. 5 hours time difference between Paris and New 
York) to complete (Lindbergh, 1927). It prevented Lindbergh from sleeping at least for 
35.5 hours (i. e. his sleep/wake histories before takeoff are unknown). It may be the first 
example of the effect of fatigue in aviation. On 21 " of May at 11: 00 AM when he was 
continuously awake for 27 hours (i. e. at least) the following is quoted (Lindbergh, 
1953): 
"The lack of sleep I feel now, at eleven o'clock in the morning, is a grain of sand 
compared to the mountain that will tower over me when dawn breaks tomorrow. Past 
dawns I have flown through come forward in memory to warn me what torture the 
desire for sleep can be. How wonderful it would be if this really was a dream, and I 
could lie down on a cloud's soft, fluffy quilt and sleep. I have never wanted anything so 
much. I would pay any price except life itself. But life itself is the price". 
Equation 4.31 is plotted, as shown in Figure 4.11, for a person with 100% initial 
reliability. Based on Figure 4.11 after 27 hours of continuous wakefulness, Lindbergh is 
with only 67.15% reliability. Based on the frame of reference (Figure 3.14), the grade of 
Lindbergh's performance after 27 hours of continuous wakefulness can be assessed as 
100% "Fairly Low" and by the time of landing as 100% Low (i. e. 51.21% reliable). 
The obtained result is fully supported with Lindbergh's autobiography. 
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Figure 4.11: Lindbergh's Reliability versus Continuous Hours of Wakefulness 
4.6.2. Guantanamo Bay Aviation Accident 
On the 18`x' August 1993 a Douglas DC-8 freighter crashed while landing at the US 
Naval Air Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) conducted the official investigation. It requested the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) fatigue countermeasures programme to assess the 
potential of fatigue in the accident. Based on the available data four physiological 
factors were identified as being present in the crew (Rosekind ef al., 1996): 
1. Acute sleep loss and cumulative sleep debt. 
2. Continuous hours of wakefulness. 
3. Time of day and circadian effects. 
4. Presence of sleep disorder. 
rH 
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Table 4.14: Crew's Cumulative Sleep Debt 
Crew Member Research Period "d" "At" 
Number of hours of sleep Cumulative sleep 
consecutive obtains by a debt 
calendar days person within "d" 
within research consecutive 
period calendar days 
Captain 65 hrs 2.7 15hrs 6.6 
First Officer 65 hrs 2.7 18hrs 3.6 
Second Officer 65 hrs 2.7 21 hrs 0.6 
Based on Figures 4.12 and 4.13, the following is obtained: 
1. After 8 hours of continuous sleep the Captain's reliability can be assumed as 100% 
reliable; since he was continuously awake for 9 hours, as shown in Figure 4.13 (i. e. 
data 1), his reliability falls to 94.58%. 
2. The Captain's reliability remains constant during his 2 hours sleep (i. e. 94.58% 
reliable); since he was continuously awake for 17.5 hours, as shown in Figure 4.13 
(i. e. data 2), his reliability falls to 79.31 %. 
3. The Captain's reliability remains constant during his 5 hours sleep (i. e. 79.31 % 
reliable); since he was continuously awake for 23.5 hours, as shown in Figure 4.13 
(i. e. data 3), his reliability falls to 53.76%. 
Based on the frame of reference (Figure 3.14), the grade of the Captain's performance 
prior to the accident (i. e. 53.76% reliable) can be assessed as 100% "Low" and 
accordingly the occurrence likelihood of an accident is "100% High". The obtained 
result is fully supported by the crash of Douglas DC-8 freighter due to the Captain's 
continuous hours of wakefulness, acute sleep loss and cumulative sleep debt. The frame 
of reference (Figure 3.14) and Equations 4.29 and 4.31 can be used to estimate the level 
of human performance so as to take appropriate preventative measures. 
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Figure 4.13: Captain's Reliability versus Continuous Hours of Wakefulness 
4.7. Results and Discussions 
Based on the guidelines which are followed by many shipping companies, the Third 
Officer conducts his duties (i. e. watch keeping in the bridge) from "08.00" up to 
"12.00" and from "20.00" up to "24.00". Based on the above information and Figure 
4.7, The Third Officer's reliability was evaluated as 72.31% reliable at "08.00". Based 
on Equation 4.31, as shown in Figure 4.14 (data 1), the Third Officer's reliability (i. e. if 
he has not taken any rests from 08.00 up to 20.00) due to continuous hours of 
wakefulness (i. e. continuous wakefulness for 12 hours) falls to 64.02% reliable. Based 
on the frame of reference (Figure 3.14) and Equation 3.20 the grade of the 'T'hird 
Officer's performance at "20.00" (i. e. 64.02% reliable) can be assessed as "20% Low" 
and "80% Fairly Low". Thus the occurrence likelihood of an accident can be estimated 
as "20% High" and "80% Fairly High". As discussed previously in Section 3.11.2 (i. e. 
control options), the Third Officer's reliability can be increased from 75% to 90% 
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(based on the FER methodology, Table 3.22) or from 72.31 % to 87.82% (based on the 
FBN methodology) by improving the quality of the ship's provisions, his motivation 
and non-technical skills. Thus, by improving the Third Officer's initial reliability from 
72.31% to 87.82% and based on Equation 4.31, as shown in Figure 4.14 (data 2), the 
Third Officer's reliability (i. e. if he has not taken any rests from 08.00 up to 20.00) due 
to continuous hours of wakefulness (i. e. continuous wakefulness for 12 hours) falls to 
79.52% reliable. Based on the frame of reference (Figure 3.14) the grade of the Third 
Officer's performance at 20.00 (i. e. 79.52% reliable) can be assessed as "100% 
Average". Thus the occurrence likelihood of an accident can be estimated as "100% 
Average". For further improving the Third Officer's reliability, 3 hours of sleep from 
13.00 up to 16.00 (i. e. Siesta), can be suggested. Based on Figure 4.14 (data 2) the Third 
Officer's reliability at "13.00" is estimated as 85.42%. The Third Officer's reliability 
remains constant during his 3 hours sleep from 13.00 up to 16.00. By putting the Third 
Officer's initial reliability as 85.42% at 13.00 up to 16.00 and based on Equation 4.31, 
as shown in Figure 4.14 (data 3), the Third Officer's reliability due to continuous hours 
of wakefulness (i. e. continuous wakefulness for 4 hours) falls to 83.56% reliable at 
20.00. Based on frame of reference (Figure 3.14) the grade of the Third Officer's 
performance at 20.00 (i. e. 83.56% reliable) can be assessed as "28.8% Average" and 
"71.2% Fairly High". Thus the occurrence likelihood of an accident can be estimated as 
"28.8% Average" and "71.2% Fairly Low". By improving the Third Officer's reliability 
owing to 3 hours of sleep (from 13.00 up to 16.00) the occurrence likelihood of an 
accident can be reduced from "100% Average" to 28.8% Average" and "71.2% Fairly 
Low". 
Evaluation of seafarers' performance can not only be used for developing a preventative 
measure against hazards but also against security incidents. It is noteworthy to mention 
that in order to identify and take preventive measures against security incidents in a port 
as well as at sea and for ensuring the performance of all ship security duties (i. e. 
controlling, monitoring and supervising), the grade of seafarers' performance is highly 
significant. Thus, by improving seafarers' reliability not only the occurrence likelihood 
of an accident can be reduced but also the grade of security can be enhanced. 
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Figure 4.14: Third Officer's Reliability versus Continuous Hours of Wakefulness 
4.8. Conclusion 
2 
Within the previous chapter and based on the detailed and comprehensive review of root 
causes for human error a generic model with a hierarchical structure for evaluating the 
seafarers' reliability, by using fuzzy logic and ER approach, was constructed and those 
significant criteria that are influencing the seafarers' reliability were found. 
Accordingly, control options to enhance seafarers' reliability were suggested. 
Within this chapter, firstly, the developed FER model in the previous chapter is 
converted to a FBN model to deal with the dependencies between criteria. Secondly, a 
new and novel approach to pre-processing of input data that allows the use of standard 
BN techniques and software tool for evaluating the seafarers' reliability is constructed. 
Thirdly, a symmetric model to enable the wider application of FBN in a generic mode is 
created. The model applies FBN construction to allow researchers to appreciate a novel 
attempt of unifying possibility and probability theories by introduction of the proposed 
FBN approach. The developed FBN methodology validated by confirming the 
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consistency of the results obtained by FER methodology and by the developed FBN 
methodology. By exploiting the developed FB N model, a general equation for the 
reduction of human reliability attributable to a person's continuous hours of 
wakefulness, acute sleep loss and cumulative sleep debt is formulated and tested. Based 
on the developed equation and a Third Officer sleep/wake timelines, it has been 
revealed that the Third Officer's performance at 20.00 hrs (i. e. Night Watch) owing to 
3 hours of sleep from 13.00 hrs to 16.00hrs can be improved from 100% Average to 
28.8% Average and 71.2% Fairly High. The analysis clearly indicates that the grade of a 
person's performance and the occurrence likelihood of an accident are inversely 
proportional (i. e. Guantanamo Bay Aviation Accident). Therefore, for developing a 
preventative measure against hazards and security incidents, seafarers' rest hours should 
be measured on ship owners' strategies. 
The container supply chain is a series network and for a series network the reliability of 
a system can be evaluated via evaluating the reliability of its component. Therefore, it is 
essential to develop a model for evaluating the reliability of the container supply chain 
via aggregating its components' reliability. The developed methodology within this 
chapter can be used as a tool for aggregating the reliability of the supply chain's 
components. Furthermore, the developed model for evaluating a seafarer's reliability 
can be used as a tool for calculating a containership's reliability. 
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Chapter Five 
Adopting Fuzzy Bayesian Network (FBN) Model for 
Evaluating a Container's Security Score 
Summary 
The aim of this study is to employ the set of data elements (i. e. importer security filling 
and shipping documents) that are provided electronically twenty four hours prior to a 
vessel loading to exploit a mathematical decision making model for evaluating a 
container's security score. This study makes full use of the Fuzzy Bayesian Network 
(FBN) advantages by exploiting a conceptual and sound methodology for evaluating a 
container's security score. 
5.1. Introduction 
Sea transportation plays a major role in most international trade and much of economic 
growth. More than 90 percent of international cargo moves through seaports, which 
have an approximately 99 percent contribution to the economy of the world (Branch, 
1996). Seaports around the world can be described as the kernel of commercial 
activities from which cities, national capitals, and thriving hinterland have emerged 
(Ramani, 1996). In so many countries, container transport, especially container sea 
transport, has become a widely used transport method of great importance. At the 
beginning of 2006, the world container port traffic totalled 336.1 million Twenty Feet 
Equivalent Units (TEUs) and the ports of developing countries and territories handled 
137.0 million TEUs, or 40.7% of the total (UNCTAD, 2006). Following the 9/11 
attacks, it was well established that sea transportation is vulnerable to a wide variety of 
crimes against persons or property; and it can be used as a channel for the movement of 
weapons of mass destruction, hostile operations, and various types of contraband by 
terrorists. Thus the IMO moved very quickly to circulate new international requirements 
to strengthen marine security. The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) 
code was adopted in December 2002 and entered into force worldwide on the first of 
July 2004 (IMO, 2003). The purpose of the code is to provide a standardised, consistent 
framework for evaluating risk, enabling governments to counteract changes in threat 
with changes in vulnerability for ships and port facilities (IMO, 2002). 
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5.2. Container Supply Chains 
A container supply chain (CSC) can be subdivided to two types of flow; the first one is 
called information flow and the other physical flow. A physical cargo flow means the 
physical movements of cargo from place to place and from mode to mode. 
CSC includes dozens of stakeholders who can physically come into contact with 
containers and their contents or are potentially related with the container trade and 
transportation. As shown in Figure 5.1, at the commencement of every container 
journey there is an originating shipper most often a manufacturer. There are hundreds of 
thousands of manufacturers around the world and many of them are active in 
international trade. These manufacturers may produce high enough volumes that they 
can ship full container loads (FCL) directly. In this case, the shipment is palletised 
and/or packed into a container within the manufacturing site and will be transported by 
road or rail either directly to a port, or to an intermediary's premises. Most of the 
manufacturers, however, produce less than full container load (LCL) shipments that 
must be consolidated before being shipped by sea. In this case, the shipment will be 
consolidated with others and transported to a multi-modal stacking area or to a port 
(OECD, 2003). Buying agents and/or freight forwarders serve as the most common 
intermediaries between originating shippers and ocean carriers. While many freight 
forwarders handle FCL shipments for their clients, their principal task turns the 
assembly and consolidation of LCL shipments into full containers. They also facilitate 
the entire international trade transaction by serving as agents with other transport 
intermediaries, the customs and other government agencies, banks and consignees. In 
some cases, the forwarders will negotiate each transaction on behalf of shippers while in 
other case the forwarders will be the principal agents contracting with the shippers. 
When forwarders offer multiple services in a logistics chain, other parties also offer 
these individually (i. e. customer brokers, truckers/rail carriers, warehouse agents, etc. ) 
(ibid). While in transit, the container may be stationary for various periods of time as 
trucks are stopped on the roadside and/or container-carrying trains are assembled in 
freight yards (ibid). Once in ports, the container is sent to a stacking area before it is 
placed immediately next to a vessel on the jetty. Even within the port area, a container 
175 
may be moved several times as required by port operators and/or the customs (ibid). 
After being placed on board, the container can be removed and transhipped through 
another port onto another vessel before arriving at its destination port. Here again, the 
container may be moved several times for customs clearance and temporary storage 
while waiting to be picked up and carried by road or rail to its final destination. The 
shipment may again transit several intermediaries' facilities where the container is 
unpacked and the palletised shipments it contains are distributed to the final consignees 
(ibid). 
Manufacturing I ýI Inland carrier. Container I Inland carrier. 
ý--ºý Port (loading). site. I II consolidation. 
Ocean Carrier. Port (discharging). Inland carrier. 
Container Inland carrier. daeonaolidation. 
Final destination. 
Figure 5.1: Container Supply Chain 
5.3. Security of Container Supply Chains 
Supply chain security has materialised as an area of vital importance for both the 
exporters and importers of the freight transportation system. This importance is in large 
part due to the economic importance of global international trade. Possible future 
terrorist attacks on the U. S, or any other global countries, may make use of the 
international and/or domestic freight transportation system, and such attacks may have 
devastating consequences in terms of fatalities and economic destruction (O'Hanlon et 
al., 2002). For instance, "the economic impact on U. S supply chains due to higher 
shipping costs, increased travel times, increased inventories, border delays, and other 
changes as a direct result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks is estimated to be $150 billion per 
year" (Bernasek, 2002). 
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Security-based disruptions can occur at various points along the supply chain. 
Containers are one of the major sources of security concerns and they have been used to 
smuggle illegal immigrants, weapons, and drugs. Recent events have created a 
fundamental shift in thinking regarding the types of threats that may affect supply chain 
systems. Supply chain and freight transportation security now typically refers to a state 
of protection against various terrorism threats, most notably the weapon of mass 
destruction (WMD) as the freight transport vehicle (e. g. container, ship, air-craft, train, 
truck). The consequences of the use of a WMD or discovery of such a device in a 
container can be serious. "Estimates suggest that a WMD explosion and the resulting 
port closure could cost $1 trillion, while a twelve-day closure following discovery of an 
un-detonated WMD could cost $58 billion" (O'Hanlon et al., 2002). Smuggling of 
terrorists and terrorist weapons using freight containers is another major threat. It is 
noteworthy to mention that security against terrorist threats, similar to security against 
narcotics smuggling or security against hazardous materials spills, is a public good in 
the parlance of economics. Market forces alone may not provide motivation for firms to 
protect themselves against supply chain terrorism threats. Since the likelihood is 
supposed to be very small and potential consequences are difficult to measure, firms are 
unlikely to bear protection costs. However, the potential societal impact of terrorist 
attacks to supply chains and/or the transportation infrastructure supporting supply 
chains is high, and therefore societies have begun to employ regulation, as revealed in 
Appendix 1, to ensure some degree of supply chain security (Savelsberg et al., 2004). 
5.4. Data Requirements for Container Supply Chains Security 
In addition to the 24-hour advance cargo rule (19 CFR 4.7(a)), as revealed in Appendix 
1, the Custom and Border Protection (CBP) proposed to require an additional set of data 
elements to be produced twenty four hours prior to vessel loading for maritime cargo 
destined to the U. S (CBP, 2009). The rules came into effect on 26th January 2009 and 
full enforcement took effect on 26th January 2010. Bases on the current rule, the 
importer is responsible for filling the first 10 data elements (i. e. importer security filling 
(ISF)) and the ocean carrier is responsible for filling the "plus 2" data elements. 
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The aim of this research is to employ (10+2) data elements and cargo manifest to 
exploit a model for measuring a container's security score (CSS). The accuracy of the 
security score depends on the degree of partnership with different parties which are 
involved in international exports and imports. A partnership with importers, exporters, 
shipper and carriers facilitates a reduction in risk because it will provide the information 
about who is moving goods and containers. The success of such a programme depends 
on the degree of confidence of a government in its partners. To overcome the mentioned 
deficiency, the best solution is to involve the classification societies on behalf of 
contracting governments to regularly evaluate and audit the companies and the 
commercial premises (e. g. manufacturing site, container stuffing locations, warehouses) 
from a security point of view. Thus by assistance of classification societies, security 
scores of manufacturing sites, container consolidation facilities and warehouses, as 
shown in Appendix 4, can be evaluated internationally. Accordingly for a decision 
making process the security scores as well as the names and addresses (i. e. ports, 
manufacturers, manufacturing sites, container consolidation centre, and warehouses) 
should be accessible internationally to administrators. 
Within this chapter it is assumed the commercial operators and premises (i. e. 
manufacturers, ports, consolidators, de-consolidators, and warehouses) are certified. 
Based on the basic physical security requirements and procedural security standards, as 
shown in Appendix 4, the security score can be evaluated and accordingly a certificate 
can be issued by the classification societies on behalf of governments. Furthermore, this 
certificate is only valuable if regular monitoring and auditing is carried out by an 
independent competent body such as a reputable classification society. 
The 10 data elements that are readily available in current logistics processes and have to 
be filled by an importer and methodologies for evaluating the reliability of different 
parties (e. g. manufacturer, exporter, importer, etc. ) are listed in the following sub- 
sections. 
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5.4.1. Manufacturer Name and Address 
The first data element that has to be filled by an importer is the name and address of the 
entity that last manufactures, produces, or grows the imported commodity (CBP, 2009). 
If the container is stuffed within the manufacturing site, then the manufacturing site is 
the primary point of vulnerability in CSCs where goods can be tampered with, or 
hazardous materials can be packaged and concealed as the product is being prepared for 
the shipment (Kumar and Verruso, 2008). The security measures (i. e. the basic physical 
security requirements and procedural security standards) that should be taken to reduce 
threats, as well as other illicit activity (e. g. smuggling, counterfeit goods) are listed in 
Appendix 4. Furthermore, if the manufacturer is the exporter of a shipment, then the 
manufacturer should be assessed for the export readiness. The methodologies for 
calculating the reliability of a manufacturer and its perimeter from security point of 
view are shown in Appendix 4. 
5.4.2. Exporter/ Consignor/ Seller Name and Address 
The second data element that has to be filled by an importer is the last named overseas 
sellers, consignors, or exporters addresses on the transaction invoice or purchase order 
(CBP, 2009). Based on Zakner and Belisa (2004)'s research a questionnaire to assess 
the exporter's reliability from business and security point of view, as shown in 
Appendix 4, is designed and adapted. 
5.4.3. Container Stuffing Location 
The third data element that has to be filled in by an importer is the physical overseas 
location (i. e. street, city, country) where the goods were stuffed into the container prior 
to the closing of the container (CBP, 2009). For a LCL shipment or if final packaging 
and consolidation is not performed in a factory or a manufacturer's perimeter, it will 
usually take place at a warehouse or a staging area. At this stage, illicit activity can 
occur while products are being consolidated into a large shipping load. Based on 
McNicholas (2008)'s research a questionnaire to assess the reliability of the container 
stuffing location from a security point of view, as shown in Appendix 4, is designed and 
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adapted. It is noteworthy to mention that, when a container is stuffed at more than one 
location and/or more than one container is on a single bill of lading, all of the stuffing 
location for the goods listed on a bill of lading must be provided (ISF, 2009). 
5.4.4. Ship to Name and Address 
The fourth data element that has to be filled in by an importer is the named party and the 
address on the transaction that will physically receive the merchandise, may be different 
from the consignee (e. g. de-consolidator, warehouse) (CBP, 2009). Based on 
McNicholas (2008)'s research a questionnaire to assess the reliability of a warehouse or 
de-consolidator's perimeter from a security point of view, as shown in Appendix 4, is 
designed and adapted. 
5.4.5. Commodity Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) Number 
The fifth data element that has to be filled in by an importer is the HTS number. HTS 
codes are the language of international trade and can be used to calculate and assess 
duties, taxes, determine import and export admissibility and conduct risk assessment 
and targeting. The first 6 digits are used universally and each country may then add to 
original six digits to suit its own tariff and statistical needs (Taxation and Customs 
union, 2009). For instance the HTS number for bearing housings, incorporating ball or 
roller bearings is 8483200000. 
5.4.6. Consignee Number 
The sixth data element that has to be filled in by an importer is the consignee number. 
The consignee number is the unique identifying number of the entity to which the goods 
are to be consigned (CBP, 2009). For the parties without the destination's country social 
security numbers in this instance, the passport number, country of issuance and date of 
birth is accepted. In practice most of bills of lading are consigned "to order" which 
means the importer can authorise someone to collect the goods. 
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5.4.7. Consolidator Name and Address 
If it is applicable, the seventh data element that has to be filled in by an importer is the 
name and address of the consolidator. The consolidator's address identifies the physical 
location of cargo, which may differ from the usual manufacturer or shipper premises 
(CBP, 2009). In other words the consolidator is the party who stuffs the container or 
arranges for the stuffing of the container. If the manufacturer is the party that stuffs the 
container or arranges for the container to be stuffed, then the manufacturer is the 
consolidator. 
5.4.8. Importer 
For custom purpose the party who makes (or on whose behalf an agent or a broker 
makes) the importer declaration, and who is liable for the payment of duties (if any) on 
the importer goods, is called the importer (ISF, 2009). Normally this party is named 
either as the consignee in the shipping document and/or as the buyer in the exporter's 
invoice. The eighth data element that has to be filled in by an importer is the last named 
buyer and addresses 24 hours prior to foreign loading (CBP, 2009). 
For custom purposes the entity responsible for the following is called the importer of 
record "IOW' (ISF, 2009): 
1. Ensuring the imported goods comply with local laws and regulations. 
2. Filling a completed duty and associated document. 
3. Paying the assessed import duties and other taxes on those goods. 
In most cases, the ultimate consignee and importer of record are one and the same 
However, in some cases the exporter's custom broker may be the importer of record and 
another party may be the ultimate consignee. The ninth data element that has to be filled 
in by an importer is the IOR number (CBP, 2009). For the parties without the 
destination's country social security numbers in this instance, the passport number, 
country of issuance and date of birth is accepted (ISF, 2009). 
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It is noteworthy to mention that, within this chapter the party causing the goods to enter 
the limit of a port and being ultimately responsible for the complete and timely filling of 
the ISF is called the importer. Based on the number of containers inspected, reviewed 
information about an importer's compliance with customs laws and regulations and 
violation history, the reliability of an importer can be measured as follows: 
" If an importer is importing to a concerned country for the first time, then due to 
uncertainty the prior reliability of the importer can be assigned as 50% reliable and 
50% unreliable (i. e. R p; m = 0.5). 
" If an importer is importing to a concerned country and no violation with customs 
laws and regulations, by means of scanning or screening of "N" consecutive 
containers, is observed, then the posterior reliability of an importer can be evaluated 
as follows: 
Rim = Reim +8 (5.1) 
Rim stands for posterior reliability of an importer, 8 stands for increment of 
reliability of an importer due to observation of no violation with customs laws and 
regulations through inspection or scanning of "N" consecutive containers, and R p; m 
stands for prior reliability of an importer. It is obvious that the maximum possible 
value for an importer's reliability is one (i. e. 100% reliable). Therefore if 8 
approaches to its maximum possible value, then Rim approaches to one. Based on 
Equation 5.1, the value of 8maxcan be evaluated as follows: 
8max =1- Reim (5.2) 
If "N" stands for the number of consecutive containers selected by an authorised 
group for inspection, then by selecting the value of "N" as high as possible and by 
observation of no violation with customs laws and regulations the degree of trust to 
a concerned importer may be maximised. Thus, a mathematical relationship (i. e. an 
exponential distribution) between 5 and N can be suggested as follows: 
1 d8 
__ 
1x 1 
(5.3) dN CN 
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C is a constant and based on the security requirement its value can be assigned by an 
authorised group (e. g. CBP). If the value of N within Equation 5.3 approaches to 
infinity, then the right hand side of the equation approaches to zero and accordingly 
8 approaches to its maximum value. Equation 5.3 can be integrated as follows: 
fdd =jx xdN 
(5.4) . 4) 
= 
Ln(N) 
+C C1 
CI is a constant and to avoid bias its value can be assigned as zero. To evaluate "N", 
let us assume "C=6" and prior reliability of an importer is 0.5. Based on Equations 
5.2 and 5.4 the values of 6.,. and "N" are evaluated as 0.5 and 20 respectively. 
Thus, the number of the consecutive containers for inspection should be selected by 
an authorised group is equal to 20. It is noteworthy to mention that for "C=10" the 
value of "N" is evaluated as 150. 
The possibility that a supposedly legitimate export and import company after a 
number of years problem free shipping, might attempt to smuggle the illicit material 
exists. To overcome this deficiency some containers may be randomly selected for 
inspection as follows: 
N+(n-1)xK<OSN+nxK 
1: 9 < 
M- N (5.5) 
K 
"M" stands for the total number of containers estimated to be imported 
weekly/monthly or annually by an importer to a concerned country, n is a natural 
number, 0 stands for a random container that may be selected for inspection, K is a 
constant and based on security level its value can be assigned by an authorised 
group, "(100/K) %" stands for the percentage of containers selected for random 
inspection. Assume "n=1, M=200, K=5 and N=20 ". Based on Equation 5.5, from 
21St to 25th container (if their security scores are within the acceptable limit), one 
container at random (e. g. 24th) may be selected for inspection. This procedure can 
continue for other values of n (i. e. n=2,3,4,5,..., 36). Thus, apart from N (i. e. the 
183 
number of consecutive containers selected by an authorised group for inspection), 
"(100/K) %" (i. e. 20% for K=S) of unexamined containers (M - N) should be 
inspected. 
Total number of containers should be selected for inspections =N+ 
MK N 
(5.6) 
If through inspection or scanning of many containers or examination of their ISF a 
violation with customs laws and regulations is observed, then the posterior 
reliability of an importer can be evaluated as follows: 
Rim = Reim -D (5.7) 
Rim 50 Rim =0 
Sl stands for decrement of reliability as a result of a non-compliance and its value 
can be evaluated by a fuzzy set of non-compliance (S) and by means of Equations 
3.14-3.19. The fuzzy set of non-compliance (. a) can be evaluated as follows: 
{l = {(ißj, High), (iß2, Fairlyhigh), (ß3, Medium), (ßß4, Firlylow), (P. 5, Low)} 
5 
ß(3i =1 (5.8) 
i=1 
CnQ14, = ß1(C+5)+ß2(C+4)+, ß3(C+3)+ß4(C+2)+/35(C+1) 
C,, , stands 
for new value of C due to a non-compliance, 3 1j, iß2, ß3, ß4 and QS 
stand for belief degrees. Let us assume "C=6" and prior reliability of an importer is 
0.5, based on Equations 5.1 and 5.4, by scanning of 10 consecutive containers and 
by observation of no violation with the customs laws and regulations the importer's 
reliability can be evaluated as 0.883. Based on Equations 5.7-5.8 and 3.14-3.19, if 
through the random inspection of the 11th container a noncompliance with customs 
laws and regulations is observed, by assuming the grade of the noncompliance as 
100% fairly low, the values of 0 and C1. can be evaluated as 0.25 and 8 
respectively. Accordingly the importer's reliability can be evaluated as 0.633 and 
based on Equations 5.2 and 5.4 the values of Smax and "N" are evaluated as 0.367 
and 19 respectively. Thus, due to a minor mistake the total number of consecutive 
containers selected for inspection is increased from 20 to 30 (i. e. 11+19). It is 
noteworthy to mention that, by assuming the grade of the noncompliance as 100% 
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high, the importer's reliability is evaluated as zero and the number of consecutive 
containers should be selected by an authorised group for inspection can be increased 
from 20 to 59874. 
5.4.9. Country of Origin 
The tenth data element that has to be filled in by an importer is the country of origin. 
Based on "CFR 19 102.11, Subpart B-rule of origin", the country of origin of a good is 
the country in which the good is wholly obtained or produced (CBP, 2009). Within this 
chapter the country of origin is the country in which the container supply chain is 
initiated (i. e. the good is produced, stuffed inside a container and sealed, stored in a 
warehouse, carried by an inland carrier and transported to a port). For measuring the 
reliability of a country the effect of environment on reliability of a country from a 
security point of view can be categorised as the political, economical, social and natural 
ones. Major and familiar environmental effects are listed as follows (CLSCM, 2003): 
" Socio-political reasons, such as wars, regulatory changes and protests. 
" Geo-political reasons, such as the disorganisation of country's union. 
9 Economical reasons, such as economic crisis, currency fluctuation and other cyclical 
downturns. 
. Natural reasons, such as earthquake, flood and diseases. 
For measuring the reliability of a country from an economical point of view the gross 
domestic product (GDP) can be assigned as a basic measure of a country's overall 
economic performance. GDP per capita may therefore be viewed as an approximate 
indicator of a nation's prosperity, while GDP per employed person can provide a 
general picture of a country's productivity (U. S Department of Labour, 2009). For 
measuring and comparing the reliability of different countries, GDPs must be converted 
to a common unit value. Purchasing power parities (PPPs) are currency conversion rates 
that allow GDPs to be expressed in a common unit value (U. S Department of Labour, 
2009): 
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"A PPP for a given country is a ratio, in which the numerator is the number of national 
currency units needed to purchase a basket of goods and services in that country and the 
dominator is the number of currency units needed to purchase a similar basket of goods 
and service in the base country (i. e. United State)". 
Based on the U. S Department of Labour (2009) report, as shown in Figure 5.2, the GDP 
per employed person for 17 countries converted to U. S dollars using PPPs is illustrated. 
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Figure 5.2: GDP per Employed Person, 2008 Converted to U. S dollars using 2008 PPPs 
[Source: U. S Department of Labour, 2009] 
Based on Figure 5.2 and from an economical point of view, by assigning the reliability 
of Norway as 100% reliable, the reliability of any other country from economical point 
of view (i. e. R 
c0) can be evaluated as follows: 
Rý"° 
GDP per Employed Person (5.9) eC 103.6 
For instance, the reliability of Spain from an economical point of view can be evaluated 
as 65.7% reliable. 
186 
5.4.10. Ocean or Sea Carriers 
In addition to the ten data elements outlined in Sub-Sections 5.4.1-5.4.9, ocean carriers 
should provide the following two additional data sets to complete the security filling 
(CBP, 2009): 
1. Vessel stow plans, consist of nine data elements (i. e. the vessel name, vessel 
operator, voyage number, container operator, equipment number, equipment size/ 
type, stow position, Hazmat-UN code, vessel location) concerning the vessel, the 
container, its contents and location on the vessel and load/discharge ports. 
2. Container status message, consist of five data elements (i. e. equipment number, 
event, event date and time, event location, vessel) detailing every action taken on a 
container during transport. 
Based on IMO (2003, codes 7.2 Part A and 9.27 Part B) for the security of a ship and its 
cargoes the following activities should be carried out: 
1. Ensuring the performance of all ship security duties. 
2. Controlling access to the ship. 
3. Controlling the embarkation of persons and their effects. 
4. Monitoring restricted areas to ensure that only authorised persons have access. 
5. Monitoring of deck area and area surrounding the ship. 
6. Supervising the handling of cargo and ship's stores. 
7. Ensuring the security communication is readily available. 
8. Routine checking of cargo, cargo transport units and cargo spaces prior to, and 
during cargo handling operations. 
9. Check to ensure that cargo being loaded matches the cargo documentation. 
10. Checking of seals or other methods used to prevent tampering. 
Containerships often stop at various seaports to discharge and load containers. 
Furthermore, the containership's transits through various routes and ports pose different 
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levels of security risk. Thus, if the above mentioned tasks are not performed 
successfully, for instance the containers are not routinely checked for seals or signs of 
tampering, the degree of risk will be increased. Therefore, the security of a container is 
directly proportional to the reliability of ocean or sea carriers. The four most important 
persons, who are dealing with the cargo as well as the security of a ship, are Master, 
Chief Officer, Second Officer and Third Officer. Accordingly, the reliability of an 
ocean carrier can be evaluated by aggregation of Master's, Chief Officer's, Second 
Officer's and Third Officer's reliability. The methodology for evaluating a seafarer's 
reliability was presented in Chapters 3 and 4. The fuzzy input sets for the assessment of 
seafarers' reliability can be filled through inspection and auditing of a port facility 
security officer (PFSO) and a port state control officer (PSCO). Accordingly for a 
decision making process the fuzzy input sets for the concerned ship should be accessible 
internationally to administrators. 
5.4.11. Inland Carriers 
Based on Figure 5.1, an inland carrier (e. g. truck) is a primary means for transporting 
cargo to and from ports. The large number of trucks at major container ports increases 
the probability of a terrorist attack. Based on Flynn and Kirkpatrick (2006)'s research 
the biggest security gap in the transportation system is due to the following essentials: 
1. Local truck drivers are poorly paid. 
2. There are no mandated standards for seal or locks on containers and criminals have 
long ago determined how to gain access to a container without even tampering with 
the seal. 
Furthermore, if a terrorist attempts to infiltrate a container the two most likely 
approaches are (Flynn et al., 2006): 
1. Individual terrorist to become truck drivers. 
2. A terrorist cell to set up its own shipping company. 
To overcome the above deficiencies, as will be shown in Figure 5.7, the following can 
be suggested: 
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1. A maritime worker's identification card for a truck driver, based on his back ground 
and history can be issued. 
2. A truck driver's photo, licence and identification card upon entry at port's entrance 
door should be scanned. 
3. Based on "a" value (i. e. a natural number greater than 2 and less than 187, assuming 
a driver does not visit a port more than once every day, which is designated by 
PFSO through consultancies with contracting government agencies) and the number 
of times a driver in the past entered the port within a six months period, his truck 
and the cargo (i. e. the container) may be selected for inspection. It is noteworthy to 
mention that due to security reasons, the procedure is to be initiated every six 
months. For instance, if a driver has entered the port for 120 times within the past 
six months, by termination of the six months period the number of times of his 
entrance should be automatically reset to zero. 
4. Based on licences numbers of those drivers previously entering the port within a six 
months period, some numbers at random will be selected for inspection on a daily 
basis. 
To appreciate the above security barriers, let us assume an importer imports M 
containers on a daily basis from "country A" to "country B" via sea. At "country A" the 
containers are palletised within the manufacturer's perimeter and are transported by 
road via M trucks to the port A. One of the drivers is working with a terrorist group and 
attempts to send an illicit material to country B by means of gaining access to the 
container without even tampering with the seal. Based on the value of "a" at day one 
and day two all the trucks and their containers will be inspected. On the third day and 
all other consecutive days based on Equations 5.1-5.6, after completion of scanning 
"N" consecutive containers, if every container's CSS is within the acceptable limit, 
"(100/K) %" of the reaming containers (i. e. M- N) at random will be scanned. 
Therefore the probability of his success (P(S)) on consecutive days can be evaluated 
as follows: 
P(S) z [1- 
KJx 
P(a) x P(ý) x P(CSS) (5.10) (K-1)x(M-N) 
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P(a) stands for probability that the value of "a" is smaller than the number of times a 
driver entered the port within six months period, P(ý) stands for the probability that a 
driver's licence number is not to be selected at random, P(CSS) stands for the 
probability that the CSS of the concerned container is within the acceptable limit. 
5.4.12. Port 
There are two types of threats related to ports (MIT, 2007): 
1. Direct attacks on the ports themselves. 
2. Transport of dangerous materials through ports for use in a terrorist plot elsewhere 
in a country. 
To avoid direct attacks on a port of destination via sea, the best proactive strategy is to 
measure a container's CSS prior to vessel loading at the loading port. If the CSS is 
lower than the requirements, the container should be screened at the loading or 
transitional port. Furthermore, the reliability of an ocean or sea carrier from a security 
point of view should be considered. To avoid the transport of illicit materials through a 
port, the terminal operators should routinely check containers for seals or signs of 
container tampering. Furthermore the inland carrier's security (i. e. Sub-Section 5.4.11) 
to be considered and the suspicious container should be targeted, scanned and inspected. 
Within a port the shipping containers may be at risk of tampering, especially if they 
must sit for extended periods of time before being staged and loaded onto a 
containership. As a result, the security of the shipping containers depends upon the 
reliability of a port. Based on McNicholas (2008)'s research a questionnaire to assess 
the reliability of a port from the security point of view, as shown in Appendix 4, is 
designed and adapted. 
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5.5. Methodology 
In order not to hamper the logistic process in an intolerable manner, the number of 
physical checks should be cautiously chosen. The percentage of inspections, as will be 
shown, may differ from port to port. However, experience has shown that even a limited 
percentage, coupled with a targeted approach based on risk analysis, can provide an 
acceptable security level (IAPH, 2002). Based on the CSS result, companies that do 
more to secure their supply chains, those that go above and beyond the minimal 
requirements, should be recognised. Accordingly those companies benefit from the 
increased supply chain security by realising more efficient supply chains, improved use 
of assets, reduced costs, revenue growth, and reduced pilferage. 
Based on ISF filling (i. e. information provided by an importer) and cargo manifest a 
mathematical decision making model for measuring of a container's CSS can be 
constructed. As a result, the information provided by an importer as well as an exporter 
has a significant influence on the model's accuracy. Therefore if an importer's 
reliability and an exporter's reliability are not 100% reliable, then the evaluated CSS 
may not be precise. As a result the first "if-then" rule is constructed as follows: 
" Rule one: If an importer's reliability and an exporter's reliability are calculated as 
100% reliable and CSS is evaluated as 75% reliable and above, then the concerned 
container may not be scanned or screened. 
Furthermore, most security experts think that, "if terrorists were to use a container, they 
would be involved in the container stuffing origin of the shipment, and almost certainly 
affix appropriate container seals or devices to the container" (Maritime Security Expo, 
2006). Thus the reliability of a country of origin and the reliability of those premises 
(i. e. loading ports, warehouses, container consolidation centre, etc. ) located within the 
country of origin are playing an important role in the security of supply chains. The 
reliability of a loading port, warehouse and container consolidation facility not only 
depends upon their physical and procedural security standards but also their locations 
(i. e. country of origin). The influence magnitude of a country of origin's reliability on 
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the reliability of a loading port, warehouse and container consolidation facility is 
difficult to predict; it can have zero to hundred percent influences at different occasions. 
As a result the second "if-then" rule is constructed as follows: 
" Rule two: If an assessor is uncertain about the reliability of a country of origin (i. e. 
50% reliable and 50% unreliable), then he/she should remain uncertain about 
reliability of loading ports, warehouses and container consolidations' perimeter 
located within that country. 
Based on the set of data elements (i. e. Importer Security Filling (ISF) and shipping 
documents) that are provided twenty four hours prior to a vessel loading, security scores 
of various commercial operators and premises (i. e. manufacturers, manufacturing sites, 
ports, warehouses, container consolidation and de-consolidation facilities) provided by 
classification societies through auditing, and ocean or sea carriers' reliability that can be 
computed by the assessments of PSCO and PFSO, the security score of a container can 
be evaluated by a FBN decision making technique. Based on the available data, as 
shown in Figure 5.3, all the root causes that are not directly influenced by any other 
variables are found. All the root causes are then assigned a node each. Furthermore all 
variables that are directly influenced by the root nodes are discovered. This hierarchical 
process continues until all variables have a place in the graph and all the parents-child 
links are accounted by the edge of the graph. The dependency among the variables (i. e. 
loading port, warehouse, container consolidation facility and country of origin) can be 
computed by means of Rule two. The FBN logic and its mathematical backgrounds 
were presented in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the network built in Figure 5.3 has been 
checked for concept of directional separation and it is aligned with the concept of d- 
separation as discussed in Section 4.2.6. The abbreviations in Figure 5.3 are shown in 
Table 5.1. 
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Figure 5.3: Generic Model for Evaluating the CSS 
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Table 5.1: Table of Abbreviations 
Abbreviation Description 
CO Country of Origin. 
MU Manufacturer. 
EXP Exporter. 
IM Importer. 
CC Container Consolidation centre. 
WH Warehouse. 
CdC Container de-Consolidation centre. 
LP Loading Port. 
TP Transitional Port. 
OC Ocean or Sea Carrier. 
DP Destination Port. 
CSS Container's Security Score. 
SO Second Officer. 
TO Third Officer. 
MU I or EXP 1 First Manufacturer or Exporter. 
MUn or EXPn n` Manufacturer or Exporter. 
Im l First Importer. 
IMn n` Importer. 
Cc l First Container Consolidation centre. 
CCn n Container Consolidation centre. 
WHI First Warehouse. 
WHn n Warehouse. 
CdC 1 First Container de-Consolidation centre. 
CdCn n' Container de-Consolidation centre. 
TP1 First Transitional Port. 
f n` Transitional Port. 
OC 1 First Ocean or sea carrier. 
OCn :: 
d 
n' Ocean or sea carriers. 
The methodology in stepwise orders is described as follows: 
Firstly, the container cargo's information and the manufacture's or the exporter's data, 
as shown in Figure 5.4, are investigated. If the ISF is accepted, then the manufacturer's 
or the exporter's reliability, as shown in Appendix 4, can be calculated. For a LCL 
shipment, the same calculation has to be carried out for each individual manufacturer or 
exporter. 
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Figure 5.4: An Outline of Security Procedure for Manufacturers or Exporters 
Secondly, the name and address of importer (buyer), importer of record and consignee, 
as shown in Figure 5.5, is investigated. If the ISF is accepted, as shown in Sub-Section 
5.4.8, the importer's reliability can be calculated. For a LCL/LCL shipment, the same 
calculation has to be carried out for each individual importer. 
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Figure 5.5: An Outline of Security Procedure for Importers 
Thirdly, the consolidator and the container stuffing location data, as shown in Figure 
5.6, are investigated. If the ISF is accepted, then the reliability of the container stuffing 
location or the manufacturer's perimeter, as shown in Appendix 4, can be calculated. 
For a shipment that has been stuffed in multiple locations, the same calculation has to 
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be carried out for each individual stuffing location. 
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Figure 5.6: An Outline of Security Procedure for Container Consolidation Facility 
Fourthly, the container and its seal, as shown in Figure 5.7, are investigated by an 
authorised person at the loading port. If the container and its seal are secured, then the 
reliability of the loading port, as shown in Appendix 4, can be calculated. If the same 
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container is discharged and transhipped through another port onto another vessel before 
arriving at its destination port, the same calculation has to be carried out for each 
individual transitional port. 
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Figure 5.7: An Outline of Security Procedure for Ports 
Fifthly, the container and its seal, as shown in Figure 5.8, are investigated by the Chief 
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Officer or an authorised person. If the container and its seal are secured, then the 
reliability of the ocean (or sea) carrier, as shown in Sub-Section 5.4.10, can be 
calculated. If the same container is discharged and transhipped through another port 
onto another vessel before arriving at its destination port, the same calculation has to be 
carried out for each individual carrier. 
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Figure 5.8: An Outline of Security Procedure for Ocean or Sea Carriers 
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Sixthly, the named party and address, as shown in Figure 5.9, are investigated. If the ISF 
is accepted, then the reliability of the de-consolidation's perimeter or warehouse, as 
shown in Appendix 4, can be calculated. For a shipment that has been stored in so 
many warehouses, the same calculation has to be carried out for each individual 
warehouse. 
Start 
Ship to name and i Based on ISF 
address. 
Is the de-eonsolldator s name and 
address accurate? 
OR/AND 
Is the name and address of the 
', warehouse location accurate? -, 
Calculate the 
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container 
do-consolidation 
facility or/and the 
warehouse. 
End 
1) 1SF to b. 
rejected. 
2) Do not load 
the container. 
3) The prior 
reliability of the 
Importer should be 
reduced by D. 
Figure 5.9: An Outline of Security Procedure for de-Consolidation Facility 
Seventhly, to obtain the relative importance (influence) of each parent node for its 
associated child node an AHP methodology is used (Section 3.9.4). The strength of 
direct dependence of each child node to its associated parents is quantified by assigning 
each child node a conditional probability table (CPT) by using the "Symmetric Model" 
(Chapter 4). 
Eighthly, based on the FBN model output (i. e. CSS) and Rule one a decision regarding 
scanning or not scanning of a container can be made. 
Finally, the sensitivity of the FBN model will be analysed. 
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5.6. Test Case 
An importer (i. e. IM) imports sport shoes by means of 200 containers from country A 
(i. e. CO, country of origin) to country B (i. e. country of destination). The country of' 
origin is assumed to be 100% reliable. The sport shoes are manufactured by two 
manufacturers (i. e. MU] and MU2). The shipment is palletised and packed into a 
container within a container consolidation centre (i. e. CC) and fitted with an ISO 
standard seal; all 200 containers are stuffed in the same location. The containers kept in 
a warehouse (i. e. WH) for some days are later on transported by inland carriers to port A 
(i. e. LP, loading port). At port A, all the containers may be loaded onto a containership 
(i. e. OC) for discharging at port B (i. e. DP, port of destination). At port B, once the 
containers are cleared by customs, they are de-consolidated at a centre (i. e. CdC) and 
transported by inland carriers to the final destination. Based on information provided 
electronically by the importer (i. e. ISF and cargo manifest), twenty four hours prior to 
vessel loading, the security scores of various commercial operators and premises 
provided by classification societies through auditing and ocean or sea carriers' 
reliability that can be evaluated by the assessments of PSCO and PFSO, the custom 
officials at the destination port can measure CSS of each individual container. By help 
of the proposed methodology (Section 5.5) and based on the generic model for 
measuring a CSS (Figure 5.3) a specific model for measuring the CSS, as shown in 
Figure 5.10, can be exploited. 
Figure 5.10: Specific Model for Evaluating the CSS 
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5.6.1. Step 1 
Based on Figure 5.4, an outline of the security procedure for manufacturers or exporters, 
the ISF and cargo manifest is inspected. If the ISF is accepted, then the reliability of 
each individual manufacturer for the export readiness, as shown in Appendix 4 (Section 
A4.2) and based on the audit result can be calculated. If both the manufacturers are 
being exported for the first time and the score of each individual manufacturer is above 
84 points (Table A4.2 and Figure A4.3), both the manufacturers are ready to export 
from the business point of view. However, based on "Rule one" a container cannot be 
exempted from inspection, until the reliability of exporters or manufacturers is 
evaluated as 100% reliable. As shown in Appendix 4 (Section A4.2, items 6 and 7) by 
inspection of the first four containers and observation of no violation history or 
noncompliance with the custom laws and regulation, the score of MU) and MU2 can be 
evaluated as 104 points. Based on Figure A4.3 the fuzzy sets for MU1 and MU2 can be 
assessed as follows: 
MU1= {(1, High), (0, Fairlyhigh), (0, Medium), (0, Firlylow), (0, Low)) 
MU2 = {(1, High), (0, Fairlyhigh), (0, Medium), (0, Firlylow), (0, Low)) 
By means of Equations 3.14-3.19, the reliability of MUl and MU2 can be evaluated as 
100% reliable. 
5.6.2. Step 2 
Based on Figure 5.5, an outline of the security procedure for importers, the ISF and 
cargo manifest is inspected. If the ISF is accepted, then as discussed in Sub-Section 
5.4.8 the importer's reliability can be computed. By assuming C=6 and based on 
Equations 5.1-5.4 by scanning of 20 consecutive containers and by observation of no 
violation history or noncompliance with custom laws and regulation, the importer's 
reliability can be evaluated as 100% reliable. By assuming K=5 and based on Equations 
5.6 by observation of no violation history or noncompliance with custom laws and 
regulations out of 200 containers only 56 containers have to be scanned. Based on "Rule 
one" since the reliability of the manufacturers (i. e. Step 1) and importer (i. e. Step 2) is 
evaluated as 100% reliable. If the other 144 containers' CSS are within the acceptable 
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limit, they may be exempted from inspection. 
5.6.3. Step 3 
Based on Figure 5.6, an outline of the security procedure for a container consolidation 
facility, the ISF and cargo manifest is inspected. If the ISF is accepted, then by means of 
the name and address of the container stuffing location as well as the warehouse the 
audit result for the concerned premise can be viewed. Assuming the audit scores for the 
concerned CC and WH are evaluated respectively as 108 and 106 points and based on 
Figure A4.1 (Appendix 4) and Equation 3.20 the fuzzy sets for CC and WH can be 
assessed as follows: 
CC = {(0, High), (0.6, Fairlyhigh), (0.4, Medium), (0, Firlylow), (0, Low)) 
WH = {(0, High), (0.53, Fairlyhigh), (0.47, Medium), (0, Firlylow), (0, Low)) 
By means of Equations 3.14-3.19, the reliability of CC and WH can be evaluated 
respectively as 65% and 63% reliable. 
5.6.4. Step 4 
Based on Figure 5.7, an outline of the security procedure for ports, the container and its 
seal are investigated by an authorised person at the loading port. If the container and its 
seal are secured, then by means of the name and address of the loading and discharging 
ports the audit result of the concerned loading and discharging ports can be viewed. 
Assuming the audit scores for the concerned LP and DP are evaluated respectively as 
116 and 118 points and based on Figure A4.2 (Appendix 4) and Equation 3.20 the fuzzy 
sets for LP and DP can be assessed as follows: 
LP = {(0, High), (0.625, Fairlyhigh), (0.375, Medium), (0, Firlylow), (0, Low)} 
DP = {(0, High), (0.687, Fairlyhigh), (0.313, Medium), (0, Firlylow), (0, Low)} 
By means of Equations 3.14-3.19, the reliability of LP and DP can be evaluated 
respectively as 66% and 67% reliable. 
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5.6.5. Step 5 
Based on Figure 5.8, an outline of the security procedure for an ocean or sea carrier, the 
container and its seal are investigated by the Chief Officer or an authorised person. If 
the container and its seal are secured, by means of the vessel name and IMO number, 
the latest audit result provided by the assessments of PSCO and PFSO can be viewed. 
Assuming the latest audit for Third Officer, Second Officer, Chief Officer and Master, 
as shown in Tables 5.2-5.5, are assessed. The reliability of the Third Officer, Second 
Officer, Chief Officer and Master, as shown in Table 5.6 and explained in Chapters 3 
and 4, can be computed. 
Table 5.2: Fuzzy Input Sets for Third Officer 
Sub-Criteria 
Description 
Fuzzy Input Set 
Qualification Excellen 0), (Very good, 0), (Good, 0.2), (Avee, 0.8), (Low, 0)) 
Experience ((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0 (Average, 0.2), (Low, 0.8 (Very Low, 0)) 
Specific Training Excellen 0.2), (Very good, 0.8 (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0 
Environmental 
States 
{(Very Calm, 0), (Calm, 0.5), (Moderate, 0.5), (Rough, 0), (Very Rough, 0)) 
Design and 
Habitability 
((Very Good, 0), (Good, 1.0), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0), (Very Bad, 0)) 
Rest Hours ((Very Good, 1), Good 0 (Average, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Nutrition Good, 0), Good, 0 (Average, 0.4), (Bad, 0.6), Bad, 0)) 
Age ((Very Young, 0), (Young, 1.0 (Average, 0), Old 0), (Very old, 0)) 
Stress ((Low, 0), (Moderate, 1), (High, 0), (Very High, 0)) 
Health ((Very Healthy, 0.5), (Health0.5), (Mol. Fit, 0), (Unhealthy, 0)) 
Communication 
and Language 
Skills 
((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Medium, 1.0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Decision Making ((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Medium, 1.0), (Low, 0), Low, 0)) 
Teamwork Good, 0), (Good, 1.0), (Medium, 0), (Low, 01 (Very Low, 0)) 
Situation 
Awareness 
((Very Good, 0), (Good, 1.0), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Motivation ((Very High, 0), Hi 0.3), (Medium, 0.7), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Design and 
Layout 
((Very Good, 1), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0), (Very Bad, 0)) 
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Table 5.3: Fuzzy Input Sets for Second Officer 
Sub-Criteria 
Description 
Fuzzy Input Set 
Qualification ((Excellent, 0), (Very good, 0), (Good, 1), (Avee 0), (Low, 0)) 
Experience ((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 1), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Specific Training xcellen 0.2), (Very ood 0.8), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0)) 
Environmental 
States 
((Very Calm, 0), (Calm, 0.5), (Moderate, 0.5), (Rough, 0), (Very Rough, 0)) 
Design and 
Habitability 
{(Very Good, 0), (Good, 1.0), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0), (Very Bad, 0)) 
Rest Hours ((Very Good, I), Good 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0 
Nutrition ((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.4), (Bad, 0.6), (Very Bad, 0)) 
Age (Very Young, 0), (Young, 1.0), (Average, 0), (Old, 0), (Very old, 0)) 
Stress ow, 0), (Moderate, 1), (High, 0), (Very High, 0)) 
Health ((Very Healthy, 0.5), (Healthy, 0.5), (Mol. Fit, 0), (Unhealthy, 0)) 
Communication 
and Language 
Skills 
((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Medium, 1.0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Decision Making ((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Medium, 1.0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Teamwork ((Very Good, 0), 
_(Good, 
1.0), (Medium, 0), (Low0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Situation 
Awareness 
((Very Good, 0), (Good, 1.0), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Motivation V ery High, 0), (High, 0.3), (Medium, 0.7), (Low0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Design and 
Layout 
{(Very Good, 1), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0), (Very Bad, 0)) 
Table 5.4: Fuzzy Input Sets for Chief Officer 
Sub-Criteria 
Description 
Fuzzy Input Set 
Qualification ((Excellent, 0, e good, 1 Good, 0), (Avee 0), (Low, 0)) 
Experience ((Very Good, 0 (Good, 1 (Average, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Specific Training Excellen 1), (Very good, 0), Go 0), (Average, 0 (Low, 0)) 
Environmental 
States 
((Very Calm, 0), (Calm, 0.5), (Moderate, 0.5), (Rough, 0), (Very Rough, 0)) 
Design and 
Habitability 
((Very Good, 0), (Good, 1.0), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0), (Very Bad, 0)) 
Rest Hours cry Good, 1 (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0), ffefy Low, 0)) 
Nutrition Ve Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.4), (Bad, 0.6 (Very Bad, 0)) 
Age Ve Youn %0 Youn 0), (Average, 1 (Old, 0), (Very old, 0)) 
Stress ((Low, 0), (Moderate, 0), (High, 1), (Very High, 0 
Health ((Very Health 0.2), (Healthy, 0.8), (Mol. Fit, 0), (Unhealthy, 0)) 
Communication 
and Language 
Skills 
((Very Good, 0), (Good, 1), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Decision Makin ((Very Good, 0), (Good1 Medium 0 (Low, 0), Low, 0 
Teamwork Ve Good, 0), (Good1.0), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Situation 
Awareness 
((Very Good, 0), (Good, 1.0), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Motivation 
-11v- 
cry High, 0), Hi 1 edium 0 Low 0e Low 0 
Design and 
Layout 
((Very Good, 1), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0), (Very Bad, 0)) 
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Table 5.5: Fuzzy Input Sets for Master 
Sub-Criteria 
Description 
Fuzzy Input Set 
Qualification (Excellent, 1, (Very good, 0), (Good0), (Average, 0), (Low0)) 
Experience e Good, 1 (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Specific Training Excellen 1), (Very good, 0), (Good, 0), (Avee 0), (Low, 0)) 
Environmental 
States 
((Very Calm, 0), (Calm, 0.5), (Moderate, 0.5), (Rough, 0), (Very Rough, 0)) 
Design and 
Habitability 
{(Very Good, 0), (Good, 1.0), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0), (Very Bad, 0)) 
Rest Hours ((Very Good, 1 ), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0 
Nutrition {(Very Good, 0), Good 0), (Average, 0.4), (Bad, 0.6), Bad, 0)) 
Age f(Very Young, 0), (Young, 0), (Average, 1), (Old, 0), (Very old, 0)) 
Stress ((Low, 0), (Moderate, 0), (High, 1), (Very High, 0)) 
Health Ve Healthy, 0.2), (Healthy, 0.8), (Mol. Fi 0), (Unhealthy, 0)) 
Communication 
and Language 
Skills 
((Very Good, 1), (Good, 0), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Decision Making ((Very Good, 1), (Good, 0), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0), e Low, 0)) 
Teamwork ((Very Good, 0), (Good1.0), (Medium0), (Low, 0), Low, 0)) 
Situation 
Awareness 
((Very Good, 1), (Good, 0), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
Motivation Very High, 0), (High, 1), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0 (Very Low, 0)) 
Design and 
Layout 
((Very Good, 1), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0), (Very Bad, 0)) 
Table 5.6: Ship Staffs' Reliability 
Node's Third leer Second Officer Chief Officer Master 
descry tion Reliable Unreliable Reliable Unreliable Reliable Unreliable Reliable Unreliable 
ualification 0.3865 0.6135 0.5525 0.4475 0.84 0.16 1 0 
Ex erience 0.363 0.637 0.435 0.565 0.88 0.12 1 0 
Specific Trainin 0.796 0.204 0.796 0.204 1 0 1 0 
Environmental 
States 
0.64 0.36 0.64 0.36 0.64 0.36 0.64 0.36 
Design and 
Habitabili 
0.84 0.16 0.84 0.16 0.84 0.16 0.84 0.16 
Rest Hours 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Nutrition 0.276 0.724 0.276 0.724 0.276 0.724 0.276 0.724 
Age 0.88 0.12 0.88 0.12 0.43 0.12 0.43 0.12 
Stress 0.88 0.12 0.88 0.12 0.43 0.12 0.43 0.12 
Health 0.94 0.06 0.94 0.06 0.904 0.06 0.904 0.06 
Communication 
and Language 
Skills 
0.44 0.56 0.44 0.56 0.84 0.16 1 0 
Decision Makin 0.44 0.56 0.44 0.56 0.84 0.16 1 0 
Teamwork 0.84 0.16 0.84 0.16 0.84 0.16 0.84 0.16 
Situation 
Awareness 
0.84 0.16 0.84 0.16 0.84 0.16 1 0 
Motivation 0.5975 0.4025 0.5975 0.4025 0.825 0.175 0.825 0.175 
Design and 
Layout 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Result 0.7229 0.2771 0.7372 0.2628 0.8273 0.1727 0.8636 0.1364 
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5.6.6. Step 6 
Based on Figure 5.9, an outline of the security procedure for the de-consolidation's 
perimeter, the named party and address are investigated. If the ISF is accepted, then by 
means of the name and address of the de-consolidation's perimeter (CdC) the audit 
result for the concerned perimeters can be viewed. Assuming the audit score for the 
concerned CdC is evaluated as 110 points and based on Figure A4.1 (Appendix 4) and 
Equation 3.20 the fuzzy set for CdC can be assessed as follows: 
CdC = {(0, High), (0.67, Fairlyhigh), (0.33, Medium), (0, Firlylow), (0, Low)} 
By means of Equations 3.14-3.19, the reliability of CdC can be evaluated as 67% 
reliable. 
5.6.7. Step 7 
To obtain the relative importance (influence) of each parent node for its associated child 
node an AHP methodology as explained in Section 3.9.4 can be used. In order to 
conduct the assessment a group of experts, which is composed of three experts is used. 
To avoid prejudgment, all experts utilized in the assessments are containing both 
academia and industrial related experience and they are assigned with equal weight. 
1. A professor of marine technology who has been involved in the marine and offshore 
safety research for 20 years. 
2. A lecturer and head of maritime studies (Master Mariner) who has been involved in 
the maritime and marine industry for more than 20 years. 
3. A researcher who has been involved in the marine industry (Chief Engineer and 
Superintendent for fleet and new construction) for more than 20 years. 
. Based on the experts' judgment, the first and second manufacturers are equally 
important. Therefore, they are assigned with equal weight (i. e. 0.5). 
" Based on the experts' judgment, the socio-political and geo-political reasons are 
equally important and they are assigned with equal weight (i. e. 0.5). 
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" Based on the experts' judgment, for a country of origin the natural, economical and 
political reasons are equally important and they are assigned with equal weight (i. e. 
I 
3) 
" Based on the experts if terrorists were to use a container, they would be involved in 
the container stuffing origin of the shipment (Maritime Security Expo, 2006). Thus, 
a loading port is moderately more important than a discharge port. Based on 
Equations 3.7-3.10, their weights can be evaluated as follows: 
WLp 
_0.75 
[0)DP 
0.25 
The value of consistency ratio (i. e. CR) is computed as 0. 
" Based on the authorities and responsibilities to deal with cargoes as well as the 
security of a ship a pair-wise comparison matrix for the Master, Chief Officer, 
Second Officer and Third Officer is illustrated in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7: Comparison Matrix for Ship Staff 
Master Chief 
Officer 
Second 
Officer 
Third 
Officer 
Master 1 1 2 2 
Chief Officer 1 1 2 2 
Second Officer 0.5 0.5 1 1 
Third officer 0.5 0.5 1 1 
Based on Equations 3.7-3.10, their weights can be evaluated as follows: 
Master 0.3333 
0Chief 
_ 
0.3333 
»Second 0.1666 
0Third 0.1666 
The value of consistency ratio (i. e. CR) is computed as 0. 
" Based on Figures 5.4-5.9, Rules 1-2, and the experts' judgement a pair-wise 
comparison matrix for the importer, ocean carrier, ports, warehouse, container 
consolidation centre, manufacturers or exporters, and container de-consolidation 
centre is illustrated in Table 5.8. 
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Table 5.8: Comparison Matrix 
IM OC Port WH CC MU or EX CdC 
IM 1 0.2 0.2 0.25 0.25 1 1 
OC 5 1 2 2 5 5 
Port 5 1 1 2 2 5 5 
WH 4 0.5 0.5 1 1 4 4 
CC 4 0.5 0.5 1 1 4 4 
MU or EX 1 0.2 0.2 0.25 0.25 1 1 
CdC 1 0.2 0.2 0.25 0.25 1 1 
Based on Equations 3.7-3.10, their weights can be evaluated as follows: 
WIM 0.046863 
WOC 0.266062 
Port 0.266062 
Wwx = 0.163643 
WCC 0.163643 
WMU 0.046863 
wCdC 0.046863 
The value of consistency ratio (i. e. CR) is computed as 0.0069. 
Based on the above results, the strength of direct dependence of each child node to its 
associated parents can be quantified by assigning each child node a CPT by using the 
"symmetric model" (Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3). 
5.6.8. Step 8 
From the above seven steps, the reliability value of the nodes in Figure 5.10 and their 
weights are illustrated in Table 5.9. A conditional probability table by means of a 
"symmetric model" (Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3) is assigned for each child node. The 
dependency among the variables (i. e. loading port, warehouse, container consolidation's 
perimeter and country of origin) is evaluated by means of Rule two. Furthermore, the 
network built in Figure 5.10 has been checked for the concept of directional separation 
and is aligned with the concept of d-separation as discussed in Section 4.2.6. 
Accordingly, as shown in Figure 5.11, the value of CSS is computed as 72.85% reliable. 
Based on Rule one, in this instance all the containers (144 numbers) should be scanned 
prior to the vessel loading. 
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Table 5.9: Reliability Value of Nodes 
Node's Parents Score Fuzzy Input Set Reliability Unreliability Weight 
description Node 
& weight 
CC - 
108 {( High, 0), (Fairly High, 0.6), (Medium, 0.65 0.35 - 
(0.163) 0.4), (Fairly Low, 0), ( Low, 0)) 
WH - 106 
(( High, 0), (Fairly high, 0.53), (Medium, 0.63 0.37 - 
0.163) 
0.47), (Fairly Low, 0), ( Low, 0)) 
Port LP 116 1( High, 0), (Fairly High, 0.625), (Medium, 0.66 0.34 0.75 
266) 0 0.375), (Fairly Low, 0), ( Low, 0)) ( 
. hi h 0 F i l Hi h DP 118 g , ), ( a r y g {( , 0.687), (Medium, 0.67 0.33 0.25 0.313 , (Fairly Low, 0), Low, 0)) 
Master - ....................................... 0.8636 0.8636 0.1364 0.34 
OC Chief - ..................................... " 08273 0.1727 0.33 
(0.267) SO - 
. 
........................................ 0.7372 0.2628 0.17 
TO - ........................................ 0.7229 0.2771 0.16 
MU or MU, 84 ), (Fairly High, 0), (Medium, 0), 1 0 0.5 
EXP ow, 0, Low, 0) 
047 0 () 
MU2 84 I), (Fairly High, 0), (Medium, 0), 0 0.5 
. ow, 0, Low, 0 
- 1 10 0), (Fairly High, 0.67), (Medium, 0.67 0.33 - 
(0.047) 
0.33), (Fairly Low, 0), ( Low, 0)) 
Importer - - .............................................. 1 0 
( 0.047 
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Figure 5.11: Evaluation of Containers' Security Score 
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5.6.9. Sensitivity Analysis (Final Step) 
A sensitivity analysis is used to test the logicality of the delivery of the analytical result. 
Three Axioms introduced in Section 4.4.2 are used. To carry out the research the 
reliability of all the input variables (16 nodes) as shown in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 is 
decreased and increased by 5%, 10%, 15% and 20% respectively. Accordingly the 
results (CSS) as shown in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 are obtained. Based on the obtained 
results (Tables 5.10 and 5.11) Figure 5.12 is drawn. All the results obtained keep 
harmony with Axioms 1 and 2. If the reliability of all input variables, as shown in Table 
5.10, is decreased by 15% the model output (i. e. CSS) is evaluated as "57.68% reliable" 
and "42.32% unreliable". By selection of ten input variables (i. e. warehouse, container 
consolidation's perimeter, Master, Chief Officer, Second Officer, Third Officer, loading 
port, destination port, fist and second manufacturer) from 16 input variables and by 
decreasing the reliability of those selected input variables (i. e. ten input variables) by 
15% the model output (i. e. CSS) is evaluated as "63.18% reliable" and "36.82% 
unreliable". In view of the fact that "57.68" is smaller than "63.18", the result is aligned 
with Axiom 3. 
Apart from the above, like all other models, FBNs can be over fit. To avoid such a 
problem, it is common practice to use a sensitivity test to measure the effect of one 
variable over another. Variables for which the model output is particularly insensitive 
should be removed in order to produce the most parsimonious model description. On 
the other hand given the same variation of input probabilities, comparing their influence 
magnitudes on the output node enables differentiating the importance of the input nodes 
in terms of the individual contribution to the output variable. Thus, the reliability of an 
individual node has been decreased by 10% and 20% respectively while the reliabilities 
of other input nodes are left unchanged. The results (i. e. CSS) as shown in Table 5.12 
are obtained. Based on the obtained results (Table 5.12) the sensitivity of the model 
output to the same variation of the each individual model input as illustrated in Figure 
5.13 is assessed. Based on the analysis, as shown in Table 5.12, the model is not over 
fit. From Figure 5.13 it is obvious that the model output is more sensitive respectively to 
the country of origin, ocean carrier and port rather than the other variables. 
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Table 5.10: Decrement of Nodes' Reliability 
Node Decrement of Reliability 
Description 0% 5% 10°/a 15% 20% 
uel4WWy Um ky RaIi lp U ry U ra 8y WHAAy 
Socio-political 1 0 0.95 0.05 0.9 0.1 0.85 0.15 0.8 0.2 
Geo-political 1 0 0.95 0.05 0.9 0.1 0.85 0.15 0.8 0.2 
Natural 1 0 0.95 0.05 0.9 0.1 0.85 0.15 0.8 0.2 
Economical 1 0 0.95 0.05 0.9 0.1 0.85 0.15 0.8 0.2 
Loading port 0.66 0.34 0.627 0.373 0.594 0.406 0.561 0.439 0.528 0.472 
Destination 
port 
0.67 0.33 0.636 0.364 0.603 0.397 0.5695 0.4305 0.536 0.464 
Warehouse 0.63 0.37 0.5985 0.4015 0.567 0.433 0.5355 0.4645 0.504 0.4% 
Container 
Consolidation 
0.65 0.35 0.6175 0.3825 0.585 0.415 0.5525 0.4475 0.52 0.48 
First 
Manufacturer 
1 0 0.95 0.05 0.9 0.1 0.85 0.15 0.8 0.2 
Second 
Manufacturer 
1 0 0.95 0.05 0.9 0.1 0.85 0.15 0.8 0.2 
Importer 1 0 0.95 0.05 0,9 0.1 0.85 0.15 0.8 0.2 
Master 0.8636 0.1364 0.82 0.18 0.777 0.223 0.734 0.266 0.6909 0.3091 
Chief Officer 0.8273 0.1727 0.786 0.214 0.745 0.255 0.703 0.297 0.662 0.338 
Second officer 0.7372 0.2668 0.7 0.3 0.663 0.337 0.627 0.373 0.5897 0.4103 
Third officer 0.7229 0.2771 0.6867 0.3133 0.6506 0.3494 0.6145 0.3855 0.5783 0.4217 
Container 
deconsolidation 
0.67 0.33 0.6365 0.3635 0.603 0.397 0.5695 0.4305 0.536 0.464 
CSS 0.7285 0.2715 0.6762 0.3238 0.6257 0.3743 0.5768 0.4232 0.531 0.469 
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Table 5.11: Increment of Nodes' Reliability 
Root Node Increment of Reliability 
Description 0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 
Rh. wiiry Uw*bAuy ROU*ft Um aw M keuw* in 
Socio-political 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Geo-political 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Natural 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 I 0 
Economical 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 I 0 
Loading port 0.66 0.34 0.693 0.307 0.726 0.274 0.759 0.241 0.792 0.208 
Destination 
port 
0.67 0.33 0.7035 0.2%5 0.737 0.263 0.77 0.23 0.804 0.1% 
Warehouse 0.63 0.37 0.6615 0.3385 0.693 0.307 0.724 0.276 0.756 0.244 
Container 
Consolidation 
0.65 0.35 0.6825 0.3175 0.715 0.285 0.747 0.253 0.78 0.22 
First 
Manufacturer 
1 0 1 0 I 0 1 0 1 0 
Second 
Manufacturer 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Importer 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Master 0.8636 0.1364 0.906 0.094 0.95 0.05 0.993 0.007 I 0 
Chief Officer 0.8273 0.1727 0.889 0.111 0.91 0.09 0.951 0.049 0.993 0.007 
Second officer 0.7372 0.2668 0.774 0.226 0.81 0.19 0.848 0.152 0.929 0.071 
Third officer 0.7229 0.2771 0.759 0.241 0.795 0.205 0.831 0.169 0.867 0.133 
Container 
deconsolidation 
0.67 0.33 0.7035 0.2%5 0.737 0.263 0.7705 0.2295 0.804 0.1% 
CSS 0.7285 0.2715 0.7613 0.2387 0.791 0.209 0.8225 0.1775 0.8529 0.1471 
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Table 5.12: Decrement of Each Individual Node's Reliability by 10% and 20% 
Root Node Decrement of Reliability 
Description 10% CSS 20% CSS Rank 
ReiiabUhy Uaueüability NeliabiYry Umetltbüüy Rel1WWly Uuue IYy R¢IMllüry U I1ky 
Socio-political 0.9 0.1 0.723 0.277 0.8 0.2 0.7171 0.2829 11 
Geo-political 0.9 0.1 0.723 0.277 0.8 0.2 0.7171 0.2829 II 
Natural 0.9 0.1 0.7175 0.2825 0.8 0.2 0.7062 0.2938 6 
Economical 0.9 0.1 0.7172 0.2828 0.8 0.2 0.7055 0.2945 5 
Loading port 0.594 0.406 0.7156 0.2844 0.528 0.472 0.7023 0.2977 4 
Destination 
port 
0.603 0.397 0.7241 0.2759 0.536 0.464 0.7194 0.2806 13 
Warehouse 0.567 0.433 0.7184 0.2816 0.504 0.4% 0.7080 0.2920 8 
Container 
Consolidation 
0.585 0.415 0.7181 0.2819 0.52 0.48 0.7074 0.2926 7 
First 
Manufacturer 
0.9 0.1 0.726 0.274 0.8 0.2 0.7232 0.2768 17 
Second 
Manufacturer 
0.9 0.1 0.726 0.274 0.8 0.2 0.7232 0.2768 17 
Importer 0.9 0.1 0.7235 0.2765 0.8 0.2 0.7182 0,2818 12 
Master 0.777 0.223 0.7205 0.2795 0.691 0.309 0.7123 0.2877 9 
Chief Officer 0.745 0.255 0.7212 0.2788 0.662 0.338 0.7134 0.2866 10 
Second officer 0.663 0.337 0.7251 0.2749 0.59 0.41 0.7214 0.2786 15 
Third officer 0.6506 0.3494 0.7254 0.2746 0.578 0.422 0.7219 02718 16 
Container 
deconsolidation 
0.603 0.397 0.7251 0.2749 0.536 0.464 0.7213 0.2787 14 
Country of 
Origin 
0.9 0.1 0.6952 0.3048 0.8 0.2 0.6616 0.3384 1 
Ocean Carrier 0.727 0.273 0.7067 0.2933 0.646 0.354 0.6846 0.3154 2 
Port 0.596 0.404 0.7112 0.2888 0.53 0.47 0.6935 0.3065 3 
214 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
20% 15% 10% 5% 0% -5% -10% -15% -20% 
-- --9enstivityAnalyss Reference line 
Figure 5.12: CSS versus Increment/Decrement of Nodes' Reliability 
0.74 
0.72 
0.7 
0.68 
0.66 
0.64 
0.62 
`ýý `'b aý 's, oýw oý e4 ýý ýý ýý ýý°O aýý 
Q qýQ of aýJ aaýý pro 
4ý ,, oý ýQ aai" ý`ý`ý" a; 
" J oýJ 
cýoc 
S, °c oý, 
o`\o C'e6 
N ! v'cýo 
c 
ra 
`° ý\ý ac aý 
'y J Pay 
Jew 
ce . \. o o cý ý5 co he ýcý` Ito 
L°ýýa ý. 
Wie` ham` 
L 
--* - 20%Decrement 10%Deaement 
Figure 5.13: Sensitivity of the Model Output to the same Variation of Each Individual Model Input 
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5.7. Results and Discussion 
Based on Figure 5.13, the model output is more sensitive respectively to the country of 
origin, ocean carrier and port. Furthermore the most significant root node for a port is 
the loading port (i. e. Rank 4) and for a country of origin is its economical stability (i. e. 
Rank 5). To evaluate the CSS, as shown in Table 5.13, the reliability of a country of 
origin is altered from 100% reliable to 76% reliable and the reliability of both an ocean 
carrier and a loading port is altered from 100% reliable to 80% reliable, while the 
reliability of all the other nodes (i. e. WH, DP, CC, CdC, etc. ) remains unchanged. As 
illustrated in Table 5.13 and based on Rule one the possible combinations among the 
three variables (i. e. CO, OC, and LP) for a container to be exempted from inspection are 
shown in bold type. For instance, based on Figure 5.11, the country of origin (i. e. CO), 
ocean carrier (i. e. OC) and loading port (i. e. LP) respectively are 100%, 80.76%, and 
66% reliable. Thus, based on Table 5.13, if the reliability of the loading port is 
increased from 66% to 80% or more, in this instance all the containers (i. e. 144 
numbers) may not be scanned or screened prior to the vessel loading. 
Based on Table 5.13 and by further scrutinizing the available data, it is clear that if the 
reliability of a country of origin is less than 76%, then all shipments (i. e. containers) 
that are originated from that country have to be scanned in a transhipment hub or port. 
To evaluate the reliability of a country under alteration of economical reasons, as shown 
in Table 5.14, reliability of a country from an economical point of view is altered from 
100% to 30% reliable and the reliability of the other nodes (i. e. Natural and Political) 
remains unchanged. For instance, based on Equation 5.9 and Figure 5.2 the reliability of 
Singapore from an economical point of view can be evaluated as 58% reliable. As 
illustrated in Table 5.14, if R c° = 58% , the country of origin's reliability (i. e. 
Singapore) can be computed as 85.7% (;: z 86%). Accordingly, as shown in Table 5.13 
(bold type), a transhipment hub (e. g. Singapore) with 86% reliability can be a suitable 
place for scanning the containers if and only if the ports that are situated in that country 
are more than 91% reliable. For measuring CSS for a container after it is discharged and 
scanned at a transhipment hub and loaded onto a containership (i. e. OC) for discharging 
at the port of destination, the transhipment hub will be the country of origin (e. g. 
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Singapore) and its port (e. g. Port of Singapore) will be the loading port. Since the 
container is stuffed and stored in the country of origin rather than at a transhipment hub, 
the directed edges between WH and CO as well as CC and CO should be removed. 
Assume a transhipment hub is 86% reliability and its port is 91% reliable (i. e. 
unconditional prior reliability) and the reliability of all the other nodes (i. e. OC, WH, 
DP, CC, CdC, etc. ) remains unchanged the container's security score, as shown in 
Figure 5.14, is evaluated as 75.03% reliable. In this instance (i. e. CSS is more than 75% 
reliable) from a security point of view the container may be exempted from further 
inspection at the port of destination. On the other hand, if a container's security score is 
evaluated less than 75% reliable, not only it has to be scanned at a transhipment port but 
also it should be scanned at the port of destination. The reason for such a security action 
is due to the fact that after scanning and loading the container onto an ocean or sea 
carrier, the ship often stops at various seaports and transits through various routes, thus, 
posing different levels of security risk on the containers as well as the vessel. The 
preventative measures are to recruit highly reliable ship staff and to measure their 
reliability appropriately and regularly. Based on Table 5.13 and Figure 5.14 and by 
further scrutinizing the available data, to circumvent scanning a container at the port of 
destination the minimum reliability of an ocean or sea carrier should not be less than 
80% reliable. 
5.7.1. Control Options 
As discussed previously to avoid unnecessary delays and security screening the 
following can be suggested: 
1. Improving the physical and procedural security standards of various commercial 
perimeters (i. e. warehouse, container consolidation's perimeter, etc. ). For instance, 
based on Table 5.11 and Figure 5.12, by increasing the reliability of various 
perimeters to 5% or more the containers may be exempted for scanning. 
2. Improving the physical and procedural security standards of loading ports, for 
example, as shown in Table 5.13 and discussed in Section 5.7, by increasing the 
reliability of the loading port from 66% to 80% or more, in this instance the 
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containers may be exempted for scanning. 
3. Improving the security procedure for ports as outlined in Figure 5.7 and discussed in 
Sub-Sections 5.4.11-5.4.12. 
4. Improving the reliability of ocean carriers (i. e. the minimum reliability of an ocean 
vessel should not be less than 80% reliable). The control options for improving the 
reliability of ship staff were suggested in Section 4.7 and Sub-Section 3.11.2. 
5. Selecting the best possible transhipment hub for scanning of those containers that 
are originated from a country of origin with the reliability of less than 76%, to 
circumvent further inspection at the discharge port. 
Table 5.13: Calculation of Containers' Security Score 
Reliability of Reliability of Ocean or Sea Carrier and Loading Port 
Country of 
Origin. 
100% 97% 94% 91% 88% 85% 84% 83% 82% 81% 80% 
100 0.8466 0.8326 0.8186 0.8047 0.7907 0.7767 0.7721 0.7674 0.7628 0.7581 0.7535 
98% 0.8387 0.8248 0.811 0.7971 0.7833 0.7694 0.7648 0.7602 0.7556 0.7510 0.7463 
96% 0.8307 0.8170 0.8032 0.7895 0.7758 0.7620 0.7574 0.7529 0.7486 0.7437 0.7391 
94% 0.8227 0.8091 0.7955 0.7818 0.7682 0.7546 0.7501 0.7455 0.741 0.7365 0.7319 
92% 0.8 447 0.8012 0.7877 0.7742 0.7607 0.7472 0.7427 0.7382 0.7337 0.7292 0.7247 
90% 0.8067 0.7933 0.780 0.7666 0.7532 0.7398 0.7353 0.7309 0.7264 0.722 0.7175 
88% 0.7987 0.7855 0.7722 0.7589 0.7457 0.7324 0.7280 0.7236 0.7191 0.7147 0.7103 
86% 0.7907 0.7776 0.7644 0.7513 0.7381 0.725 0.7206 0.7162 0.7118 0.7075 0.7031 
84% 0.7827 0.7697 0.7567 0.7436 0.7306 0.7178 0.7132 0.7089 0.7046 0.7002 0.6959 
82% 0.7748 0.7618 0.7489 0.736 0.7231 0.7102 0.7059 0.7016 0.6973 0.6930 0.6887 
80% 0.7667 0.7539 0.7411 0.7284 0.7156 0.7028 0.6985 0.6942 0.69 0.6857 0.6815 
78% 
76% 
0.7587 
0.7507 
0.7461 
0.7382 
0.7334 
0.7256 
0.7207 
0.7131 
0.708 
0.7005 
0.6954 
0.6880 
0.6911 
0.6838 
0.6869 
0.67% 
0.6827 
0.6754 
0.6785 
0.6712 
0.6742 
0.667 
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Figure 5.14: Evaluating the Container s' Security Score at a Transhipment Hub 
Table 5.14: Evaluation of Country of Origin's Reliability 
Reliability of country of origin from an economical 
point of view (RecO 
) 
Reliability of country of origin 
100% 100% 
90% 96.59% 
80%o 93.18% 
70% 89.78% 
60% 86.38% 
58% 85.70% 
55% 84.68% 
50% 82.99% 
40% 79.59% 
30% 76.19% 
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5.8. Conclusion 
Within the previous chapter, a FBN and symmetric model to enable wider application of 
FBN in a generic mode are developed. The technique was used to evaluate a seafarer's 
reliability. The same technique is used, within this chapter, for evaluating a container's 
security score. 
Within this chapter, firstly, the methodology for evaluating the reliability of commercial 
operators (i. e. importer, exporter, manufacturer, etc. ) and premises (i. e. port, warehouse, 
manufacturing site, container consolidation and de-consolidation centre) are developed. 
Secondly, by using FBN and symmetric model the methodology for evaluating a 
container's security score is created. Thirdly, based on analysis, a general equation for 
calculating the number of consecutive containers that has to be inspected by an 
authorised group is developed. Fourthly, outline of security procedures for commercial 
operators and premises are created. Fifthly, based on analysis, it has been revealed that 
if the security score of a container is less than 75%, then the container should be 
inspected at the loading port or a transhipment hub. Furthermore, based on analysis, it 
has been revealed that those containers that are originated from a country of origin with 
reliability of less than 76% reliable, transported via loading ports and containerships 
with reliability of less than 80% reliable have to be inspected / scanned in a 
transhipment hub. 
Based on Allen (2006)'s research and according to the world bank report, daily 
spending in customs adds almost 1% to the cost of goods. The FBN methodology 
implemented in this chapter can be used for targeting those containers which pose high 
level of risk to the container supply chains. Furthermore, it can be used to identify the 
commercial operators that do not act appropriately to secure their supply chains. Based 
on the model output, in order to obtain a competitive advantage and to improve the 
commercial operators' motivations, the financial burden should be placed upon those 
operators that do not act appropriately. Consequently, the cost of any security system 
can be justified. 
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A containership, based on its cargo containers' security scores, poses a determinable 
level of security risk to a port. Therefore, it is essential to develop a mathematical 
decision making model for evaluating the security level of a port, based on security 
scores of a ship's cargo containers prior to ship / port interface. Such that the port 
authorities are able to assess the level of security risk prior to a containership's arrival at 
anchorage (i. e. prior to ship / port interface). If the level of security risk is low, then 
permission can be granted to the concerned ship to enter the berth. Otherwise, the 
security level of the port should be increased or the concerned ship not entitled to enter 
the port. 
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Chapter Six 
Adopting Fuzzy Bayesian Network (FBN) Model for 
Evaluating the Security Level of a Port 
Summary 
The aim of this study is to exploit a FBN decision making model for evaluating the 
security level of a port, based on the security scores of a ship's cargo containers prior 
to ship/port interface. This study makes full use of the Fuzzy Bayesian Network (FBN) 
advantages by exploiting a conceptual and sound methodology for evaluating the 
security level of a port. 
6.1. Introduction 
Global commerce is totally dependent on the movement of shipping containers, which 
carry about 80% of world trade by volume (Allen, 2006). A container terminal connects 
sea and land and can be employed for transferring containers to and from ships. It can 
be used for handling containers rapidly, economically, precisely, and in greater volumes 
than conventional ports. Nowadays, container sea transport has become the major 
transport method of international main sea lines. In so many countries, container 
transport, especially container sea transport, has become a widely used transport method 
of great importance. In a container terminal the process begins when a ship arrives at the 
anchorage and joins a queue. The "first come first served" strategy is usually employed. 
If the berth is vacant, then permission is granted to enter the berth. Otherwise, a delay 
occurs for the ship until a berth is available. After the ship enters the berth, based on the 
infrastructure of the container terminal, it experiences an average delay of one or two 
hours before the loading and unloading operation takes place. A gantry crane (or cranes) 
is then assigned to start unloading and loading the containers. When these activities are 
completed the ship may have to wait (i. e. delay period) before it can leave the port. The 
movement of containers through a port is generally on a queuing system and this means 
that any delay snarls. all operations (Goslin, 2008). As shown in Figure 6.1, the flow of 
containers is composed of import (i. e. containers unloaded from ships, to be directed to 
final destination by inland carriers), transhipment (i. e. containers unloaded from ships, 
to be transhipped to final destination by feeder ships or inland carriers), and export flow 
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(i. e. containers loaded on ships leaving the terminal). The cargo containers that remain 
on board a vessel (ROB) are not flowing through the port. For the import flow, 
containers are unloaded by the cranes from the ship, then transported by prime mover to 
the interchange area before they are stacked in the yard. At the interchange area, the 
prime movers queue for the straddle carriers to stack the container in the yard, when the 
consignee claims the container/containers, truck/trucks will be used to transport them 
outside the port area. For the export containers, the reverse process applies. Millions of 
dollars worth of cargo pass through a port on a daily basis and if a port is closed to 
counteract a significant incident or in response to an attack, then a nationally recognised 
set of protocols must be followed to efficiently resume port operations (The Port 
Authority of NY & NJ, 2010). Aside from the direct effects of an attack on a port, the 
economic, social, and political consequences of a significant disruption in container 
supply chain would be staggering. 
Inland Carriers 
Export Cargo Containers- --f 
f- Import Cargo Containers - I ROB 
Transhipment Cargo Containers 
Export Cargo Containers 
---¬xport Cargo Containers Container Terminal 
Transhipment Cargo Containers 
f Import Cargo Containers 
Export Cargo Containers ROB 
Export Cargo Contains 
Import Cargo Containers 
Feeder Ships 
Figure 6.1: Flow of Containers 
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6.2. Port Security 
Intelligence experts agree that global supply chains are significant targets for an 
eventual attack on ports (The Port Authority of NY & NJ, 2010). Ports are typically 
large so that they can concurrently accommodate ship, truck and rail traffic, petroleum 
product / liquid offload storage or piping and container storage (Godlin, 2008). 
Therefore, the topography of ports is the primary cause of their security dilemma. There 
are two types of threat related to ports, direct attacks or transport of dangerous materials 
through ports for use in a terrorist plot elsewhere in a country (MIT, 2007). Based on 
OECD (2005)'s research the technique used by drug and contraband smugglers (i. e. the 
criminal wishes to ensure that their illegal consignment gets to the final consignee 
unnoticed and untouched) is probably more in line with the potential of the terrorist than 
the technique used by cargo theft (i. e. the criminal is interested in removing the contents 
of a container in such a manner as to avoid, or at least delay, discovery). Based on 
expert opinion, a single security countermeasure such as the container security initiative 
(CSI) or terrorist watch list, cannot adequately address port or marine security and 
safety concerns (Goslin, 2008). Technology alone cannot secure ports or shipping, nor 
can adding additional security procedures, physical barriers, or additional manpower 
fully mitigate the risk (Goslin, 2008). Based on expert opinion the only truly effective 
measure remains the scanning and/or physical inspection of the suspicious container 
(OECD, 2005). In addition some experts have called for scanning all import cargo 
containers. The conducted research by OECD (2005) revealed that 100% scanning is 
not a realistic option and it would make little sense to seek to scan all import cargo 
containers since not all containers pose the same risk. In fact much containerised trade 
is repetitive (i. e. same shippers, same shipment, and same consignee), involves large 
and well known trades, operating in predictable patterns and can be screened (OECD, 
2005). Furthermore, an over-emphasis on security may result in policies destabilizing 
the economic benefits brought about by containerisation (Thibault, et al., 2006). 
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6.2.1. Maritime Transportation Security Act 
Based on IMO (2003, Codes 2.9-2.11, Part A), individual governments are required to 
assess the risk facing their ports and establish a three-tier security system as follows: 
1. Security level 1 means the level for which minimum appropriate protective security 
measures shall be maintained at all times (i. e. normal level of security threats). 
2. Security level 2 means the level for which appropriate additional protective security 
measures shall be maintained for a period of time as a result of heightened risk of 
security incident (i. e. medium level of security threats). 
3. Security level 3 means the level for which further specific proactive security 
measures shall be maintained for a limited period of time when a security incident is 
probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to identify the specific target 
(i. e. high level of security threats). 
Based on the ISPS Code the parties (i. e. ports, ship operators, and vessels) should 
establish three-tier security plans that correspond with the three levels of security 
assessment. These security plans should indicate the operational and physical measures 
required to comply with each of the three security levels. 
6.2.2. Declaration of Security (DOS) 
Based on IMO (2003, Code 5.1, Part A) "contracting government shall determine when 
a declaration of security (DOS) is required by assessing the risk the ship/port interface 
or ship to ship activity poses to person, property or the environment". 
The following can be revealed by a review of the IMO (2003, Part B, Codes 5.2,5.3, 
9.50,16.55, and 16.57): 
" It is likely that a DOS will be requested at higher security levels, when a ship has a 
higher security level than the one of the port facility, or another ship with which it 
interfaces. 
"A port facility security officer (PFSO) may also initiate a DOS prior to ship/port 
interfaces that are identified in the approved port facility security assessment 
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(PFSA) as being of particular concern. 
" The ship security plan (SSP) should establish details of the procedures and security 
measures the ship could adopt if the ship is at a higher security level than that 
applying to a port facility. 
" The port facility security plan (PFSP) should establish details of the procedures and 
security measures the port facility could adopt if the port facility is at lower security 
level than that applying to a ship. 
" The PFSP should establish the procedure to be followed when, on the instruction of 
the contracting government, the PFSO requests a DOS or when a DOS is requested 
by a ship. 
The following can be revealed by review of the form recommended in IMO (2003, 
Appendix to Part B) for documenting the DOS between a ship and a port facility: 
. The security levels of the ship and port facility. 
The activity covered by the DOS (i. e. loading, discharging, mooring, bunkering, 
etc. ). 
The agreement between the ship security officer (SSO) and PFSO to carry out a 
variety of specific activities in accordance with the relevant approved plan. 
" The period of validity of the DOS. 
6.2.3. Indicator of Port Security (IPS) 
Within Chapter 5 (Section 5.4.12) and based on the assessment of an independent 
competent body such as a reputable classification society the methodology for 
evaluating the reliability of a port from the security point of view was explained. 
Furthermore, to indicate the accuracy of audit result for measuring a port's reliability 
(i. e. RP n") and its deviation on a timely basis an indicator of port security (IPS) can be 
defined as follows: 
Total number of accidents / claims involving pilferage and/or tampering incidents 
observed on the annual basis at the port = N, 
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Total number of bill of ladings / manifests handled by the port annually = NI 
IPS = 
N' 
(6.1) Ni 
LIPS = -log(IPS) 
RLIPS = Round up LIPS to an integer value 
Based on Equation 6.1, for instance, if a port (e. g. port of Singapore) is handling 30 
million TEUs annually (i. e. Nj) and N, is evaluated as 3, then RLIPS can be evaluated 
as 7 and the reliability of the port can be estimated as high. Furthermore, if the value of 
N, is evaluated as 30,300,3000, or 30000, then RLIPS can be evaluated as 6,5,4, or 3 
respectively, thus, the reliability of the port can be estimated as fairly high, medium, 
fairly low, or low. Accordingly a quantitative criterion (i. e. RLIPS), as shown in Figure 
6.2, can be transformed to a qualitative criterion (i. e. reliability of a port) by exploiting 
the membership functions. Based on the value of RLIPS and Figure 6.2 a fuzzy set for a 
port's reliability can be assessed. Furthermore by help of Equations 3.14-3.19, the 
reliability of a port based on the indicator of its security (i. e. Rcan be evaluated. As 
a result the reliability of a port (i. e. R,, 0,, 
) can be evaluated as follows: 
R= min/RA°d" R" (6.2 Pnrr \ Port ' Pori ý 
Degree 
3 
Figure 6.2: Membership Functions of Port 
6.3. Targeting strategy 
Prior to 9/11, port authorities focused their security effort on preventing criminal 
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activities within their jurisdiction. After attacks, they become very concerned that a 
terrorist attack at one of their terminals or facilities could have local, national, and 
international inferences (Thibault, et al., 2006). Based on experts' opinion, to enhance 
the security of a port the best option is to exploit an integrated, carefully planned 
approach that incorporates the best elements of technical, physical, procedural and 
information security disciplines into a comprehensive strategy (Goslin, 2008). 
Moreover, the hourly waiting cost of a containership arriving at port of disembarkation 
is tens of thousands of dollars. Thus, the strategy must be developed in a way that does 
not slow down world trade. In other words, instead of inspecting cargo containers at 
random, rational inspection should be carried out. Thus, to enhance the probability that 
targeted cargo proves to be compliant with regulations or contains no contraband; firstly 
the topology of a port should be investigated. Analysis of a port's topology should 
reveal the following: 
" The availability of illicit materials or contraband at the host country. 
" The flow of containers on daily/monthly or annual basis. 
" The number of cargo containers that remain on board a vessel or vessels within a 
port territory on daily/ monthly or annual basis. 
" The willingness of terrorist organisations to attack the port or its host country. 
" The damage capability and recall difficulties after an attack. 
The consequences of an attack in world trade or international supply chain. 
" The reliability of the host country and the port. 
The significant effect of a port's topology on targeting strategy can be divulged in the 
following examples. 
Firstly, assume that an authorised group is uncertain regarding availability of illicit 
materials within a batch of containers (e. g. 100 containers). To detect the illicit 
materials the authorised group decided to scan 20% of the batch at random. The 
probability of detecting an unknown container that contains illicit materials given that 
within all scanned containers (i. e. 20% of the batch) no illicit material was found can be 
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calculated as 1/80 = 0.0125, therefore, the authorised group is not able to gain any 
certainty pertaining to the remaining containers (i. e. 80% of the batch). As it is obvious 
a targeting strategy based on random inspection cannot be a successful tactic. 
Secondly, based on Figure 6.1, four states (i. e. import, export, transhipment, and ROB) 
for containers can be alleged. Based on the surveillance of a port's topology and 
through consultancy with the host government officials a conditional probability table 
(CPT), as shown in Table 6.1, can be illustrated. 
Table: 6.1: CPT (Illicit Material I Cargo Container) 
Container Export Import Transhipment ROB 
Illicit 
Material 
Present U TIM a7S ° RD8 
Absent 1-Q 1- °1M 1-Q7S 1-aRO8 
Assume NEx , NIM and N7 stand for the total numbers of export, import and 
transhipment cargo containers flowing through a port on daily basis respectively and 
NROB stands for the number of cargo containers remaining on board a vessel or vessels 
within a port territory on a daily basis. As a result: 
N,. = NEx + NLw + N7N + NROB 
P(Container = EX) = 
NEX 
NT 
P(Container = IM) = 
N'"' 
(6.3) 
NT 
P(Container = TS) = 
N'L 
NT 
P(Container = ROB) = 
NR°e 
NT 
Based on the Bayesian's chain rule, Table 6.1 and Equation 6.3 the marginal probability 
of the presence of illicit material can be calculated as follows: 
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P(Ill icit 
-material = 
Present) = 
aEx NEx +° 1M NIM + a,, N,, + QRog NRoR ( 6.4) 
NT 
If the presence of illicit material is known with 100% certainty (i. e. instantiation of 
illicit material), then by using Bayesian's rule the posterior probabilities can be 
calculated as follows: 
P(Container = EX) = 
NEx° Fx 
NEX aEX +NjMQfy +N,, Q,, +NROeam)s 
P(Container = IM) = 
Nj"' _l"' 
NEXQEX + NzwQ, M + N7so'7s + NROBaROB 
P(Container = TS) = 
N'scr 's (6.5) 
NEx QEX +N,, a,, +N, SQ,, +NRneaROe 
P(Container = R. O. B) = 
NROBOROB 
NEX QEX+NI, y6,, y +Njs 67, s +NROBaROB 
Assume that, after surveillance of a port's topology, the following data is illustrated by 
experts (Table 6.2): 
Table 6.2: Experts' Opinion based on the Port's Topology 
6Er 6IM ars CrROe NEX 
N,. 
NIM 
NT 
Nls 
N,. 
N1 )ß 
N7. 
0.3 0.7 0.5 0.2 15% 40% 20% 25% 
Based on Equation 6.4 the marginal probability of the presence of illicit materials can 
be calculated as 47.5% (i. e. 52.5% absent). Based on Equation 6.5 the posterior 
probabilities of the export, import, transhipment and ROB cargo containers containing 
illicit materials are evaluated as 9.74%, 58.95%, 21.05% and 10.53% respectively. 
Therefore, the probability that the import cargo containers contain contraband is higher 
than the others. Within Chapter 5 based on measuring a container's security score, a 
targeting strategy that specifies which containers are required to be scanned and where 
to scan them (i. e. at overseas port of embarkation, at the domestic port of 
disembarkation, or both) was developed. If the targeting strategy developed in Chapter 
5 is utilized by authorities at the discharge port (i. e. disembarkation) and in cooperation 
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with the authorities at an overseas loading port (i. e. embarkation), then the value of o 
may approach zero. As a result, based on Equation 6.4 the marginal probability of the 
presence of illicit materials can be calculated as 19.5% (i. e. 80.5% absent). In addition 
the gain in certainty is evaluated as (80.5% - 52.5%) 28%. Thus, to enhance the 
probability that targeted cargo proves to be compliant with regulations or contains no 
contraband, the best tactic is to analyse a port's topology and define a different 
methodology for targeting, screening, and scanning export, import, transhipment, and 
ROB cargo containers. The symbols and abbreviations are presented in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3: Table of Symbols and Abbreviations 
R Reliable 
R Unreliable 
CSS A container's security score. 
P(C = R) = CSS Probability that a container does not contain illicit 
materials. 
P(IM = R) = Rim Probability that an importer is reliable and does not 
cooperate with criminals. 
P(EX = R) = REx Probability that an exporter is reliable and does not 
cooperate with criminals. 
P(WH = R) Probability that a warehouse is reliable. 
P(CO = R) = Rco Probability that a country of origin or a host 
country is reliable. 
P(LP = R) Probability that a loading port is reliable. 
P(OC = R) = Roc Probability that an ocean carrier is reliable. 
P(CC = R) Probability that a container consolidation centre is 
reliable. 
P(WH =RI CO = R) = RWN Probability that a warehouse is reliable given that 
its host country is reliable. 
P(LP =R CO = R) = RLp Probability that a loading port is reliable given that 
its host country is reliable. 
P(CC =R CO = R) = Rcc Probability that a container consolidation centre is 
reliable given that its host country is reliable. 
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6.3.1. Evaluating the Security Score of Export Cargo Containers 
Once the container is stuffed and it leaves the manufacturing site, the container is 
vulnerable to being interrupted and having its contents tampered with. Ideally, seals 
should only be placed on containers by the party directly responsible for stuffing and/or 
visually verifying the content of the container. Thus, it is noteworthy to mention that the 
party responsible for stuffing and sealing the container is the first, and most important, 
link in a secure container supply chain (OECD, 2005). Based on OECD (2005)'s 
research, seals are only valuable when referencing a document (manifest, bill of lading, 
etc. ) that provides a picture of what was in the container and when it was sealed. The 
commercial operators (may physically come into contact with an export cargo container 
and its contents) and premises after being transported by road or rail directly to a port 
(i. e. at the port's gate) can be listed as follows: 
9 Manufacturer or exporter. 
9 Container consolidation facility. 
Warehouse or an intermediary's premises. 
" Inland carrier. 
As a result, firstly an authorised group should gain sufficient information regarding a 
manufacturer or an exporter. The information can be provided by evaluating the 
reliability of a manufacturer or an exporter (Appendix 4 Section A. 4.2). Secondly by 
scanning a limited number of an exporter's cargo containers (Equations 5.1-5.8) and 
accruing sufficient evidence that the exporter is not cooperating with criminals the 
exporter's name can be documented within the low risk exporters. 
To gain sufficient information regarding inland carriers and accruing sufficient evidence 
that they are not cooperating with criminals, the method developed in Chapter 5 
(Section 5.4.11) can be used. Furthermore, it can be combined with a technology. For 
instance, Duos Technologies has developed a system, Intermodal Container Exit System 
(ICES) that can identify and track containers and link them to transport companies, 
drivers and specific vehicles. ICES will capture and store the following information in a 
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simple user interface (Goslin, 2008): 
" Container number. 
" Trailer number. 
" Front and rare licence plates. 
9 Driver's licence data. 
" Video of vehicle and container. 
" Video and audio of driver and guard 
interaction at the port. 
9 Biometric capture of fingerprint. 
To achieve sufficient information concerning a security score of an export cargo 
container that is stuffed in a consolidation centre (i. e. CC) and is stored in a warehouse 
(i. e. WH) and accruing sufficient evidence concerning performance of CC and WH from 
the security point of view, firstly, based on the audit result (Appendix 4, Section A. 4.1) 
their reliability (i. e. RWH and Rcc) should be evaluated. Secondly, due to uncertainty 
and avoiding any preconceived notion the probability that an export cargo container is 
reliable given either CC, WH, or both are unreliable / reliable can be assigned as 
follows: 
P(C=RICC=R, WH=R)=0 
P(C=RICC=R, WH=R)=0.5 
P(C=RIWH=R, CC=R)=0.5 
(6.6) 
P(C=RIWH=R, CC=R)=1 
As discussed in Chapter 5, the reliability of a warehouse, loading port and container 
consolidation's perimeter depends upon their host country (i. e. country of origin). Thus, 
the marginal probability of a warehouse, loading port and container consolidation's 
perimeter can be formulated as follows: 
P(WH= R) = P(WH = RI CO= R) x P(CO= R) +P(WH= R{ CO= R) x P(CO= R) 
P(CC=R)=P(CC=RICO=R)xP(CO=R)+P(CC=R{CO=R)xP(CO=R) (6.7) 
P(LP= R) = P(LP= R{ CO= R)x P(CO= R)+P(LP= R{ CO= R)x P(CO= R) 
Based on OECD (2005)'s research "in many cases of container related crime, internal 
conspiracies between criminals and inside personnel (belonging to warehouse managers, 
carriers, forwarders and even customs) have been involved". Thus, the assessment of a 
container consolidation facility, loading port and warehouse's reliability, based on the 
audit result (Appendix 4, Section A. 4.1), is only valid if their host country is found to be 
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reliable (Section 5.4.9). In other words, the probability that a warehouse, loading port 
and container consolidation centre is reliable given that their country of origin (i. e. their 
host country) is unreliable should be assigned to zero (i. e. to avoid bias). As a result, 
based on Table 6.3, Equation 6.7 can be simplified as follows: 
P(WH=R)=RwH xRco 
P(CC = R) = Rcc x Rco (6.8) 
P(LP = R) = R,. x Rco 
Based on the Bayesian's chain rule and Equations 6.6 and 6.8, the marginal probability 
that an export cargo container is reliable and does not contain illicit materials (i. e. at the 
port's gate) can be evaluated as follows: 
CSSfor an export cargo container = P(CF = R) =2x Rcc x Rco +2x RWy x Rco (6.9) 
As discussed in Chapter 5, if the value of the CSS is less than 75% (i. e. acceptable 
limit), then the container should be physically inspected or scanned. Furthermore, 
based on Equation 6.9, if the reliability of a country of origin (i. e. host country) is 
evaluated as 75% or less, then the value of the CSS (i. e. for all values of RWH and R(. (. ) 
can be evaluated as 75% or less. Accordingly the container should be physically 
inspected or scanned at a transhipment hub or port rather than the country of origin. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the reliability of the host country for a transhipment hub or port 
has to be more than 75% reliable. As a result it is possible to designate some foreign 
ports through which containers are transhipped, for piloting an integrated scanning 
system to include non-intrusive inspection (NII) and radiation detection. 
6.3.2. Evaluating the Security Score of Import Cargo Containers 
The methodology for evaluating the security score of an import cargo container was 
explained in Chapter 5. The best strategy is to identify and examine or search marine 
containers that pose a security risk (i. e. the value of CSS is not within the acceptable 
limit) before loading such containers at a loading port for shipment, either directly at the 
loading port or through a transhipment hub or port. 
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6.3.3. Evaluating the Security Score of Transhipment and ROB Cargo Containers 
Containers during their passage through the supply chain may transit through several 
countries, be loaded onto several different modes of transport, transferred between 
several different firms, handled several times, and wait in some location for an extended 
period of time. Thus, evaluating the security score of a transhipment or ROB cargo 
container depends upon many variables and is complex. Furthermore, transhipment 
cargo containers moved from one vessel to another are only available for scanning for a 
short period of time and may be difficult to access. Similarly, it may be difficult to scan 
cargo containers that remain on board a vessel as it passes through a foreign seaport. 
Based on GAO (2007)'s research "currently containers such as these that are designated 
as high-risk at CSI ports are not scanned unless specific threat information is available 
regarding the cargo in that particular container". 
To simplify the evaluation of a security score of a transhipment and ROB cargo 
container the following hypotheses are useful: 
1. The probability of detecting an export cargo container (Section 6.3.1) that contains 
illicit materials at an effectively reliable loading port (i. e. LP) given that its host 
country (i. e. CO) is sufficiently reliable can be evaluated as high. 
2. As soon as a container is loaded on board an ocean carrier (i. e. OC) at an effectively 
reliable loading port, the containership will often stop at various seaports to 
discharge and load containers. Furthermore, the containership transits through 
various routes and ports pose different levels of security risk. As discussed in 
Chapter 5 (Sections 5.4.10 and 5.7), if the reliability of an ocean carrier is evaluated 
as 80% or more, then the ship staff are adequately reliable (i. e. vigilance) and the 
probability of tampering with its cargo containers at various seaports can be 
evaluated as low. 
Based on the above hypotheses and the Bayesian's chain rule, the marginal probability 
that a transhipment or ROB cargo container is reliable and does not contain illicit 
materials can be evaluated as follows: 
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P(C = R) = P(C =RI LP = R, OC = R)xP(LP = R)xP(OC = R)+ 
P(C=RILP=R, OC=R)xP(LP=R)xP(OC=R)+ 
P(C=RILP=R, OC=R)xP(LP=R)xP(OC=R)+ 
(6.10) 
P(C=RLP=R, OC=R)xP(LP=R)xP(OC=R) 
As a result of uncertainty and avoiding any preconceived notion the probability that a 
transhipment or ROB cargo container is reliable given either OC, LP, or both are 
unreliable / reliable can be assigned as follows: 
P(C=RIOC=R, LP=R)=0 
P(C=RIOC=R, LP=R)=0.5 
P(C=RI OC=R, LP=R)=0.5 
P(C=RIOC=R, LP=R)=1 
(6.11) 
Based on Table 6.3 and Equations 6.8,6.10, and 6.11, the marginal probability that a 
transhipment or ROB cargo container is reliable and does not contain illicit materials 
can be evaluated as follows: 
CSSfor a transhipment/ROB cargo container = P(C = R) 
P(C=R)=P(LP=R)xP(OC=R)+0.5xP(LP=R)xP(OC=R)+ 
0.5 x P(LP = R) x P(OC = R) = P(LP = R) x P(OC = R) + (6.12) 
0.5 x [(1- P(LP = R)) x P(OC = R)] + 0.5 x [P(LP = R) x (1- P(OC = R))] _ 
0.5 x P(OC = R) + 0.5 x P(LP = R) = 0.5 x Roc +0.5xRLp xRco 
It is noteworthy to mention that based on the mentioned hypotheses, Equation 6.12 (i. e. 
simplified formula) can only be used, if the reliability of an ocean carrier, a loading port 
and a country of origin is 80% (Section 5.7), 75% (Section 6.2.3), and 75% (Section 
6.3.1) or more respectively. Otherwise a container's security score should be measured 
by the elaborated methodology in Chapter 5 (i. e. accurate method). However, if the 
sufficient data is not available CSS can be estimated as follows: 
" If the reliability of an ocean carrier is more than 80% (i. e. the probability of 
tampering with the ocean carrier's cargo containers at various seaports can be 
evaluated as low) and reliability of loading port is less than 75%, then the container 
should be categorised as medium or high risk and, based on a series network 
terminology with two components, the probability that a transhipment or ROB cargo 
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container is reliable and does not contain illicit materials can be evaluated as 
follows: 
P(C=R)=RLp xRco (6.13) 
9 If the reliability of an ocean carrier is less than 80% and reliability of loading port is 
less than 75%, then the container should be categorised as medium or high risk and, 
based on a series network terminology with three components, the probability that a 
transhipment or ROB cargo container is reliable and does not contain illicit 
materials can be evaluated as follows: 
P(C = R) = RLP x Rco x Roc 
6.4. Methodology 
(6.14) 
The aim of this study is to exploit a FBN decision making model for evaluating the 
security level of a port, based on the security scores of a ship's cargo containers. The 
methodology in stepwise orders is described as follows: 
Firstly, based on Sub-Sections 6.2.3 and 5.4.9 the reliability of a port and its host 
country can be evaluated. 
Secondly, prior to a ship / port interface, the numbers of import, transhipment, and ROB 
cargo containers on board a ship are assessed by an authorised group. 
Thirdly, based on Sub-Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 security scores of import, transhipment 
and ROB cargo containers are evaluated. Based on the value of CSS, as shown in Table 
6.4, three states (i. e. low risk, medium risk, and high risk) for a container are alleged. 
Fourthly, based on experts' opinion a CPT, as shown in Table 6.5, is formulated. 
Fifthly, based on the BN decision making model, as shown in Figure 6.3, the likelihood 
of security level 1 (i. e. L1), security level 2 (i. e. L2), and security level 3 (i. e. L3) is 
evaluated. 
Sixthly, the security level based on the likelihood of security levels, as shown in Table 
6.6, is evaluated. Mathematically no more possibilities exist. 
Seventhly, based on Section 6.3, a targeting strategy is developed. 
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Finally, the sensitivity of the model is analysed. 
Table 6.4: Risk level based on the value of CSS 
if 
0.75<_CSS<_1 
if 
0.5<_CSS < 0.75 
if 
0<_CSS<0.5 
Low Risk Medium risk High Risk 
Table 6.5: CPT (Illicit Material Ia Container's Security Score) 
CSS 
Illicit 
Material 
Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk 
Present Eý ýý iuI 
Absent 62 772 92 
Uncertain 1-(e +62) 1-(771 +172) 1 -(p1 +/42) 
Figure 6.3: BN Decision Making Model for Evaluating the Security Level 
238 
Table 6.6: Likelihood of Security Levels versus Security Level 
if if if if 
L2 + L3 < L, L2 + L3 >_ L, L2 > L3 L3 Z L2 
L3 5 L, L3 S L, L2 > L, L3 > L, 
L2 :5 . 
1., LZ<_L, 
then then then then 
Level I Level 2 Level 2 Level 3 
6.5. Test Case 
Based on IMO rules (2003, Codes 2.9-2.11, Part A) and the following information an 
authorised person in country-p would like to assess the security level of port-+ , based 
on the security scores of the V-ship's cargo containers, prior to V-ship / port-p 
interface. 
9 The reliability of country-i, from an economical point of view is evaluated as 58% 
reliable. From the natural and political point of view the country-4 is 100% reliable. 
The audit score for the port-p is evaluated as 152. The value of RLIPS for port-b is 
evaluated as 7. 
Based on the latest audit result provided by the assessments of port state control and 
port facility security officers the reliability of the V-ship is evaluated as 80.76% 
reliable (Figure 5.11, Sub-Section 5.6.5). 
9 The total number of cargo containers on board the V-ship is 3000 TEU. The 
numbers of import, transhipment, and ROB cargo containers on board the V-ship are 
1000,500, and 1500 respectively. 
" Based on the port-p requirements the data elements (i. e. importer security filling and 
shipping documents) for the import cargo containers have to be submitted 
electronically twenty four hours prior to vessel loading. 
" Assume that out of 500 cargo containers (i. e. transhipment cargo containers), 300 
were loaded at the 60% reliable port (sited at the 80% reliable country) and 200 
were loaded at the 70% reliable port (sited at the 90% reliable country). 
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Assume that out of 1500 cargo containers (i. e. ROB cargo containers), 1000 were 
loaded at the 90% reliable port (sited at the 80% reliable country), 200 were loaded 
at the 65% reliable port (sited at the 75% reliable country) and 300 were loaded at 
the 74% reliable port (sited at the 75% reliable country). 
By help of the proposed methodology (Section 6.4) the security level of the port-p can 
be measured as follows: 
6.5.1. Step 1 
Based on the given information the audit score for the port-p is evaluated as 152 and 
based on Figure A4.2 (Appendix 4) and Equation 3.20 the reliability of the port-p in 
terms of a fuzzy set can be assessed as follows: 
port-b= {(0.75, High), (0.25, Fairlyhigh), (0, Medium), (0, Firlylow), (0, Low) ) 
By means of Equations 3.14-3.19, the reliability of port-p based on the audit result 
(i. e. Ltp ) can be evaluated as 93.75% reliable. Furthermore, based on the given 
information (i. e. RLIPS = 7) and Figure 6.2, the reliability of the port-k in terms of a 
fuzzy set can be assessed as follows: 
port -5= 
{(1, High), (0, Fairlyhigh), (0, Medium), (0, Firlylow), (0, Low)} 
By means of Equations 3.14-3.19, the reliability of port-p based on an indicator of 
security (i. e. R,, 1) can be evaluated as 100% reliable. As a result and based on Equation 
6.2, the reliability of the port-p (i. e. RP0, ) can be evaluated as (93.75% z 94%) 94% 
reliable. Based on the given information the reliability of the host country (i. e. country- 
), as shown in Figure 6.4, is evaluated as 85.97% reliable. Based on Equation 6.8 the 
marginal probability that the port-p is reliable can be evaluated as (0.94 x 0.8597) 
80.81% reliable. 
6.5.2. Step 2 
Based on the given information the percentages of import, transhipment, and ROB 
cargo containers on board the V-ship can be evaluated as follows: 
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import = 
1000 
= 33.33% 3000 
transhipment = 
500 
3000 _ 
16.67% 
ROB = 
1500 
_ 50% 3000 
6.5.3. Step 3 
Based on the port-p requirements the data elements for the import cargo containers have 
to be submitted electronically twenty four hours prior to a vessel loading. Therefore, if 
the elaborated methodology in Chapter 5 is followed by the authorities at port-p, then 
the value of CSS for all the import cargo containers on board the V-ship is within the 
acceptable limit (i. e. CSS >_ 0.75). 
Based on the given information and Equation 6.13 out of 500 transhipment cargo 
containers, the value of CSS for 300 containers is evaluated as 0.48 (i. e. 0.8 x 0.6) and 
for the remainder is evaluated as 0.63 (i. e. 0.70 x 0.9). 
Based on the given information and Equations 6.12-6.13 out of 1500 ROB cargo 
containers, the value of CSS for 1000 containers is evaluated as 0.7638 (i. e. 0.5 x 
0.8076 + 0.5 x 0.9 x 0.8), the value of CSS for 200 containers is evaluated as 0.4875 
(i. e. 0.65 x 0.75) and for the remainder is evaluated as 0.555 (i. e. 0.74 x 0.75). 
Based on Table 6.4 and the above results Table 6.7 is illustrated. 
Table 6.7: Containers' Security Score of V-ship's Cargo Containers 
Container 
CSS 
import Transhipment ROB 
Low Risk 1000 0 1000 
Medium Risk 0 200 300 
High Risk 0 300 200 
6.5.4. Step 4 
Based on experts' opinion a condition probability table is illustrated (Table 6.8). 
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Table 6.8: CPT (Illicit Material I Low, Medium, and High Risk Cargo Containers) 
CSS 
Illicit 
Material 
Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk 
Present 0 0.5 0.9 
Absent 0.75 0 0 
Uncertain 0.25 0.5 0.1 
6.5.5. Step 5 
The likelihood of security level 1 (i. e. LI), security level 2 (i. e. L2), and security level 3 
(i. e. L3), as shown in Figure 6.4, is evaluated as 0.40,0.22, and 0.38 respectively. 
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Figure 6.4: BN Decision Making Model for Evaluating the Security Level 
6.5.6. Step 6 
Based on Step 5 the value of L1 (i. e. 0.4) is greater than the individual values of L2 (i. e. 
0.22) and L3 (i. e. 0.38) and is lesser than the combination of both (i. e. 0.6). In other 
words additional protective measures should be maintained. Consequently, based on 
Table 6.6, the security level is evaluated as Level 2. 
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6.5.7. Step 7 
Based on Table 6.7,500 transhipment cargo containers and 500 ROB cargo containers 
on board the V-ship are categorised as medium and high risk. Most security experts 
think that, if terrorists were to use a container, they would be involved in the container 
stuffing origin of the shipment, and almost certainly affix appropriate container seals or 
devices to the container (Maritime Security Expo, 2006). Thus, the probability that an 
import cargo container contains illicit materials is higher than the transhipment and 
ROB cargo containers. Assume that after surveillance of port-p's topology (Section 6.3) 
a CPT, as shown in Table 6.9, is illustrated by security experts. 
Table 6.9: Experts' Opinion based on the Topology of Port-p 
Container Import Transhipment ROB 
Illicit 
Material 
Present 0.7 Q7s = 0.5 o'ROa = 0.3 
Absent 1-Q=0.3 1- o'7s = 0.5 1- QROe = 0.7 
If the presence of illicit materials is known with 100% certainty (i. e. instantiation of 
illicit materials), then by using Bayes chain rule the posterior probabilities of the 
transhipment and ROB cargo containers containing illicit materials are evaluated as 
follows: 
P(Container = TS) = NTS 7S 
N+ 
NROBQROB 500 x 0.5 + 500 x 0.3 
62.5% 
P(Container = ROB) = 
NR°BO ROB _ 
500x 0.3 
= 37.5% No +NROBQROB 500x0.5+500x0.3 
Based on the above calculations and since the posterior probability of the transhipment 
cargo containers (i. e. 62.5%) is greater the posterior probability of the ROB cargo 
containers (i. e. 37.5%), therefore, all transhipment cargo containers (i. e. 500TEU) 
should be scanned or physically inspected. 
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6.5.8. Sensitivity Analysis (Final Step) 
A sensitive analysis is used to test the logicality of the delivery of the analysis result. To 
carry out the research the percentage of low, medium, and high risk containers, as 
shown in Table 6.10, is decreased and increased by a certain amount respectively. 
Accordingly the obtained results (i. e. security level) are found to be realistic. 
Table 6.10: Sensitive Analysis 
CSS Likelihood of security level Result 
90% Low risk L, = 0.54 
0% Medium risk L2 = 0.19 Level 1 
10% High risk L3 = 0.27 
85% Low risk L, = 0.51 
0% Medium risk L2 = 0.18 Level 1 
15% High risk L3 = 0.31 
84% Low risk L, = 0.50 
0% Medium risk L2 = 0.18 Level 2 
16% High risk L3 = 0.32 
76.67% Low risk L, = 0.46 
10% Medium risk L2 = 0.21 Level 2 
13.33% High risk L3 = 0.33 
73.33% Low risk L, = 0.44 
10% Medium risk L2 = 0.20 Level 2 
16.67% High risk L3 = 0.36 
71 % Low risk L, = 0.43 
0% Medium risk L2 = 0.17 Level 2 
29% High risk L3 = 0.41 
70% Low risk L, = 0.42 
0% Medium risk L2 = 0.16 Level 3 
30% High risk L3 = 0.42 
66.67% Low risk L, = 0.40 
16.67% Medium risk L2 = 0.22 Level 2 
16.67% High risk L3 = 0.38 
60% Low risk L, = 0.36 
20% Medium risk L2 = 0.22 Level 3 
20% High risk L3 = 0.42 
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6.6. Results and Discussion 
In an ideal condition by scanning all import cargo containers loaded at an overseas port 
of embarkation (e. g. port-A) and to be discharged at a port of disembarkation (e. g. port- 
E), the probability that an import cargo container does not contain illicit material can be 
increased but cannot approach 100% certainty. The reason is that as soon as the cargo is 
loaded on board a vessel it passes through different ports (i. e. B, C, and D) with 
different reliabilities and each of them poses different levels of security risk. Thus the 
only practical way to clear from this dilemma, due to lack of information and number of 
variables, is to enhance the ocean or sea carriers' reliability through enhancing their ship 
staffs reliability. The methodology for selection of and control options for improving 
the ship staffs reliability were shown in Chapters 3 and 4. To analyse the cost and 
benefit (i. e. CBA), the following decision making scenario is developed: 
To increase a shipping company's profit, its manager has to make a decision to take an 
action or not. The manager is uncertain whether the performance of the company's 
employees (i. e. ship staff s performance or SSP) is high, average or low. The cost of an 
action is Ci. It is believed that by taking an action and enhancing the performance of the 
employees (i. e. with average performance) the reliability of the company's vessels will 
increase and accordingly the profit and the net profit associated with an action can be 
estimated as B1 and (Bi - CO respectively. Similarly for the employees with low 
performance, the profit and the net profit associated with an action can be estimated as 
B2 and (BZ - Ci) respectively. An assessment programme (i. e. Audit) will help the 
manager to determine the company's performance (i. e. CP). The cost of an assessment 
programme (i. e. Audit) is C2. The manager assumes that 50%, 30%, and 20% of the 
company's employees are with high, average and low performances respectively. Based 
on experts' opinion a CPT, as shown in Table 6.11, can be illustrated. 
Table 6.11: CPT (Company performance I Performance of Ship Staff) 
SSP 
CP 
High (H) Average (A) Low(L) 
High (H) 0.8 0.1 0.1 
Average (A) 0.1 0.8 0.2 
Low (L) 0.1 0.1 0.7 
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Based on the Bayes chain rule the following equations can be evaluated: 
P(CP = H) =0.8x0.5+ 0.1x0.3+ 0.1x0.2 = 0.45 
P(CP=A)=0.1x0.5+0.8x0.3+0.2x0.2=0.33 
P(CP=L)=0.1x0.5+0.1x0.3+0.7x0.2=0.22 
0.8x0.5 
P(SSP=HICP=H)= =0.89 0.45 
P(SSP=AICP=H)=0.1x0.3 =0.07 0.45 
P(SSP=LjCP=H)= 
0.1x0.2 
= 0.04 0.45 
P(SSP=HI CP=A)= 
0.1x0.5 
= 0.15 0.33 
P(SSP=AI CP=A)= 
0.8x0.3 
=0.73 0.33 
0.2x0.2 
P(SSP =L MCP=A)= = 0.12 0.33 
P(SSP=HICP=L)= 
0.1x0.5 
= 0.22 0.22 
0 3 
P(SSP=AICP=L)= 
0.22 =0.14 (6.13) 
0.7 x0.2 P(SSP=LICP=L)= _0.64 0.22 
A decision tree is a diagram that represents, in a special organised way, the decisions 
and the main external or other events that influence uncertainty, as well as possible 
outcomes of all those decision and events. Figure 6.5 shows a decision tree 
representation and solution to this problem. In Figure 6.5, squares represent decisions 
and the lines coming out of each square show all available distinct options that can be 
selected at the decision analysis point. For instance, as shown in Figure 6.5, to perform 
an assessment programme (i. e. Audit) or not to perform, two lines coming out of "audit 
square" show all available distinct options (i. e. Yes or No) that can be selected by the 
manager. In Figure 6.5, circles show various circumstances that have uncertain 
outcomes and the lines that come out of each circle denote a possible outcome of that 
uncertainty. For instance, as shown in Figure 6.5, the "circle R" shows the result of an 
assessment program and the lines that come out of "circle R" denote possible outcomes 
of that uncertainty (i. e. a company's performance is high, average, or low). Based on 
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Equation 6.13 the probability of each outcome is written on each respective line. Based 
on Figure 6.5, the manager can calculate the overall desirability of those choices. For 
instance, if the manager makes a decision to perform the audit and based on the audit's 
result the company's performance found to be high, then the desirability for taking an 
action can be calculated as follows: 
-0.89x(C1 +C2)+0.07x[B, -(C, +C2))+0.04x[B2 -(C, +C2)) (6.14) 
=0.07xB, +0.04xB2 -(Cl +C2) 
If the assessment (i. e. evaluated by Equation 6.14) is lesser than "- C2 ", then no action 
has to be taken. Thus: 
0.07xB, +0.04xB2 -(C, +C2) <(-C2) 
or 
0.07xB, +0.04xB2 <C, 
(6.15) 
If the manager makes a decision to perform the audit, with similar techniques Equations 
6.14 and 6.15 are evaluated, the desirability for the other choices can be assessed. Thus, 
the three conditions can be summarised as follows: 
1. If a company's performance is high and Cl > 0.07 x B, + 0.04 x B2, then take no 
action. 
2. If a company's performance is average and CI > 0.73 x B1 + 0.12 x B2, then take no 
action. 
3. If a company's performance is low and CI > 0.14 x B1 + 0.64 x B2, then take no 
action. 
As an illustrative example, assume the company owns 10 vessels and the total loss of 
the company due to low reliability of its vessels (i. e. delay, accidents, and detention) is 
estimated as £2,400,000. Assume B2 =2x B1. Thus: 
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B1 + B2 = £2,400,000 
B2 =2xBj 
B1= £800,000 
B2 = £1,600,000 
The manager may take an action to increase the manning scale of all the vessels by 
employing additional Second Officers. The total cost of this action (i. e. C1) is estimated 
as £480,000 (i. e. 12 x 10 x £4000). The cost of an assessment programme (i. e. C2) is 
estimated as £ 100,000. As a result, the condition 1 is satisfied and conditions 2 and 3 
are not satisfied. Consequently and based on Figure 6.5, the expected profit associated 
with this strategy is calculated as: 
-0.45x(C2)+ 
0.33x{-0.15x(Cl + C2) + 0.73 x[B, -(C, +C2)]+0.12x[B2 -(C, +C2)])+ 
0.22 x {-0.22 x (C, +C2)+0.14x[B, -(C, +C2)]+0.64x[B2 -(C, +C2)]}= (6.16) 
0.2717xB, + 0.1804 x B2-0.55xC, -C2 m 
0.27xB, +0.18xB2 -0.55xC, -CZ =£140,000 
Based on Figure 6.5, the expected profit associated with taking an action and not 
performing the audit is calculated as: 
0.5x (-C, )+0.3x (B, -C, )+0.2x (BZ -C, ) = 
0.3xB, +0.2xB2 -C, =£80,000 
(6.17) 
Based on Equations 6.16 and 6.17, the optimal strategy is to perform a crew assessment 
programme; take no action if the company's performance is high, and take an action if 
an assessment programme reveals the company's performance either average or low. 
For the above example and by assuming that the utility function is a linear function of 
the monetary profit, a BN decision making model, as shown in Figure 6.6, is illustrated. 
In Figure 6.6, squares represent decisions and diamonds (i. e. U1 and U2) represent 
utilities. The values for U1 and U2 are shown in Tables 6.12 and 6.13. In Figures 6.6, the 
expected profits associated with taking an action and performing the audit (i. e. yes) or 
not performing the audit (i. e. no) are estimated as £140,000 and £80,000 respectively. 
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0.45 
NO Action - 
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Figure 6.5: Decision Tree for the Shipping Company 
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Table 6.12: Values of U, 
Audit Yes No 
U, -£ 100,000 0 
sh staff reliablltL J 
50,00 Highly Reliable 
30.00 Average Reliable 
Table 6.13: Values of U2 
Action Yes No 
SSP High Average Low High =Average Low 
UZ 4480,000 £320,000 £ 1,120,000 0 0 0 
iý ZUAU LOW Reelable 
U2 
Auät 
yes Audit shlp_staff_r... 
no 
company_p... Action 
UI 
Figure 6.6: BN Decision Making Model for Evaluating the Shipping Company's Profit 
6.7. Conclusion 
Within the previous chapter a FBN model for evaluating a container security score was 
developed. The output of the newly developed model (i. e. security scores of containers) 
is used within this chapter to evaluate the security level of a port, prior to ship / port 
interface. 
This chapter generates a new approach to pre-processing of input data that allows the 
use of standard BN techniques and software tools for evaluating the security level of a 
port. Based on the developed FBN decision making model, port authorities are able to 
assess the level of security risk prior to a containership's arrival at anchorage and 
making decisions accordingly (i. e. the ship permitted, further inspection is required, or 
not entitled to enter the port). 
Based on the analysis, the significant influence of the ship staff's reliability on the level 
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of security risk is revealed within this chapter. As a result, if a shipping company would 
like to expand its security effort to maintain its profit and reputation, the company 
should not only identify its weakness, including human factors in the infrastructure, 
policies and procedure but also ensure that: 
The company security officer, appropriate shore-based company personnel and ship 
security officer receive the necessary training. 
The company security officer, the master of the ship and the ship security officer are 
given the necessary support to fulfil their duties and responsibilities. 
" The person who is responsible for selecting the ship staff is familiar with calculation 
of human reliability and its outcome (i. e. the methodology developed in Chapters 3- 
4) 
A sufficient number of reliable crew members are appointed and engaged on the 
ship in any capacity on business of that ship (i. e. proposed BN Decision making 
model, within this chapter, for evaluating the shipping company's profit). 
" Internal audits are carried out at planned intervals, findings are reviewed and the 
appropriate corrective measures are taken, where necessary. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions and Further Research 
Summary 
Within this chapter the reliability assessment and decision making approaches and 
techniques that would be valuable in safety/security of CLSC operation are outlined. 
Furthermore, the areas, which require more effort to be paid for the enhancement of the 
developed approaches, are summarised. 
7.1. Research Contribution 
More than 90 percent of international cargo passes through seaports, which contribute 
approximately 99 percent to the world economy. Thus, smooth operation of the 
international trade and transportation infrastructure is essential to global trade. The 
integrity of the supply chain system is highly dependent on the reliability of its 
components (i. e. importers, exporters, manufacturers, manufacturing sites, inland 
carriers, warehouses, ports, containerships, container consolidation and deconsolidation 
facilities, etc. ). Additionally the challenges in appropriately assessing the reliability of 
the supply chain are associated with uncertainty. 
There are two types of threat related to ports: direct attacks, or the transport of 
containers containing illicit materials through ports for use in terrorist plot elsewhere in 
a country. If a port is closed to counteract a significant incident or in response to an 
attack, then trading partners are no longer trusted, consumer choices are reduced with 
fewer goods, and possibly higher prices. To prevent the relevant commercial dilemma, 
commercial operators can respond by attempting to mitigate risk. Mitigation can consist 
of attempting to reduce the damage caused by supply chain disruptions, or taking 
actions to prevent or reduce the possibility of supply chain disruptions. If the sources of 
vulnerabilities are known, then an early warning system can focus on these sources and 
help to generate timely awareness of potential and actual disruptions, allowing for 
earlier `mitigation and reduction of losses. Mitigation systems can also assign 
responsibility, detailing who should focus on which areas of security threats. 
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The work presented in this thesis has developed four new analytical models capable of 
performing reliability assessments of a CLSC's components and security/safety 
management under high uncertainties. Such frameworks have been demonstrated by 
four corresponding test cases with regards to safety/security of CLSC operations. The 
frameworks have been developed in a generic sense to be applicable to deal with 
operational and management problems and as a foundation for generation of various 
risk analysis methods and decision making procedures. In summary, the newly 
developed methods and techniques can be summarised as follows: 
" Based on the detailed and comprehensive review of root causes for human error a 
generic model with a hierarchical structure for evaluating the seafarers' reliability, 
by using fuzzy logic and ER approach has been constructed and the methodology for 
evaluating the seafarers' reliability developed. 
.A novel frame of reference (i. e. benchmark) for selection of seafarers, based on their 
reliability, has been created and tested. 
A new approach to pre-processing of input data that allows the use of standard BN 
techniques and software tool for evaluating the seafarers' reliability has been 
developed and constructed. 
.A FBN model to evaluate the reliability of a complex system and to deal with the 
dependent relationships between input variables has been developed. 
"A new symmetric model to enable the wider application of FBN in a generic mode 
has been created. 
"A new FBN methodology has been proposed that allows researchers in the field of 
expert systems to unify possibility and probability approaches to the decision 
making process. 
"A general equation for the prediction of reduction of human reliability attributable to 
a person's continuous hours of wakefulness, acute sleep loss and cumulative sleep 
debt has been formulated. 
9 Methodologies for evaluating the reliability of commercial operators (i. e. importer, 
exporter, manufacturer, etc. ) and premises (i. e. ports, warehouses, manufacturing 
sites, container consolidation and de-consolidation centres) has been developed. 
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Furthermore, by using FBN and symmetric model the methodology for evaluating a 
container's security score has been developed. The new FBN methodology can be 
used for targeting those containers which pose high level of risk to the container 
supply chains. Additionally, the new methodology can be used to identify the 
commercial operators that do not act appropriately to secure their supply chains. 
" The need to formulise port security level decision making has been identified. 
Consequently a new FBN decision making model for evaluating the security level of 
a port, based on security scores of a ship's cargo containers prior to ship / port 
interface, has been developed. Based on the proposed FBN decision making model, 
port authorities are now able to assess the level of security risk prior to a 
containership's arrival at anchorage and making decisions accordingly (i. e. the ship 
permitted, further inspection is required, or not entitled to enter the port). 
"A BN Decision making model has been formulated. The model can be used to 
analyse the company's costs, benefits and potential company's profit. 
It is believed that these newly developed methods can be adapted to the practical 
application of dealing with safety/security problems in other industries, particularly in 
situations where a high level of uncertainty exists. More specifically: 
The fuzzy logic and Bayesian probability inferences are two major uncertainty 
reasoning theories. Because of their flexibility and prediction capabilities, both 
fuzzy logic and BNs have shown much potential in the field of risk assessment 
including broad risk analysis, risk prediction and risk based decision making. The 
FBN methodologies developed within this thesis on the basis of the two theories can 
be considered as the contribution to the absence of the literature of risk and 
reliability studies in the context of CLSCs and the transference of the knowledge of 
uncertainty treatment to the area of risk assessment. 
" In risk assessment and safety/security management the tactic for managing 
uncertainty is a main concern. Irrespective of what approach to be applied it is 
always dependent on human judgment to manage the uncertainties. In other words, 
the deficiencies of risk modelling resulting from the lack of data or a high level of 
uncertainty as a result of intrinsic feature of complex systems must be made up by 
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means of general evaluation capacity of humans, who are able to grasp the essence 
of an object even if it is vague and unclear. In modelling realistic safety/security 
scenarios using BNs, the converging connections are more popular than diverging 
and serial connections. This point can be supported by many widely used 
hierarchical risk analysis approaches such as FTA. The converging connections are 
more difficult to handle appropriately compared to the diverging and serial 
connections in BNs; they are not friendly enough for human knowledge and may be 
too specific for any expert. A novel "Symmetric ModeP' has been developed within 
this thesis to have the capability of dealing with such a problem, thus helping the 
wider applications of BNs in a generic mode. 
Since the test cases in this study provide reasonable results, the analytical models 
developed have the potential to improve the safety of CLSC operation by enabling and 
facilitating the decision makers to evaluate the reliability of a seafarer prior to his/her 
designation to any activities and during his/her seafaring period, and evaluating the 
outcome (i. e. CBA). The new methods have the potential to improve the security of 
CLSC operation by targeting those containers with high or medium level of risk 
particularly in circumstances where the lack of data exists or such information is 
associated with a high level of uncertainty without jeopardising the efficiency of 
operation. Furthermore, they can be used for evaluating the security level of a port, 
based on security scores of a ship's cargo containers prior to ship / port interface. Such 
that port authorities are able to assess the level of security risk prior to a containership's 
arrival at anchorage and making decisions accordingly (i. e. the ship permitted, further 
inspection is required, or not entitled to enter the port). 
7.2. Implication for Future Research 
Although this programme of research provides a comprehensive analysis related to the 
risk assessment and decision making of the CLSC operation, further opportunities for 
the application of the ideas developed have been identified. Further research 
opportunities are listed as follows: 
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Firstly, within Chapter 2 under heading of historical failure data and statistical analysis, 
the data was collected for UK merchant vessels via the M4IB. However, for further 
research there is the possibility of using international databases such as Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and 
Marine Accident Investigators' International Forum (MAIF). This will provide a more 
extensive input data set. 
Secondly, within this thesis an AHP methodology was used to obtain the relative 
importance of each criterion or attribute. In order to conduct the assessment, a group of 
three experts were employed. However, for further research the number of experts could 
be increased and they could be selected from a range of different maritime industries 
(e. g. port state controls, ship owners, ship staff, marine academia, and marine 
superintendents). This would further increase the applicability of the newly developed 
techniques and may give rise to further interesting findings. 
Thirdly, in Chapter 4a general equation (i. e. Equation 4.31) for the prediction of loss of 
human reliability as a function of a person's continuous hours of wakefulness, acute 
sleep loss and cumulative sleep debt was formulated. Furthermore, Equation 4.31 was 
validated by help of two test cases (i. e. Lindbergh's Flight to Paris and Guantanamo 
Bay Aviation Accident). For complete validation of Equation 4.31, further research 
under simulation laboratory conditions can be conducted as follows: 
" Firstly, in a simulation laboratory a person should be designated to operate a gantry 
crane for four consecutive hours. Such an experiment will test the effects of fatigue 
on coordination and concentration during the loading and unloading of container 
vessels. 
" Secondly, the number of the operations (i. e. the number of consecutive movements 
for loading and discharging) and the number of errors (i. e. the number of incidents 
and accidents) should be recorded. The number of errors divided by the number of 
operations can indicate a person's unreliability value. Accordingly the designated 
person's reliability value can be calculated. 
Thirdly, an identical test should be carried out by the same person and with different 
percentages of sleep loss (i. e. in a 24- hour period). 
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9 Fourthly, the difference of his/her reliability value in steps 2 and 3 can indicate the 
reduction of his/her reliability due to continuous hours of wakefulness, acute sleep 
loss and cumulative sleep debt. 
" Fifthly, Steps 1-4 should be repeated with at least ten different persons, the 
associated deviation should be studied accordingly. 
Such a series of tests could also be a carried out on selected deck officers through the 
use of a ship/bridge simulator. 
Fourthly, in Chapter 5a general equation (i. e. Equation 5.4) for evaluating the 
increment of an importer's reliability (i. e. S) due to observation of no violation with 
customs laws and regulations through inspection or scanning of "N" consecutive 
containers at the port of embarkation was formulated. Based on the security requirement, 
the value of C in Equation 5.4 was assigned by the author. To evaluate a rational value 
for C, based on the following, further research in different ports can be conducted. 
" The availability of illicit materials or contraband at the host country. 
" The willingness of terrorist organisations to attack the port or its host country. 
" The damage capability and recall difficulties after an attack. 
" The consequences of an attack in world trade or international supply chain. 
" The reliability of the host country and the port. 
Fifthly, The complexity of container line supply chains leads to a lack of transparency 
which interferes with the ability to monitor their safety/security. Based on the physical 
security requirements and procedural security standards identified within this thesis, it 
was suggested that the commercial operators and premises be certified by an 
independent competent body such as a reputable classification society. As a result, the 
effectiveness of the check lists which have been constructed in Appendix 4 should be 
further investigated by the classification societies. Furthermore, the security score of 
commercial operators and premises should be included within classification societies' 
audits. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Summary of Security Initiative, Conventions, Rules and Regulations 
ALL Special Measure to Enhance Maritime Security 
International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (i. e. ISPS Code) enforced from I 
of July 2004. Part A of the Code is mandatory and part B contains guidance as how to 
comply with the mandatory requirements. The regulation requires administrations to set 
security, levels and ensure the provision of security level information to ships entitled to 
fly their flag. Prior to entering a port, or whilst in a port, within the territory of a 
contracting government, a ship shall comply with the requirements for the security level 
set by that contracting government, if that security level is higher than the security level 
set by the administration for that ship. Regulation X1-2/8 confirms the role of the Master 
in exercising his professional judgement over decisions necessary to maintain the 
security of the ship. It says he shall not be constrained by the company, the chatterer or 
any other person in this respect. Regulation XI-2/5 requires all ships to be provided with 
a ship security alert system. When activated the ship security alert system shall initiate 
and transmit a ship-to-shore security alert to a competent authority designated by the 
administration, identifying the ship, its location and indicating that the security of the 
ship is under threat or it has been compromised. The system will not raise any alarm on- 
board the ship. The ship security alert system shall be capable of being activated from 
the navigation bridge and in at least one other location. Regulation XI-2/6 covers 
requirements for port facilities, providing among other things for contracting 
governments to ensure that port facility security assessments are carried out and that 
port facility security plans are developed, implemented and reviewed in accordance with 
the ISPS Code. Other regulations in this chapter cover the provision of information to 
IMO, the control of ships in port, (including measures such as the delay, detention, 
restriction of operations including movement within the port, or expulsion of a ship 
from port), and the specific responsibility of companies (IMO, 2003). 
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A1.2. Twenty-Four Hour Advanced Cargo Rule 
The rule requires all sea carriers (with the exception of bulk carriers and approved break 
bulk cargo) to provide proper cargo descriptions and valid consignee addresses twenty- 
four hours before cargo is loaded at the foreign port for shipment to the United States. 
Prior to this requirement, many cargo manifests would simply declare that the container 
had "Freight All Kind" or "General Merchandise " (Kelly, 2007). 
A1.2.1. Automated Targeting System (ATS) 
ATS takes manifest information provided in accordance with the twenty-four hour rule 
and uses a system that integrates enforcement and commercial databases. The system is 
designed to detect anomalies and determines which cargo is high-risk and should be 
subject to additional scrutiny. ATS accomplishes this by analysing the data and rank 
ordering it based on certain rules and algorithms. Upon reaching certain thresholds, 
cargo may be targeted for further action by Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 
including physical inspection of the container (Kelly, 2007). 
A1.3. Container Security Initiative (CSI) 
Under CSI, teams of CBP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel 
are assigned to (currently) fifty-four ports around the world that collectively account for 
about ninety per cent of the containerised freight destined for the U. S. The program 
calls for CBP to work with host nation customs officials to examine high-risk containers 
at foreign seaports before they are loaded on vessels bound for the U. S. The three core 
elements of CSI are (Kelly, 2007): 
1. Identify high-risk containers. CBP uses automated targeting tools to identify 
containers that pose a potential risk for terrorism, based on advance information and 
strategic intelligence. 
2. Pre-screen and evaluate containers before they are shipped. Containers are screened 
as early in the supply chain as possible, generally at the port of departure. 
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3. Use technology to pre-screen high-risk containers to ensure that screening can be 
done rapidly without slowing down the movement of trade. This technology 
includes large-scale X-ray and gamma ray machines and radiation detection devices. 
A1.3.1. Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) 
SFI is a pilot program designed to test high-volume scanning at six ports in Pakistan, 
Honduras, UK, Oman, Singapore and South Korea. Containers arriving at participating 
ports are scanned with both non-intrusive radiographic imaging and passive radiation 
detection equipment placed at terminal arrival gates to screen incoming containers. 
Transhipment cargo containers (i. e. those being transferred from ship to ship) would 
also be scanned. Sensor and image data concerning U. S. bound containers will be 
transmitted in near real-time to the National Targeting Centre where it will be combined 
with other available risk data to improve risk scoring and targeting of high-risk 
containers; thus enhancing the opportunity to conduct further scrutiny of suspect cargo 
while still overseas (Kelly, 2007). 
A13.2. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) 
C-TPAT is a "public-private partnership" that is designed to strengthen the global 
supply chain by the voluntary agreement of the private sector program participants to 
adopt a wide range of security measures. For example, in the area of container and 
trailer security, members are required to take certain measures to ensure that containers 
and truck trailers are protected against the introduction of unauthorized material and/or 
persons. At the point-of-stuffing, containers and trailers must be sealed using an 
approved "high security" seal and an inspection must be conducted to assure the 
physical integrity of the box. Other C-TPAT requirements include personnel security, 
procedural security, information technology security, physical security and security 
training/threat awareness. C-TPAT is open to a wide range of industries in the trade 
community including importers, sea, air and land carriers, airfreight consolidators, 
port/terminal operators, and foreign manufacturers and warehousing operators. In return 
for their participation, C-TPAT members are extended certain benefits that reduce the 
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level of inspection that participant's shipments are subjected to when entering the 
United States. Because of their certification as a C-TPA T member, the risk profile on 
their shipments is reduced; thus subjecting it to a far lower likelihood of extensive 
documentary and physical inspection. Additionally, they receive access to FAST lanes 
on the Canadian and Mexican border and expedited cargo processing at FAST lanes. C- 
TPAT members are certified by CBP based on self-reported compliance with mandated 
security measures and are vetted, in part, based on prior history concerning violations 
and compliance with customs regulations. Critics of C-TPAT question whether CBP has 
sufficient procedures and personnel to validate that members are indeed compliant with 
mandated security measures (Kelly, 2007). 
A1.3.3. Mega Ports Initiative 
The initiative provides early detection of possible illegal trafficking of nuclear materials 
through foreign ports. Under this program, the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA) installs radiation detection equipment at foreign ports to 
strengthen the detection and exclusion capabilities of officials within the partner 
nations. The program is designed to provide the foreign governments with the ability to 
screen incoming, outbound and transhipped cargo while posing a minimal threat of 
delay to port operations. NNSA has identified seventy ports of interest in some thirty- 
five countries based on the volume of U. S. bound containers. To date, however, it is 
only operational in Greece, Bahamas, Sri Lanka, Spain, Singapore and the Netherlands 
(Kelly, 2007). 
A1.4. Conventions & Regulations 
Based on Singapore Shipping Association (SSA, 2008)'s research the following 
conventions and regulations regarding minimum standards expected for planning, 
loading, transportation and discharge of containers with the aim of preventing further 
accident are listed. 
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A1.4.1. International Convention for Safe Containers 1972 (CSC Convention) 
The stated objective of the CSC Convention is to maintain a high level of safety of 
human life in transport and handling of containers by providing acceptable test 
procedures and related strength requirements and to facilitate the international 
transportation of containers through uniform international safety regulations equally 
applicable to all modes of surface transport. There are two annexes to the Convention. 
Annex 1 provides, over the course of five chapters, the regulatory framework by which 
administrations may approve containers as conforming to the maintenance and 
examination criteria of the instrument. Annex 2 concerns the structural safety 
requirements and tests for containers and provides a number of test loads and 
procedures for containers in operational contexts such as lifting, stacking, transverse 
racking, etc. It should be noted that the CSC does allow for the approval of containers 
that do not meet the structural norms of the ISO standards upon which most vessel 
stowage systems are bound. 
A1.4.2. Code of Safe Practice for Cargo Stowage and Securing (CSS) 
The CSS code aims to provide an international standard to promote the safe stowage and 
securing of cargoes, including containers, by a number of means, and establishes the 
general principles of cargo stowage and securing. The code is divided into seven 
chapters that set out securing systems and appropriate actions to be taken in heavy 
weather following the shifting of the cargo. There are 13 annexes to the code that 
address safe stowage and securing procedures for specific types of cargo. 
A1.4.3. International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code 
The IMDG code is the instrument under SOLAS that governs dangerous goods 
transported in the marine environment. Importantly, the code does not only concern 
itself with the carriage of dangerous goods in packaged form in containers, but also with 
terminology, packaging, labeling, placarding, markings, stowage, segregation, handling, 
and emergency response. It therefore extends beyond the ship to shore side operations 
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concerning the packaging and transport of dangerous good in containers. The code is 
divided into two volumes and a supplement. The first volume covers general provisions, 
definitions and training, classifications of dangerous goods, packing and tank 
provisions, consignment procedures, construction and testing of cargo receptacles and 
provisions concerning transport operations. The second volume consists of the 
dangerous goods list and limited quantities exemptions. The code is under permanent 
review and amendments are published on annual basis. 
A1.4.4. Containers Regulations (ISO standards) 
All containers destined for carriage by sea should comply with both the international 
regulations detailed below, as well as the ISO Standards contained at Appendix X of 
International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC). All containers presented for 
carriage by sea must comply with the Container Safety Convention 1984 as noted 
below: 
1. The International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC) requires that all those 
operating containers internationally by sea have in place a system of examination, 
maintenance and record keeping to ensure that they operate their container fleets 
safely; their system must be approved by their competent authority, and in particular 
that: 
9 All containers are CSC plated. 
9 All containers have a Next Examination Date (NED), which is a date in the 
future, or / and ACEP approval decal. 
" Records are kept of CSC examinations and NED. 
An Approved Container Examination Procedure (ACEP) is in place. 
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Table Al. 1: Summary of International Rules and Regulations for Containerships 
Title, Alphabetical order Source Code version 
Automatic Identification system SOLAS AIS 2004 
Cargo Securing Manual SOLAS MSC. 69 69 CSM 2002 
Code of Safe Practice for Cargo Stowage and CSS 1992 
Securing 
Code on Alarms and Indicator IMO Resolution ISM 
A. 830 XIX 
Convention on International Regulations for COLREG 1972/2002 
Preventing Collisions at Sea 
Explanatory notes to the standards for ship MSC Circ. 1053 ISM 
manoeuvrability 
Fire Test Procedure Code MSC. 80 43 FTP 2002 
Guidance for implementation of SOLAS chapter XI-2 MSC circ. 1097 ISM 
and ISPS code 
Guidelines for the control and management of ship's IMO resolution ISM 
ballast water to minimise the transfer of harmful A. 868(XX) 
aquatic organisms and pathogen 
Harmonised System of Surveys and Certification SOLAS MSC. 88 71 HSSC 2001 
Inspection of water tight bulkheads SOLAS MSC. 69 69 2002 
Interim ideline for Top Containership MSC/Circ. 608 1994, Rev. I 
Interim Standards for Ship Manoeuvrability IMO resolution ISM 
A. 751 18 
International Code for MSC. 98(73) FSS 2002 
Fire Safety System 
International Code for the Safe carriage of packaged SOLAS MSC. 88(71) INF 2001 
irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and high -level 
radioactive waste on board ships 
International Convention for Safety of life at sea SOLAS 2004 
International Convention on Load lines MSC. 143(77) ILLC 66/68 2005 
International convention on tonnage measurement of 1969 
ships, amended by IMO resolution A. 493(XII) and 
A. 494 II 
International convention on standards of Training, STCW 1978 
Certification and watch keeping for seafarers 
International Convention for prevention of pollution MARPOL 1973/78,1991 Plus 
from ships including annex VI prevention of air amendments 
Ilution from ships 1997 
International Life-Saving Appliances Code LSA 2003 
International Management code for the safe operation SOLAS MSC. 99(73) ISM 1994/2002 
of ships and for pollution prevention amended by 
IMO resolution 
A. 741(18) 
International Maritime dangerous Goods Code SOLAS IMDG 2004/2006 
MSC. 123 75 
Issues to be considered when introducing new MSC circ. 1091 ism 
technology on board ships 
Prevention of air pollution on ships IMO resolution ISM 
A. 7 19 XVII 
Principles relating to bridge design MSC/Circ. 982 ism 
Provision and display of manoeuvring information IMO resolution ISM 
onboard ships A. 601 XV 
Safe Access to working in large Cargo tanks and IMO resolutions ISM 
ballast Spaces A. 272(VIII)and 
A. 330(IX) 
Special measure to enhance Maritime Security SOLAS chanter XI-2 2004 
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Appendix 2 
Solution to Test Case (Chapter 3) 
By help of the proposed methodology (Section 3.9) and the following information, the 
Master of a container vessel can assess the reliability of a Third Officer under his 
command and evaluate the variation of the Third Officer's reliability value by alteration 
of each criterion's value. 
A2.1. Information 
The Third Officer is 30 years old. 
He holds an approved "officer in charge of navigational watch" certificate of 
competency (STCW 95) with the level of competency as a second mate and does not 
hold a BSc degree in nautical science. 
" He has a valid medical fitness certificate, and 31.2 months of qualifying sea service. 
" He holds the following approved certificates: 
1. Ethic and leadership certificate. 
2. Basic safety training (BST) certificate. 
3. Advanced fire prevention & fire fighting certificate. 
4. Radar simulation training certificate. 
5. Global maritime distress safety system (GMDSS) certificate. 
6. First aid training certificate. 
7. Survival craft and rescue boat training certificate. 
8. Automated radar plotting aids (ARPA) training certificate. 
9. ISM attendance course certificate. 
10. Bridge resource management (BRM) attendance course certificates. 
" Pursuant to his statements, the quality of the foods, which are served on board, is 
"not bad". 
" He had 8 hours rest in previous night. 
" Based on his statements, the level of his stress is "moderate" and he is "healthy". 
285 
. The values of Beaufort number for the last two days are indicated as 4 and 5 
respectively. 
The vessel is partially loaded and the value of metacentric height (GM) is 3 meters. 
" Based on the available data (during design and construction) and pursuant to ABS 
guidance notes for the application of ergonomics to marine systems, the design & 
layout grade is estimated as 100% very good. 
9 The design & habitability grade for the last two days is estimated as 100% good. 
" Based on the Master's observation, he is punctual, needs supervision occasionally, 
and is enthusiastic. 
" Based on the Master's judgement, the grade of his communication and language 
skill is medium, his teamwork is good, and the grade of his decision-making is 
medium. 
. To estimate his situation awareness, the Master has demonstrated a scenario. The 
Master asked him to elucidate his actions regarding the presented scenario. 
Accordingly, the grade of his situation awareness is evaluated as good. 
A2.2. Qualification 
Based on the previous discussion (Section 3.4.1) the decision makers have assigned the 
following fuzzy rules for a deck officer's qualification: 
" If a person holds a BSc degree in nautical science and an approved chief 
mate/master certificate of competency (STCW 95) with the level of competency as a 
master, then his qualification is 100% excellent. 
" If a person holds an approved chief mate/master certificate of competency (STCW 
95) with the level of competency as a master, then his qualification is 20% excellent 
and 80% very good. 
" If a person holds a BSc degree in nautical science and an approved chief 
mate/master certificate of competency (STCW 95) with the level of competency as a 
chief mate, then his qualification is 100% very good. 
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. If a person holds an approved chief mate/master certificate of competency (STCW 
95) with the level of competency as a chief mate, then his qualification is 20% very 
good and 80% good. 
" If a person holds a BSc degree in nautical science and an approved officer in charge 
of a navigational watch certificate of competency (STCW 95) with the level of 
competency as a third or second mate, then his qualification is 100% good. 
" If a person holds an approved officer in charge of a navigational watch certificate of 
competency (STCW 95) with the level of competency as a third or second mate, 
then his qualification is 20% good and 80% average. 
" If a person does not hold any certificate of competency, then his qualification is 
100% low (e. g. fake certificate) and his or her reliability value is zero. 
Based on the given information and the stated rules, the Third Officer's qualification set 
is assessed as follows: 
{(Excellent, 0), (Very good, 0), (Good, 0.2), (Average, 0.8), (Low, 0)) 
The decision makers have assigned the following fuzzy rules for mapping from 
qualification to technical proficiency (Figure A2.1): 
" If a person qualification is excellent, then his/her technical proficiency is 100% very 
good. 
" If a person's qualification is very good, then his/her technical proficiency is 20% 
very good and 80% good. 
" If a person's qualification is good, then his/her technical proficiency is 10% good 
and 90% average. 
If a person's qualification is average, then his/her technical proficiency is 20% 
average and 80% fairly low. 
If a person's qualification is low, then his/her technical proficiency is 100% low. 
Based on Equations (3.3-3.5), the following is obtained: 
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u2=0.2x0.1=0.02, u3=0.2x0.9+0.8x0.2=0.34, u4=0.8x0.8=0.64 
FUZZY OUTPUT 
1=0 u2 = 0.02 u3 = 0.34 u4 
Fu 0.64 us =0 Technical 
V. Good Good Average Flow Low Proficiency 
Qi=0.2 
ßi=. l 
Q2=O. H =0.9 sO. 
2 ý4°O. H 165=1 
B1=1 
Excellent V. Good Good 1% ge LOW Qualification 
11=0 1lZ=o 13=0.2 1`= 0.8 i =o 
FUZZY INPUT 
Figure A2.1: Mapping from Qualification to Technical Proficiency 
The fuzzy output set is assessed as follows: 
To = {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0.02), (Average, 0.34), (Fairly Low, 0.64), (Low, 0)) 
A2.3. Experience 
Based on the given information, the Third Officer has 31.2 months of qualifying sea 
service. Based on Figure 3.6 and Equation (3.20), the belief degrees are calculated as 
follows: 
" Hn+i stands for Average grade. 
" H stands for Low grade. 
" hi = 31.2, h,,,; = 30, and hn+i,; = 36. 
Thus, 8n,; = (36-31.2)1(36-30) =0.8 with the Low grade and ß,, 4- l,; =1- 0.8 = 0.2 
with the Average grade. Therefore, the Third Officer's experience set is assessed: 
E= ((Very Low, 0), (Low, 0.8), (Average, 0.2), (Good, 0), (Very Good, 0)) 
The mapping process, as shown in Figure A2.2, is elucidated and elaborated. 
Accordingly, the fuzzy output set is evaluated as follows: 
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TE = {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.28), (Fairly Low, 0.72), (Low, 0)} 
u1=0 u2=0 u3=0.28 u*=0.72 
Y 
Technical 
V. Good Good Average F. Low Proficiency 
Q4 = 0. ö ii? =0.6 Q3=0.6 
ýý=1 
QZ=0.4 8; =0.4 
ý4-0.2 
V. Good Good Avera e Gow V. Low Experience 
j'=0 12=0 13= 0.2 14=0.8 js=0 
FUZZY INPUT 
Figure A2.2: Mapping from Experience to Technical Proficiency 
A2.4. Specific Training 
Based on the previous discussion (Section 3.4.2) the decision makers have assigned the 
following fuzzy rules for a deck officer's specific training. It is noteworthy to mention 
that for special vessels (i. e. LNG, Tanker, RORO, passenger, etc) additional 
requirements have to be considered. 
If a person holds the following certificates, then his/her specific training is 100% 
excellent. 
1. Ethic and leadership certificate. 
2. Advanced medical training certificate. 
3. Basic safety training (BST) certificate. 
4. Advanced fire prevention & fire fighting certificate. 
5. Radar simulation training certificate. 
6. Global maritime distress safety system (GMDSS) certificate. 
7. First aid training certificate. 
8. Survival craft and rescue boat training certificate. 
9. Automated radar plotting aids (ARPA) training certificate. 
10. ISM attendance course certificate. 
11. Bridge resource management (BRM) attendance course certificates. 
. If a person holds the following certificates, then his/her specific training is 20% 
excellent and 80% very good. 
1. Ethic and leadership certificate. 
2. BST certificate. 
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3. Advanced fire prevention & fire fighting certificate. 
4. Radar simulation training certificate. 
5. GMDSS certificate. 
6. First aid training certificate. 
7. Survival craft and rescue boat training certificate. 
8. ARPA training certificate. 
9. ISM attendance course certificate. 
10. BRM attendance course certificates. 
" If a person holds the following certificates, then his/her specific training is 100% 
good. 
1. BST certificate. 
2. Advanced fire prevention & fire fighting certificate. 
3. Radar simulation training certificate. 
4. GMDSS certificate. 
5. First aid training certificate. 
6. Survival craft and rescue boat training certificate. 
7. ARPA training certificate. 
8. ISM attendance course certificate. 
9. BRM attendance course certificates. 
If a person holds the following certificates, then his/her specific training is 20% 
good and 80% average. 
1. BST certificate. 
2. Advanced fire prevention & fire fighting certificate. 
3. Radar simulation training certificate. 
4. GMDSS certificate. 
5. First aid training certificate. 
6. Survival craft and rescue boat training certificate. 
7. ARPA training certificate. 
8. ISM attendance course certificate. 
If a person does not hold any certificate, then his/her specific training is 100% low 
(e. g. fake certificate) and his or her reliability value is zero. 
Based on the stated rules and the given information, the Third Officer's specific training 
set is assessed as follows: 
S= {(Excellent, 0.2), (Very good, 0.8), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0)} 
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The mapping process is elucidated as shown in Figure A2.3, and the fuzzy output set is 
evaluated as follows: 
Ts = {(Very Good, 0.2), (Good, 0.64), (Average, 0.16), (Fairly Low, 0), (Low, 0)) 
FUZZY OUTPUT 
ul0,2 u2=0.64 u3=0.16 u°0 us=0 Technical 
1V. Good Good Average F. Low Low Proficiency 
3 
Q2°0.8 ßz0.2 ß3=0.1 
0'4 =0.2 
Q3=0.9 '64 
Qs-i 
Excellent V. Good Good Average Low Specific 
j'=0.2 12=0.8 3=0 14=0 1s=0 Training 
FUZZY INPUT 
Figure A2.3: Mapping from Specific Training to Technical Proficiency 
A2.5. Aggregation of Sub-Criteria 
The weight of each sub-criterion can be extracted from Table 3.8. Moreover, by help of 
the IDS software, as shown in Figure A2.4, TQ, TE and TS are aggregated and the 
result is presented in Table A2.1. 
Table A2.1: Aggregation of Sub-Criteria (Technical Proficiency) 
Technical Very Good Good Average Fairly Low Low Weight 
Proficiency 
7, 
Q 
0 0.02 0.34 0.64 0 0.3708 
7. 
E 
0 0 0.28 0.72 0 0.3408 
7, TS 0.2 0.64 0.16 0 0 0.2884 
Aggregation 0.0474 0.1605 0.2712 0.5209 0 
Result 0.05 = 0.16 = 0.27 = 0.52 
291 
First aftmative Technical Proficiency 
100.00% 
90.00% 
80.00% 
G) 70.00% 
Q) 
60.00% 
-gyp 50.00% 
OD 40.00% U) 
CO 30.00% 
20.00% 
10.00% 
0.00% 
Low 
52.09% 
Figure A2.4: Technical Proficiency Aggregation Result 
A2.6. Mapping from Main Criterion (Technical proficiency) to Goal 
The main criterion (i. e. technical proficiency) can be transformed to the goal (i. e. Third 
Officer's reliability) by formulating a mapping process. Based on Table A2.1, the fuzzy 
set for the Third Officer's technical proficiency can be written as follows: 
T= {(Very Good, 0.05), (Good, 0.16), (Average, 0.27), (Fairly Low, 0.52), (Low, 0)} 
The mapping process, as shown in Figure A2.5, is elaborated and elucidated. The fuzzy 
output set is evaluated as follows: 
G,. = {(High, 0.08), (Fairly High, 0.16), (Medium, 0.34), (Fairly Low, 0.42), (Low, 0)} 
where G, stands for fuzzy output set that is evaluated by mapping from technical 
proficiency to the Third Officer's reliability. 
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Fairly Low Good 
Average Very Good 
Evaluation grades 
0.08 u1=0.16 
1u'=0.34 u'=0.42 u'=0 
Medium F. Low Lam, 
Third Officers Reliability 
ihF. High 
0.2 ß, =0.1 
ell B2 0.8 0.9 
Bi-0.2 , 
8z = f=0.8 _3=1 
Technical Proficiency 
11'=0.051 11` =0.161 I13=0.271 Il'=0.521 Il' ' OI 
FUZZY INPUT 
Figure A2.5: Mapping from Technical Proficiency to the Third Officer's Reliability 
A2.7. Rest Hours 
pursuant to the given information, the Third Officer had 8hrs rest/day, based on Figure 
3.8; the fuzzy set for his rest hours is evaluated as follows: 
R= {(Very Good, 1), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)} 
The mapping process is illustrated in Figure A2.6, and the fuzzy out put set is evaluated 
as below: 
HR = {(Very Low, 1), (Low, 0), (Medium, 0), (High, 0), (Very High, 0)) 
I =j u2=0 u3 =o u4=o tls=o 
V. Low Low Medium High V. High Human Fatigue 
B=1 
g2=0. ö 
ß4= 0.9 
i2=0.2 
Q3=o. ö 
'64 
q'=1 rs 
V. Good Good Average 
Low VlOw Rest Hours 
I'=1 11=o I'=o 14=o Is=o 
FUZZY INPUT 
Figure A2.6: Mapping from Rest Hours to Human Fatigue 
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A2.8. Environmental State 
Pursuant to the given information and Sub-Section 3.10.3.1, the average Beaufort 
number is 4.5, based on Figure 3.5 and Equation 3.20, the fuzzy set for Environmental 
State can be evaluated as follows: 
ES = {(Very Calm, 0), (Calm, 0.5), (Moderate, 0.5), (Rough, 0), (Very Rough, 0)) 
The mapping process is illustrated in Figure A2.7, and the fuzzy out put set is evaluated 
as follows: 
HES = {(Very Low, 0.1), (Low, 0.4), (Medium, 0.4), (High, 0.1), (Very High, 0)} 
u7=0.1 u1=o. 4 uj=0.4 u°=0.1 
W=O 
Human Fatigue 
V. LOW Low Medium High V. High 
7 
Q2=0.8 
3_ ßs-0.8 Q3_0.2 
0: - 0.1 
11 
1_ ß2=0.2 
64 0. 
ýs=1 
V. Calm Calm Moderate Rh oug 
Environmental 
V 
. 
Rough state 
1`=0 12=05 13 =o. s 14=o IS=o 
FUZZY NPUT 
Figure A2.7: Mapping from Environmental State to Human Fatigue 
A2.9. Design & Habitability 
Based on the given information, the fuzzy set for Design & Habitability is evaluated as 
follows: 
DH = {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 1.0), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0), (Very Bad, 0)} 
The mapping process is shown in Figure A2.8, and the fuzzy out put set is evaluated as 
follows: 
HDH = {(Very Low, 0.2), (Low, 0.8), (Medium, 0), (High, 0), (Very High, 0)} 
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1u3=0 u°=0 u'=0 
Medium High Y. Hfgh Human Fatigue 
(3; - o. 1 
'6ä = 0.9 B3=0.8 6s1 
ß=O. 2 
Y. Good 
1`=0 
Good Average lý" I Design 
J72 
-rn 13 =n 
I1 0I )sý= p and Habitability 
FUZZY INPUT 
Figure A2.8: Mapping from Design &Habitability to Human Fatigue 
A2.10. Aggregation of Sub-Criteria 
The weight of each sub-criterion can be extracted from Table 3.10. Moreover, by help 
N 
of the IDS software, as shown in Figure A2.9, IHR , 
HES, and H., are aggregated and 
the result is presented in Table A2.2. 
Table A2.2: Aggregation of Sub-Criteria of Human Fatigue 
Human Very low Low Medium High Very high Weight 
fatigue 
H 
R 
1 0 0 0 0 0.4491 
HEs 0.1 0.40 0.40 0.1 0 0.2880 
HDH 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 0.2629 
Aggregation 0.5954 0.2870 0.0941 0.0235 0 
Result = 0.6 = 0.28 = 0.1 = 0.02 
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100.00% ., ': 
n 
90.00% 
80.00% 
70.00% 
0) 
60.00% 
N 
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y-. 
a) 40.00% 0) 
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20.00% 
10.00% 
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Evaluation grades 
Figure A2.9: Human Fatigue Aggregation Result 
A2.11. Mapping from Main Criterion (Human Fatigue) to Goal 
Very Low 
The main criterion (i. e. human fatigue) can be transformed to the g oal (i. e. Third 
Officer's reliability) by formulating a mapping process. Based on Table A2.2, the fuzzy 
set for the Third Officer's fatigue can be written as follows: 
H= {(Very Low, 0.6). (Low, 0.28), (Medium, 0.1), (High, 0.02), (Very High, 0)) 
The mapping process is shown in Figure A2.10, and the fuzzy out put set is evaluated 
as follows: 
GH = {(High, 0.656), (Fairly High, 0.224), (Medium, 0.1), (Fairly low, 0.0 16), (Low, 0.004)} 
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ul = 0.656 u2= -0.1 - 0.224 uj u4 - 0.0161 us = 
0.004 
Third Officer's 
High F. High 
1Medium 
F. Low Low Reliability 
, Bz = 0.8 
i=1 /ýz=0.2 =1.0 
V. Low Low Medium 
j'=0.6 1ý=0.28 13=0.1 
FUZZY INPUT 
Figure A2.10: Mapping from Human 
P4 - 0.2 
Qä 0.8 
Qs=ý 
High V. High Human Fatigue 
'=0.02 =0 
Fatigue to the Third Officer's Reliability 
A2.12. Situation Awareness 
Based on the given information the grade of the Third Officer's situation awareness is 
evaluated as good. Thus, the fuzzy set can be evaluated as follows: 
SÄ = {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 1.0), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)} 
The mapping process is shown in Figure A2.11, and the fuzzy out put set is evaluated as 
follows: 
N? = {(Very Good, 0.2), (Good, 0.8), (Average, 0), (Fairly low, 0), (Low, 0)) 
u'=0.2 u2=0. ö u4=0 
u 
V. Good Good F. Loý+' Low Non-Technical 
Skill 
r 
s 13. - 0.1 
'6i = 0.8 i1 Qä=09 
i O 
Qs=I 
. Z ß; =0.2 
V. Good Good Medium Low V. Low Situation 
jJ =0 j1=1.0 
3 =0 
jý 0 is =0 
Awareness 
FUZZY INPUT 
Figure A2.11: Mapping from Situation Awareness to Non-Technical Skill 
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A2.13. Communication & Language Skill 
Based on the given information, the Third Officer's communication & language skill is 
Medium. Thus, the fuzzy set can be evaluated as follows: 
CL = {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Medium, 1.0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)} 
The mapping process is shown in Figure A2.12, and the fuzzy output set can be 
evaluated as follows: 
NTci = {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.8), (Fairly low, 0.2), (Low, 0)) 
u1=0 u2=0 u3=0.8 u4=0.2 u'=0 
V. Good Good Average F"+' LON' Non-Technical 
Skill 
p2 = 0.8 
'64=0.9 
Q1=1 
Q2=0.2 -83=0.8 X3_0.2 
ý3=1 
V. Good 
1'=o 
Good 
12=0 
Medium 
1'=1.0 
Low 
1'=o 
V. Low 
dap 
CoomunicaUon & 
Language Skill 
FUZZY INPUT 
Figure A2.12: Mapping from Communication & Language Skill to Non-Technical Skill 
A2.14. Teamwork 
Based on the given information and the Master's observation the grade of the Third 
Officer's teamwork is evaluated as good. Therefore, the fuzzy set can be evaluated as 
follows: 
TW = {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 1.0), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
The mapping process is elucidated in Figure A2.13, and the fuzzy output set can be 
evaluated as follows: 
1VT,, W = {(Very Good, 0.2), (Good, 0.8), (Average, 0), (Fairly low, 0), (Low, 0)} 
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Figure A2.13: Mapping from Teamwork to Non-Technical Skill 
A2.15. Decision Making 
Based on the given information and Master's judgement, the grade of the Third 
Officer's decision making is evaluated as medium. Therefore, the fuzzy set can be 
evaluated as follows: 
DM = {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Medium, 1.0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)} 
The mapping process is elucidated in Figure A2.14, and the fuzzy output set can be 
evaluated as follows: 
NTDM = {(Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.8), (Fairly low, 0.2), (Low, 0)) 
u1=0 u1=0 u3=0.8 u4=0.2 u'=0 
V. Good Good Average Flow 
Low Non-Technical 
Skill 
/iZ=0.8 
4 
'64 = 0.9 
Qz=0.2 , 
6-, = 0.8 
ýý=0.2 
ýs=1 
Y. Good 
1_=0 
Good 
=0 
Mediu 
1'=1.0 
m 
1 s0 
IV. LOWI Decision 
i'=o Making 
Figure A2.14: 
FUZZY INPUT 
Mapping from Decision Making to Non-Technical Skill 
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A2.16. Aggregation of Sub-Criteria 
Based on the experts' judgement, situation awareness, communication and language 
skill, teamwork, and decision making are equally important. Moreover, by help of IDS 
software, as shown in Figure A2.15, NTH, , NT,., , NT-1-w, and NT, are aggregated. 
The result is presented in Table A2.3. 
Table A2.3: Aggregation of Sub-Criteria of Non-Technical Skill 
Strength Very Good Good Average Fairly Low Low Weight 
NT, ý 
0.2 0.8 0 0 0 0.25 
NTý. ý 
0 0 0.8 0.2 0 0.25 
NT71 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 0.25 
NTi)M 0 0 0.8 0.2 0 0.25 
Result 0.0928 z 0.1 0.4072 0.4 0.4072 z 0.4 0.0928 z 0.1 0 
Figure A2.15: Non-Technical Skill Aggregation Result 
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A2.17. Mapping from Main Criterion (Non-Technical Skill) to Goal 
The main criterion (i. e. Non-Technical Skill) can be transformed to the goal (i. e. Third 
Officer's reliability) by formulating a mapping process. Based on Table A2.3, the fuzzy 
set for the Third Officer's fatigue can be written as follows: 
NT = {(Very Good, 0.1), (Good, 0.4), (Average, 0.4), (Fairly low, 0.1), (Low, 0)) 
The mapping process is shown in Figure A2.16, and the fuzzy output set can be 
evaluated as follows: 
GNT = {(High, 0.18), (Fairly High, 0.32), (Medium, 0.4), (Fairly low, 0.08), (Low, 0.02)) 
FUZZY OUTPUT 
u1=0.18 u2=0.32 u3=0.4 u`=0.08 us=0.02 Third Officers 
High F. High Medium F" ow Reliability 
1Q; = 0.81 ID' - 0.21 
p1=1 2=0.2 Q3-I. O 
Qý=ý. B/ 
ý3=1 
FV-. Good 
l'=o. 
Good 
12=o. 4 
Average 
13=0.4 
F. Low 
1'=0.1 
Low 
Is _o 
Non-Technical 
Skill 
FUZZY INPUT 
Figure A2.16: Mapping from Non-Technical Skill to the Third Officer's Reliability 
A2.18. Age 
Based on the given information and Figure 3.7, the fuzzy set for the Third Officer's age 
can be evaluated as follows: 
A= {(Very Young, 0), (Young, 1.0), (Average, 0), (Old, 0), (Very old, 0)) 
The mapping process is shown in Figure A2.17, and the fuzzy output set can be 
evaluated as follows: 
FSA = {(Very High, 0.2), (High, 0.8), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)} 
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ß3=0. ö 
fl(., 
Voung Young Average O! d Age 
1 -0 1 1.0 L 
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Figure A2.17: Mapping from Age to Fitness and Strength 
A2.19. Health 
Based on the given information, the Third Officer is holding a valid medical fitness 
certificate and according to his statements he is "healthy". Based on the Master's 
judgment he is 50% very healthy and 50% healthy Thus, the fuzzy set for his health can 
be evaluated as follows: 
HE= {(Very Healthy, 0.5), (Healthy, 0.5), (Mo1. Fit, 0), (Unhealthy, 0)) 
The mapping process is shown in Figure A2.18, and the fuzzy output set can be 
evaluated as follows: 
FSE = {(Very High, 0.6), (High, 0.4), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)} 
u'=0.6 u2=0.4 uj=0 u'5=0 
V. High High Medium 
Y 
Fittneaa & Stmngth 
633O. 2 
1.0 
181 
q 
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Q2=0.2 183 
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V. Healthy Healthy Mol. Fit UnHealthy Health 
1'=0. s 13=0 l4=0 
Fuzzy Input 
Figure A2.18: Mapping from Health to Fitness and Strength 
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A2.20. Stress 
Based on the given information and the Third Officer's statement, his stress level is 
Moderate. Thus, the fuzzy set for his stress can be evaluated as follows: 
ST = {(Very High, 0), (High, 0), (Moderate, 1), (Low, 0)) 
The mapping process is shown in Figure A2.19, and the fuzzy output set can be 
evaluated as follows: 
FSs,. _ {(Very High, 0.2), (High, 0.8), (Medium, 0), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)} 
FUZZY OUTPUT 
us=0 ; tß=0.2 u1=0. ö u3=0 u°=0 
V. High High Medium Low 
V"Low Fittness & Strength 
= 0.2 T #634 
1.0 
ý2=0.2-0.8 
Q30.8 
ýe i =1.0 
Low Moderate High V. High stress 
'=0 11=1 1'=0 1'=0 
FUZZY INPUT 
Figure A2.19: Mapping from Stress to Fitness and Strength 
A2.21. Nutrition 
Based on the Third Officer's statement, the quality of food is "not bad", accordingly 
based on expert's judgment "not bad" stands for 40% average and 60% bad. Thus, the 
fuzzy set for his nutrition can be evaluated as follows: 
N= ((Very Good, 0), (Good, 0), (Average, 0.4), (Bad, 0.6), (Very Bad, 0)} 
The mapping process is shown in Figure A2.20, and the fuzzy output set can be 
evaluated as follows: 
FSN = {(Very High, 0), (High, 0), (Medium, 0.36), (Low, 0.64), (Very Low, 0)} 
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Figure A2.20: Mapping from Nutrition to Fitness and Strength 
A2.22. Aggregation of Sub-Criteria 
The weight of each sub-criterion can be extracted from Table 3.12. Moreover, by help 
of the IDS software, as shown in Figure A2.2 1, FS,,, FSHE, FSS,, and FSN are 
aggregated and the result is presented in Table A2.4. 
Table A2.4: Aggregation of Sub-Criteria of Fitness and Strength 
Fitness & Very high High Medium Low Very low Weight 
Strength 
FSA 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 0.1479 
FSfE 0.6 0.4 0 0 0 0.3205 
FS 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 0.3798 
FSN 0 0 0.36 0.64 0 0.1518 
Aggregation 0.2907 0.6031 0.0382 0.0679 0 
Result = 0.29 z 0.6 0.04 - 0.07 
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Figure A2.2 1: Fitness & Strength Aggregation Result 
A2.23. Mapping from Main Criterion (Fitness and Strength) to Goal 
The main criterion (i. e. fitness and strength) can be transformed to the goal (i. e. Third 
Officer's reliability) by formulating a mapping process. Based on Table A2.4, the fuzzy 
set for the Third Officer's fitness and strength can be written as follows: 
FS = {(Very High, 0.29), (High, 0.6), (Medium, 0.04), (Low, 0.07), (Very Low, 0)) 
The mapping process is shown in Figure A2.22, and the fuzzy output set can be 
evaluated as follows: 
G1; S = {(High, 
0.53), (Fairly high, 0.36), (Medium, 0.04), (Fairly low, 0.042), (Low, 0.028)} 
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Figure A2.22: Mapping from Fitness and Strength to the Third Officer's Reliability 
A2.24. Motivation 
The following fuzzy rules are assigned by the experts: 
If a person is punctual, performs his job more than expected, does not require 
supervision, and reads books and manuals regularly to enhance his cognitive 
demands, then his motivation is 100% very high. 
If a person is punctual, performs his job according to his job description, requires 
supervision occasionally, and reads books and manuals regularly to enhance his 
cognitive demands, then his motivation is 70% high and 30% very high. 
" If a person is punctual, performs his job according to his job description, requires 
supervision occasionally, and reads books and manuals occasionally to enhance his 
cognitive demands then his motivation is 70% medium and 30% high 
If a person is punctual, performs his job according to his job description, requires 
supervision frequently, and does not read books and manuals then his motivation is 
70% low and 30% medium. 
If a person is not punctual, not performs his job according to his job description, 
requires supervision frequently, and does not read books and manuals then his 
motivation is 100% very low. 
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Based on the given information, the Third Officer is punctual, he needs supervision 
occasionally, and he is enthusiastic. Thus, the fuzzy set for his motivation can be 
evaluated as follows: 
M= {(Very High, 0), (High, 0.3), (Medium, 0.7), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
A2.25. Mapping from Main Criterion (Motivation) to Goal 
The main criterion (i. e. motivation) can be transformed to the goal (i. e. Third Officer's 
reliability) by formulating a mapping process. Based on A2.24, the fuzzy set for the 
Third Officer's motivation can be written as follows: 
M= ((Very High, 0), (High, 0.3), (Medium, 0.7), (Low, 0), (Very Low, 0)) 
The mapping process is shown in Figure A2.23, and the fuzzy output set can be 
evaluated as follows: 
GM = {(High, 0.09), (Fairly High, 0.21), (Medium, 0.7), (Fairly low, 0), (Low, 0)) 
FUZZY OUT PUT 
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1 
F. High Medium 
Ju 1 4=0 
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12=0.3 1j=o. ý 14=ý 1J=U 
FUZZY INPUT 
Figure A2.23: Mapping from Motivation to the Third Officer's Reliability 
A2.26. Design & Layout 
Based on the given information, the fuzzy set for Design & Layout is evaluated as 
follows: 
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DL = {(Very Good, 1), (Good, 0), (Average, 0), (Bad, 0), (Very Bad, 0)} 
A2.27. Mapping from Main Criterion (Design & Layout) to Goal 
The mapping process is shown in Figure A2.24, and the fuzzy output set can be 
evaluated as follows: 
GoL = {(High, 1), (Fairly High, 0), (Medium, 0), (Fairly low, 0), (Low, 0)) 
=1 u20 u3°0 u°=0 us=0 Third Officer's 
figh F. High Medium F. Low Low Reliability 
ß' - 0.3 
1 
Q; -0.3 
p2-0.7 
ý3=1.0 
ß4°0.7 
Bs=1 
Design & Layout 
V. Good Good FA verage Bad V. Bad 
1'°1 11 .0=o 
FUZZY INPUT 
Figure A2.24: Mapping from Design & Layout to the Third Officer's Reliability 
. 2.28. Aggregation of Main-Criteria 
3ased on the experts' judgement, the main criteria are equally important, therefore the 
veight distributed evenly between them (i. e. 1/6). Moreover, by help of the IDS 
oftware, as shown in Figure A2.25, G,. , G , GNT. , GFS , GM , and 
Goy are aggregated 
nd the result is presented in Table A2.5. 
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Table A2.5: Aggregation of Main Criteria to Goal 
Ship-Staff High Fairly High Medium Fairly Low Low Weight 
Reliability 
G7 0.08 0.16 0.34 0.42 0 1/6 
G 
H 
0.656 0.224 0.1 0.016 0.004 1 /6 
G, 
vr 
0.18 0.32 0.4 0.08 0.02 1/6 
G, s 
0.53 0.36 0.04 0.042 0.028 1/6 
G M 0.09 0.21 0.7 0 0 1/6 
1 0 0 0 0 1/6 GJ)r. 
Goal Result 0.4449 0.2060 0.2581 0.0834 0.0076 
OV. VV lV 
70.00% 
N 
' 60.00% 
50.00% 
40.00% 
G) 
m 30.00% 
20.00% 
10.00% 
0.00% 
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Figure A2.25: Aggregation of Main Criteria to Goal 
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A. 2.29. Utility Value 
Evidently, the assessment based on a single value is much easier and more intuitive as a 
practical tool for a professional decision maker for ranking the alternatives. Therefore, 
to obtain a single crisp number for the goal, the utility value associated with each 
linguistic term has to be calculated. Based on Table A2.5, the fuzzy set for the Third 
Officer's reliability (Goal) can be written as follows: 
((High, 0.4449), (Fairly High, 0.2060), (Medium, 0.2581), (Fairly Low, 0.0834), (Low, 0.0076)) 
In view of the fact that the fuzzy set for the goal has been characterised by five 
linguistic terms, the highest preference is given to the "High" linguistic term and the 
lowest preference is given to the "Low" linguistic term. Thus, the ranking value is 
designated from five (i. e. highest preference) to one (i. e. lowest preference). The goal's 
assessments, as shown in Table 3.15, are complete. Based on Equations (3.14) and 
(3.19) the goal's utility value can be calculated as shown in Table A2.6. 
Table A2.6: Calculation of Utility Value 
Hn High Fairly high Medium Fairly low Low 
Vn 5 4 3 2 1 
u(Hn 5-1 =1 
4-1 
=0.75 
3-1 
=0.5 
2-1 0.25 
1-1 
=0 5-1 5-1 5-1 5-1 5-1 
ß 
n 
0.4449 0.2060 0.2581 0.0834 0.0076 
5 
E ßn =0.4449+0.2060+0.2581+0.0834+0.0076=1 -" ßH =0 
n=1 
ßn x u(Hn) 0.4449 0.1545 0.12905 0.02085 0 
5 
R! - _ Lßnxu(Hn)=0.7493=0.75 
n=1 
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Appendix 3: Mapping Process (Chapter 4) 
Table A3.1: Qualification (Based on Figures A2.1 and A2.5) 
Fuzzy I 1 1 1 1 
Input 
0 0 0.2 0.8 0 
Belief 
i 
fl; 1,1 ýý Pý, 1 ß2,1 ß3,1 ß3,1 Q4,1 ý5,1 
n degrees 
First 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8 1 
Belief 
i )6ý, 
2 ßi, 2 ß2,2 ß3,2 ßj, 2 /ý, 2 ß,, 2 ß5,2 
n degrees 
Second 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8 1 
Result g g g g g5 
0.004 0.05 0.434 0.512 0 
Prior 0.3865 
Probability 
Table A3.2: Experience (Based on Figures A2.2 and A2.5) 
Fuzzy 1 1 1 I 1 
Input 
0 0 0.2 0.8 0 
Belief 
i )6,1 ,1 
ßß, l j63,1 6ý, 
1 31 4,1 ßs, 1 
n degrees 
First 
mapping 1 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.8 1 
Belief 1,2 
)6; 
1,2 ß2 2,2 ý2 2,2 ß3 3,2 Q 3,2 Q 4,2 Q fl 3,2 degrees in 3 4 4 S 
Second 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8 1 
Result g g g g g 
0 0.028 0.396 0.576 0 
Prior 0.363 
Probability 
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Table A3.3: Specific Training (Based on Figures A2.3 and A2.5) 
Fuzzy 1 1 1 l I 
Input 
0.2 0.8 0 0 0 
Belief 
i 
1,1 ý1 2,1 
182 
3,1 ý2 3,1 ý3 4,1 Q 4,1 
/ß 
S, 1 Q 5,1 Q n degrees 3 4 4 S 
First 
mapping 1 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.1 
Belief 
i 
1,2 ý1 1,2 ý2 2,2 Q2 2,2 Q3 3,2 Q 3,2 Q 4,2 Q 5,2 Q 
n degrees 3 4 4 S 
Second 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.8 1 
Result g g g g g 
0.328 0.528 0.144 0 1 0 - 
Prior 0.796 
Probability 
Table A3.4: Rest Hours (Based on Figures A2.6 and A2.10) 
Fuzzy 1 1 1 1 1 
Input 
1 0 0 0 0 
Belief 
i 
1,1 ßl 1,1 ß2 2,1 ß2 3,1 ý3 4,1 Q3 4,1 Q S, 1 Q 5,1 Q 
n degrees 4 4 S 
First 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.1 1 
Belief 
i 
1,2 
)61 
1,2 
'82 
2,2 Q2 2,2 Q3 3,2 Q 4,2 ß 5,2 Q S2 P , n degrees 3 4 4 5 
Second 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0 1 0.8 0.2 1 
Result g g g g g 
1 0 0 0 0 
Prior 1 
Probability 
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Table A3.5: Environment (Based on Figures A2.7 and A2.10) 
Fuzzy l 1 l 1 1 Input 
0 0.5 0.5 0 0 
Belief 
degrees in 
6I 1 Q2'1 2,1 ý33 1 84,1 3 ßi, 
1 ý5,1 4 ý5,1 S 
First 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.1 1 
Belief 
degrees in 
1,2 ý1 1,2 
182 
2,2 ý2 3,2 ý3 4,2 Q3 4,2 ý4 5,2 Q4 5,2 QS 
Second 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 1 0 0.8 0.2 1 
Result $ $ $ 
0.18 0.32 0.4 0.08 0.02 
Prior 0.64 
Probability 
Table A3.6: Design & Habitability (Based on Figures A2.8 and A2.10) 
Fuzzy 1 1 1 1 1 Input 
0 1 0 0 0 
Belief 
degrees in )6j'1 /jß1 '33,1 '83,1 ýf4, l #5,1 ý5,1 S 
First 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.1 1 
Belief 
degrees in 
2 
j6; ' 
1,2 ß2 22 ý2 2,2 ß3 3,2 Q3 4,2 Q4 5,2 Q4 5,2 
/QS 
Second 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0 1 0.8 0.2 1 
Result g g g g S 
0.36 0.64 0 0 0 
Prior 0.84 
Probability 
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Table A3.7: Situation awareness (Based on Figures A2.11 and A2.16) 
Fuzzy 1' 1` 1 I 1 Input 
0 1 0 0 0 
Belief 
degrees in 
1,1 
181 
1,1 ß2 2,1 ý2 3,1 Q3 4'1 Q3 ,, 1 ý3 5.1 ýj 5.1 P 
S 
First 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.1 1 
ief 
delgrees in )61 
1,2 X2.2 Pý, 2 ý2,2 X3,2 ý4,2 ß4,2 112 
Second 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0 1 0.8 0.2 1 
Result g g g S g 
0.36 0.64 0 0 0 
Prior 0.84 
Probability 
Table A3.8: Communication and Language Skill (Based on Figures A2.12 and A2.16) 
Fuzzy 
Input 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 1 
0 
1 
0 
Belief 
degrees in 
First 
1,1 ßl 1,1 ý2 21 ß2 3,1 Q3 4,1 Q3 (34,1 ýj4.1 85,1 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.1 1 
Belief 
degrees in 
Second 
1,2 ßl 1,2 ý2 2,2 ß2 Q3'2 Q3'2 4,2 Q4 ,2 84. ' 5,2 ýj5 
1 0 2 mapping . 0.8 0 1 0.8 0.2 1 
Result $ g $ 
0 0 0.8 0.16 0.04 
Prior 
Probability 
0.44 
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Table A3.9: Teamwork (Based on Figures A2.13 and A2.16) 
Fuzzy 1 1 1 1 1 Input 
0 1 0 0 0 
Belief 
degrees in 
11 
)61' 
1,1 ß2 2,1 ß2 3,1 ß3 4,1 Q3 4,1 Q4 S, 1 fl4 S1 I /ßS 
First 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.1 
Belief 
degrees in 
X1'2 62'2 QZ'2 ß3'2 Qß"2 
, 64,2 /34.2 85,2 
Second 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0 1 0.8 0.2 
Result $ $ $ 9 9 
0.36 0.64 0 0 0 
Prior 0.84 
Probability 
Table A3.10: Decision Making (Based on Figures A2.14 and A2.16) 
Fuzzy 1' 1` 1 1 1 Input 
0 0 1 0 0 
Belief 
degrees in 
1,1 ý1 1,1 ß2 2,1 8 63 1 
/ß3 ,1 
41 ý34 1 845' S, 1 ýQS 
First 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.1 1 
Belief 
degrees in 
1,2 
)61 
1,2 ß2 2,2 ß2 fl3'2 Q3 ý2 4,2 Q4 S2 Q4 5,2 QS 
Second 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0 1 0.8 0.2 1 
Result $ g g 94 9 
0 0 0.8 0.16 0.04 
Prior 0.44 
Probability 
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Table A3.1 1: Age (Based on Figures A2.17 and A2.22) 
Fuzzy 1' 1` 1 1 1 Input 
0000 
Belief 
degrees in 
1,1 1,1 fl1 2,1 4,1 S, l S, 1 ý2 ý2 Q3l Q3 J4 QS 
First 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.2 0.9 0.1 1 
Belief 
degrees in 
12 
)61' 
1,2 
162 
2,2 ß2 2,2 ß ß3,2 4,2 ß ý, 2 / 2 
j655 
Second 
mapping 1 0.4 0.6 0 1 0.6 0.4 1 
Result g g g S g 
0.52 0.48 0 0 0 
Prior 0.88 
Probability 
Table A3.12: Health (Based on Figures A2.18 and A2.22 
Fuzzy 
Input 
1' 1` I 1 1 
0 5 0 5 . . 0 0 0 
1 1 
degrees in 
First 
/3 
1 0 2 
ß2I /331 ý4.1 ý3,1 ý5.1 ý5,1 
mapping . 0.8 0.8 0.2 0 1 0 
Belief 
degrees in 
Second 
1,2 ß1 1,2 fl2 1822 
113,2 ý3j'2 ýf;, 
2 fjý5,2 ý5,2 
1 0 4 mapping . 0.6 0 1 0.6 0.4 1 
Result $ 4 $ 
-- 
$ 9 9 
0 76 00 . . 2244 0 0 0 
Prior 
Probability 
0.94 
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Table A3.13: Stress (Based on Figures A2.19 and A2.22) 
Fuzzy 1 1 1 1 1 
Input 
0 1 0 0 0 
Belief 
degrees in 
1,1 ý1 1,1 Q2 2,1 Q2 3,1 Q3 84,1 Q3 1 P4. ' S1 Q4 S, I QS 
First 
mapping 1 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.2 0 1 0 
Belief 
degrees in 
1,2 ý1 1,2 ý2 2,2 ý2 2,2 ß3 32 ý3 4,2 Q4 52 84' 5,2 ßS 
Second 
mapping 1 0.4 0 .6 0 1 0.6 0.4 1 
Result g g g 8 $ 
0.52 0.48 0 0 0 
Prior 0.88 
Probability 
Table A3.14: Nutrition (Based on Figures A2.20 and A2.22) 
Fuzzy 1 1 1 1 I 
Input 
0 0 0.4 0.6 0 
Belief 
degrees in 
1,1 ß l 
1,1 ý2 21 ß2 3,1 Q3 4,1 
'83 
3,1 Q4 4,1 Q4 5,1 QS 
First 
mapping 1 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.8 1 
Belief 
degrees in 
8 1,2 1 
1,2 ý2 22 ß2 ýj3 2 3 ,2 ý4.2 /jß'2 ßSS ,2 
Second 
mapping 1 0.4 0.6 0 1 0.6 0.4 1 
Result g g g g 8 
0 0 0.36 0.384 0.256 
Prior 0.276 
Probability 
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Table A3.15: Motivation (Based on Figure A2.23) 
Fuzzy 
Input 
1 1 Z 1 1 
0 0.3 0.7 0 0 
Belief 
degrees /ß1 
#2 %j2 /3 
'83 p4 
Q4 QS 
1 0.3 0.7 1 0 0.7 0.3 1 
Result g g g g g 
0.09 0.21 0.7 0 0 
Prior 
Probability 
0.5975 
Table A3.16: Design & Layout (Based on Figure A2.24) 
Fuzzy 
Input 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 
Belief 
degrees 
ßl 2 2 ß3 3 ß4 Q4 ßS 
1 0.3 0.7 1 0 0.7 0.3 
Result g g g3 
71 
g g 
1 0 0 0 0 
Prior 
Probability 
1 
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Appendix 4 
Security Assessments 
A4.1. Security Assessment of a Warehouse, Port, Manufacturing Site, 
Container Consolidation and de-Consolidation Facility. 
The following are designed to assess the basic physical security and procedural security 
standards for the factories, and plants as well as container yards and warehouses 
(McNicholas, 2008): 
1. Perimeter barrier: At least 8 feet in height, chain link fence or concrete wall, and 
topped with blade concertina wire. 
a. The basic physical security is assessed as very high. 
b. The basic physical security is assessed as high. 
c. The basic physical security is assessed as average. 
d. The basic physical security is assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not 
met). 
2. Gates: At least 8 feet in height, chain link fence or metal door, and topped with 
blade concertina wire. 
a. The basic physical security is assessed as very high. 
b. The basic physical security is assessed as high. 
c. The basic physical security is assessed as average. 
d. The basic physical security is assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not 
met). 
3. Security gatehouse: Vehicle and personnel control logs, visitor badges, telephone, 
radio, post order, emergency notification poster, fire extinguisher, flash lights. 
a. The basic physical security is assessed as very high. 
b. The basic physical security is assessed as high. 
c. The basic physical security is assessed as average. 
d. The basic physical security is assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not 
met). 
319 
4. Lighting: Perimeter, exterior of buildings and loading docks, parking area, container 
staging areas, and all cargo storage and packing areas. 
a. The basic physical security is assessed as very high. 
b. The basic physical security is assessed as high. 
c. The basic physical security is assessed as average. 
d. The basic physical security is assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not 
met). 
5. Segregated parking area: Privately owned vehicles (POVs) to be separated from 
company vehicles, no POVs parked near loading docks or cargo or container staging 
area. 
a. The basic physical security is assessed as very high. 
b. The basic physical security is assessed as high. 
c. The basic physical security is assessed as average. 
d. The basic physical security is assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not 
met). 
6. Building door and window locks/ protection: Deadbolt locks on all exterior doors, 
wire mesh or bars on all windows below and second floor. 
a. The basic physical security is assessed as very high. 
b. The basic physical security is assessed as high. 
c. The basic physical security is assessed as average. 
d. The basic physical security is assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not 
met). 
7. Access control: Challenging, screening, inspection, and documentation of all 
vehicles, cargos, and persons at perimeter, gates, and building entrances and exits, 
a. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as very high. 
b. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as high. 
c. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as average. 
d. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not met). 
320 
8. Security officers: Deployed at all entrances/exits and on patrol. 
a. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as very high. 
b. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as high. 
c. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as average. 
d. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not met). 
9. Intrusion detection: Alarms, passive infrared (PIR) systems, taut wires, buried 
cables etc., at the perimeter and at the access points to all restricted areas. 
a. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as very high. 
b. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as high. 
c. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as average. 
d. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not met). 
10. Closed circuit television (CCTV) system: Cameras mounted at perimeter, 
entrance/exits, container and cargo staging areas, loading dock and restricted areas, 
monitored and recorded 24/7 in central monitoring office. 
a. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as very high. 
b. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as high. 
c. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as average. 
d. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not met). 
11. Identification cards: For employees, vendors and visitors. 
a. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as very high. 
b. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as high. 
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c. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as average. 
d. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not met). 
12. Security key: Issue and control programme in place. 
a. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as very high. 
b. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as high. 
c. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as average. 
d. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not met). 
13. Container seals: Inventory controls, issue logs and reconciliation procedures. 
a. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as very high. 
b. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as high. 
c. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as average. 
d. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not met). 
14. Security standard operating procedure manual: Written, comprehensive, 
implemented and audited. 
a. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as very high. 
b. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as high. 
c. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as average. 
d. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not met). 
15. Personal security: Screening all applicants for employment, completion of detailed 
employment interview by the manager, criminal history and credit checks and 
interview of references and prior employs. 
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a. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as very high. 
b. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as high. 
c. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as average. 
d. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not met). 
16. Contraband detection systems: Non intrusive technology (i. e. passive gamma, 
passive neutron, active radiography, X-Ray machines, portal monitors, radiation 
detective pagers) [Applicable for Ports]. 
a. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as very high. 
b. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as high. 
c. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as average. 
d. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not met). 
17. Raw material and finished product: Controlled, inspected, inventoried, secured and 
monitored [Applicable for Factories]. 
a. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as very high. 
b. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as high. 
c. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as average. 
d. The procedural security standards, monitoring and detecting systems are 
assessed as low (i. e. the basic requirement is not met). 
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Table A4.1: Answer Key for A4.1 
Question Number Point Values of Answers 
a b c d 
1 10 8 6 (-120) 
2 10 8 6 (-120) 
3 10 8 6 (-120) 
4 10 8 6 (-120) 
5 10 8 6 (-120) 
6 10 8 6 (-120) 
7 10 8 6 (-120) 
8 10 8 6 (-120) 
9 10 8 6 (-120) 
10 10 8 6 (-50) 
11 10 8 6 (-120) 
12 10 8 6 (-120) 
13 10 8 6 (-120) 
14 10 8 6 (-120) 
15 10 8 6 (420) 
16 10 8 6 (-50) 
17 10 8 6 (-120) 
Based on Table A4.1, the highest score for a warehouse, container consolidation and de- 
consolidation facility can be calculated as 150 points (i. e. very high security standard). 
However, if the security standards are evaluated as high and average the score can be 
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evaluated as 120 and 90 points respectively. Furthermore, if any of the basic security 
requirements are not met the score is calculated as 30 points. A quantitative criterion (i. e. 
the scores), as shown in Figure A4.1, can be transformed to a qualitative criterion (i. e. 
reliability) by exploiting the membership functions. In the same manner the 
membership functions for a port or a manufacturing site, as shown in Figure A4.2, can 
be constructed. 
Degree 
30 
Figure A4.1: Membership Functions of Warehouse, Container Consolidation and 
de-Consolidation facility 
Degree 
Figure A4.2: Membership Functions of Port and Manufacturing Site 
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45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 Score 
32 48 64 80 96 112 128 144 160 Score 
A4.2. Assessment of Exporters or Manufacturers for Export Readiness. 
The following are designed and modified to assess the exporter or the manufacturer's 
reliability (Zakner and Belisa, 2004): 
1. What product (products) does (do) the exporter offer? 
a. Fast-selling consumer goods (e. g. food, drink, confectionary product). 
b. Consumer durables (e. g. furniture, hi-fi, appliances). 
c. Industrial consumables or durables (e. g. raw material, components, machinery, 
etc. ). 
2. How long is the exporter in the business? 
a. More than 15 years. 
b. Less than one year. 
c. Between one and three years. 
d. More than three years. 
3. Is the trend of sales and inquiries up or down? 
a. Up. 
b. Down. 
c. About the same. 
d. Do not know. 
4. How many sales offices, sales locations, or distribution points does the company 
have? 
a. One or more domestic office and at least one foreign office. 
b. One. 
c. Two. 
d. More than two. 
5. What is the timeframe for the exporter's business plan? 
a. Six months. 
b. One year. 
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c. Three years. 
d. No business plan. 
6. Have the exporter exported before? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
7. Had the exporter exported to the concerned country (i. e. discharging port) before? 
a. Yes, more than three times and no violation history or noncompliance with 
customs laws and regulations observed. 
b. Yes, less than three times and no violation history or noncompliance with 
customs laws and regulations observed. 
c. No. 
d. A violation history or noncompliance with customs laws and regulations 
observed. 
8. How much time is the exporter dedicated to export planning? 
a. Considerable planning efforts (i. e. three to six months). 
b. Some (one or two months). 
c. Minimal(less than a month). 
d. Do not know. 
9. How quickly does the management expect export operations to become self- 
sustaining? 
a. Three years. 
b: Immediately. 
c. Six months or already self-sustained. 
d. Do not know. 
10. Has the company's management allocated resources for the export effort? 
a. Assigned extra personnel only. 
b. Allocated extra financial resources. 
c. Allocated both personnel and financial resources. 
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d. No extra resources will be allocated. 
11. Which of the following market entry barriers have the exporter researched? 
a. Tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 
b. International standards. 
c. Product modification. 
d. All of the above. 
12. For the product what factors did the exporter take into account? 
a. Cost only. 
b. Market demand and cost only. 
c. Competition and cost only. 
d. All of the above. 
13. What factors does the company include in its market analysis? 
a. Structure. 
b. Market share and size. 
c. All of above. 
d. None of above. 
14. Does the exporter have a website in English language? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
15. With how many countries has business been conducted? 
a. None. 
b. One. 
c. Between two and three. 
d. More than three. 
16. Has the exporter participated in the international trade exhibition? 
a. Never. 
b. Once as an attendee. 
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c. Twice and more as an attendee. 
d. More than once as an attendee and at least once as an exhibitor. 
17. How much international business experience does the company's staff have, either 
/both in theory and /or practice? 
a. None. 
b. Moderate amount. 
c. Considerable amount. 
d. Do not know. 
18. Which of the company's employees speak English? 
a. Top management only. 
b. Middle and top managements. 
c. Administrative staff as well as top and middle managements. 
d. None of the above. 
19. Did the company succeed in obtaining a bank loan in the last 10 years? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
c. Do not know. 
20. What method of payment does the exporter consider the least secure? 
a. Open account. 
b. Cash in advance. 
c. Letter of credit. 
d. Documentary collection. 
21. Which method of e-mail communication is used by the company? 
a. External communication only. 
b. Internal communication only. 
c. Both as internal and external communication method. 
d. Not used at all. 
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Table A4.2: Answer Key for A4.2 
Question Number Point Values of Answers 
a b c d 
1 3 3 3 - 
2 5 0 1 3 
3 5 0 1 0 
4 5 0 1 3 
5 (-30) 1 4 (-50) 
6 5 0 _ 
7 15 5 0 (-40) 
8 5 1 (-15) (-15) 
9 (-2) 1 2 0 
10 2 3 5 0 
11 0 0 0 5 
12 0 0 0 5 
13 1 1 5 0 
14 5 0 
15 0 1 2 3 
16 0 1 2 5 
17 1 2 3 0 
18 2 3 4 0 
19 5 0 0 - 
20 5 0 0 0 
21 2 2 5 0 
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Based on Table A4.2, the highest score (i. e. sum of the highest values for each question) 
for an exporter or a manufacturer can be calculated as 104 points. However, if an 
exporter has exported less than three times or if an exporter is exporting for the first 
time the score may be evaluated as 94 or 84 points respectively. Furthermore, if an 
exporter has a serious interest in exporting, but there are some areas of weakness in the 
exporter's strategy the score may be evaluated as 64-84 points. The quantitative 
criterion (i. e. the scores), as shown in Figure A4.3, can be transformed to a qualitative 
criterion (i. e. reliability) by exploiting the membership functions. 
Degree 
Figure A4.3: Membership Functions of Exporter and Manufacturer for Export Readiness 
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b4 ea 14 is 84 89 94 99 104 Score 
